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Beauty and Its Problems:  
Introduction
‘A theory of beauty would be a good thing to have . . . ’
Denis Donoghue, Speaking of Beauty1
Stoics and their place in ancient aesthetics
Beauty is often taken to be a part of the standard philosophical 
curriculum, yet there are not many comprehensive histories of 
Western thought on the subject. One of the more recent of such 
studies is Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz’s The History of Aesthetics. In this 
work, Tatarkiewicz presents a taxonomy of the theories and con-
ceptualisations of beauty. The ‘original Greek concept of beauty’ 
is the first type of theory. Tatarkiewicz explains this type of theory 
by contrasting it with the prevalent understanding of beauty in 
Europe from the eighteenth century, which constitutes the second 
type of theory in his classification. He claims that the former is 
broader than the latter, as it is applicable not only to shapes, sounds 
and sights, but also to thoughts and customs.2 The second type of 
concept of beauty, meanwhile, includes aesthetic experiences only.3 
So far, Tatarkiewicz’s account is, by and large, fairly standard. The 
third category in his taxonomy, however, is a surprising one. While 
the first category summarises Greek literature and philosophy in 
an overarching manner, as if all Greek texts shared a single concept 
of beauty, the third category singles out one line of thought within 
the Greek tradition. It is the Stoic theory of beauty. According to 
2 The Stoic Theory of Beauty
Tatarkiewicz, the Stoics presented an aesthetic concept of beauty, 
but their theory recognised only visual beauty,4 and, for this reason, 
the Stoic theory constitutes a distinct category in his taxonomy.
Tatarkiewicz’s taxonomy of the theories of beauty can be ques-
tioned and criticised in multiple ways,5 but the peculiar addition of 
Stoicism to what would otherwise be a relatively standard classifica-
tion of the theories of beauty is thought-provoking. One might 
wonder whether the Stoic6 account was indeed sufficiently differ-
ent from the other concepts employed by Greek philosophers and 
writers to deserve its own category. Before investigating whether 
the Stoics deserve a category of their own, however, it is important 
to examine Tatarkiewicz’s motivation for singling out Stoicism.
Tatarkiewicz is not very explicit about his motivation, but it 
is likely that he describes the Stoic conceptualisation of beauty 
as restricted to the visual realm due to the tension between the 
standard interpretation of Stoic philosophy and the presence of the 
aesthetic vocabulary in Stoic arguments. Tatarkiewicz points out 
in his History of Aesthetics that the Stoics’ ‘philosophical principles 
were not suited to make aestheticians of them’.7 This statement 
was very likely inspired by the Stoics’ reputation as strict moralists 
who argue that it is crucial to remain unaffected by life’s joys and 
sorrows alike. If Stoicism is viewed in this way, it would be natural 
to assume that the Stoics adopted an equally indifferent attitude 
towards beauty and, thus, their principles led them away from 
aesthetics.
The understanding of Stoicism as a philosophy which requires 
its followers to be ascetics who shun ordinary human experiences, 
however, does not take into account all of the available evidence. 
One might be led into thinking this way by noting that the Stoics 
classified beauty as a preferred indifferent,8 which seems to suggest 
that a Stoic ought not to be concerned about beauty. At the same 
time, there is a surviving Stoic definition of beauty as summetria of 
parts with one another and with the whole accompanied, at least 
in some cases, by the examples of visual beauty. These two pieces 
of evidence might be the reason why Tatarkiewicz writes that the 
only concept of beauty subscribed to by the Stoics was an aesthetic 
concept of visual beauty. Such a stance on beauty would be unique, 
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so it is unsurprising that Tatarkiewicz presents the Stoic idea as 
not being comparable to any other theory and deserving of its own 
category.
There are, however, some additional Stoic arguments that 
are not mentioned by Tatarkiewicz. In these arguments, beauty 
terms are employed to describe phenomena that are not visual 
and, in some cases, are related to morality, thus indicating that 
the Stoic concept of beauty might have been more complex than 
Tatarkiewicz acknowledges it to be. There are at least two groups 
of problematic evidence.9 First, the texts that record the definition 
of beauty as summetria also state that just as the summetria of limbs 
accounts for the beauty of the body, so an analogous phenomenon 
accounts for the beauty of the soul. Second, the infamous Stoic 
paradox stating that only the wise man is beautiful suggests that the 
Stoics presented some reflections on the question of what human 
beauty amounts to which took into account much more than visual 
appearance. The claim that only the wise man is beautiful is not 
compatible with the concept of beauty as an aesthetic property 
restricted to visual appearance alone. Therefore, the Stoics either 
conceptualised beauty in a more complex way than Tatarkiewicz 
suggests, or they had more than one concept and some of those 
concepts accounted for more than visual beauty.
Interestingly, this evidence also shows that beauty is not con-
trasted with morality in Stoic arguments, as one might expect 
given the Stoic view that conventional goods are of indifferent 
value. In fact, there is little evidence that prominent early Stoics 
such as Chrysippus wrote about beauty as possessing or lacking 
intrinsic value.10 One of the extant arguments states that only the 
beautiful (τὸ καλόν) is the good, but, as will be argued in Chapter 
3, the context of this argument shows that it concerns an infer-
ence about the properties of the good rather than the equation of 
beauty with morality. Beauty, in this case, plays an instrumental 
role in making such inferences. There is also a group of surviving 
theological arguments which state that the beauty of the world, 
especially astronomical phenomena, is an indication of the manner 
in which the world was generated. All these ideas suggest that the 
Stoics employed beauty terms to denote attributions of value and 
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to construct logical inferences. The Stoic concept of beauty, there-
fore, must have been much broader than Tatarkiewicz allowed. 
It was also more problematic, but in philosophically interesting 
ways. First, there is a tension between some fundamental Stoic 
ethical doctrines and the prominent role that beauty terms play in 
certain Stoic arguments, which raises the question of the relation-
ship between morality and aesthetic value. Second, the employ-
ment of aesthetic terms in wide-ranging contexts raises the question 
of the unity of the underlying theory. In order to determine the 
scope of the Stoic theory, it is necessary to consider the broad 
context in which they occur. This concerns not only the historical 
context (which will be discussed in later chapters) but also the 
philosophical one, in the sense of the problems that the aesthetic 
phenomenon poses and the manner in which these problems are 
typically approached.
Ancient aesthetics
Before delving into the philosophical problems concerning beauty, 
it is necessary to address the potential issue that concerns the area of 
this study, that is, ancient aesthetics. Any work on ancient aesthet-
ics inevitably faces the question of whether the term itself is not 
anachronistic and inappropriate. Before discussing the tradition of 
the theories of beauty and how Stoic thought might fit into it, it 
is necessary to address the concern of whether ancient thought can 
be a part of aesthetics in general. The most famous and often-cited 
proponent of the view that philosophers and thinkers did not make 
proper aesthetic enquiries until the eighteenth century was Paul 
Oskar Kristeller, who argued as follows:
We have to admit the conclusion, distasteful to many historians of 
aesthetics but grudgingly admitted by most of them, that ancient 
writers and thinkers, though confronted with excellent works of art 
and quite susceptible to their charm, were neither able nor eager to 
detach the aesthetic quality of these works of art from their intellec-
tual, moral, religious and practical function or content, or to use such 
an aesthetic quality as a standard for grouping the fine arts together 
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or for making them the subject of a comprehensive philosophical 
interpretation.11
While some scholars treat this view as a serious challenge to 
ancient thought,12 it has also been convincingly criticised in a large 
variety of ways. James Porter, for instance, has astutely criticised 
both Kristeller’s premises and conclusions.13 Stephen Halliwell 
has not only criticised Kristeller’s argument itself,14 but has also 
argued that the ideas of Plato and Aristotle are both relevant to the 
preoccupations of modern philosophers and address the founda-
tional questions of aesthetics and philosophy of art.15 As Anastasia-
Erasmia Peponi has argued, despite the fact that in the eighteenth 
century aesthetics was conceived of as a discipline that investigates 
the fine arts, it does not follow that ‘aesthetic’ cannot be applied 
to historic material. Although the Greeks did not have an exact 
equivalent of the modern notion of ‘fine arts’, there is evidence that 
at least some thinkers grouped activities we call ‘fine arts’ and were 
interested in the effects produced by the beautiful properties of, for 
instance, poetry.16
There is, of course, always a risk of anachronism in attributing 
concepts to the ancients that originated much later. At the same 
time, there is a risk of denying that ancient philosophers were able 
to conceptualise certain positions just because their ideas originated 
in different contexts.17 The sensitivity to context is necessary in any 
historical study, but this is due to the fact that the context often 
illuminates the richness of the thought. By itself, it cannot exclude 
certain debates from being part of a wider tradition. Kristeller’s 
view that ancient thought ought to be separated from later devel-
opments in aesthetics because the ancients mixed aesthetic ques-
tions with moral, intellectual, practical and other questions, hence 
making their enquiries not purely ‘aesthetic’, can be challenged 
in this way too. In the introduction to A Companion to Ancient 
Aesthetics, the editors Pierre Destrée and Penelope Murray present a 
careful and context-sensitive study of the nature of ancient debates 
on aesthetics, including a discussion of the difference between the 
ancient and the modern traditions. And while ancient aesthetics is 
shown as a distinct tradition in its own right, it is also quite clear 
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that it can be studied as a tradition of aesthetics. Its differences do 
not limit the ability of the ancient thinkers to offer interesting and 
valuable insights on the nature of aesthetic properties and art. In 
fact, in recent years, several substantial studies on both literary criti-
cism and philosophical aesthetics have been published, and they are 
an additional proof that ancient aesthetics is a productive field of 
research.18 Given the amount of work that has been done on this 
topic, it seems that Kristeller’s challenge is not a great obstacle for 
including ancient thought in the general history of aesthetics.
More importantly, the way in which ancient thought is 
approached in the more recent and novel studies in aesthetics shows 
this challenge to be somewhat dated. Contemporary philosophers 
rarely subscribe to the restricted meaning of ‘aesthetics’. The very 
idea that aesthetics is a clearly demarcated area of philosophy has 
been shown to be problematic.19 Some of the more recent novel 
projects in aesthetics ignore these boundaries altogether and, as 
a result, show Kristeller’s historical concept of aesthetics to be an 
untenable position.
Denis Dutton’s monograph Art Instinct, for instance, is a rather 
innovative approach to the analysis of art production and experi-
ence. In this work, Dutton attempts to find solutions to standard 
questions raised by philosophers of art by employing insights pro-
vided by Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Since Dutton 
approaches aesthetic questions with a methodology which suggests 
that the practical and biological functions of objects are very sig-
nificant for understanding artistic and aesthetic value, ancient ideas 
and theories that often treat aesthetics as connected to the consid-
erations of the nature of human beings are as relevant as the ideas of 
their successors. Dutton not only briefly discusses Plato’s critique 
of the arts in the Republic and Aristotle’s theory of mimesis in 
the Poetics as works that exemplify some important problems and 
insights regarding human experience of the arts,20 but even states 
that ‘Plato and Aristotle invented aesthetics as analysis of the arts.’21 
This is not as rash an assertion as it might appear at first sight. In 
Dutton’s theoretical framework, the fact that these philosophers do 
not approach aesthetic questions in the same manner as eighteenth-
century thinkers is not a reason to exclude their thought from 
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aesthetics, because his own project would not count as ‘aesthetics’ 
either according to Kristeller’s definition. If Plato and Aristotle 
raised issues and proposed ideas that are significant for thinking 
about aesthetic properties and art, then it does make sense to speak 
of Platonic and Aristotelian aesthetics. Of course, not all classicists 
and experts on ancient philosophy will readily agree with Dutton’s 
naming of Plato and Aristotle as the inventors of aesthetics,22 but 
the way in which Dutton weaves ancient thought into his project 
shows that the scope of ancient discussions is by no means a reason 
to exclude them from the field of aesthetics.
Beauty and ethical puzzles
Questions about the nature of beauty have many ramifications in 
the philosophical analysis of value. The attribution of beauty to an 
object or a phenomenon implicitly assigns a certain value to that 
object.23 This raises the question of the grounds on which beauty 
is a value and, in certain cases, this question is of great importance. 
For instance, if beauty prompts scientists to choose one theory over 
another, then the way in which beauty renders one theory more 
valuable than another is not trivial. Of course, in order to determine 
in what sense beauty renders an object valuable and choice-worthy, 
it is necessary to understand what kind of a property beauty is and 
how it comes into being.
In some cases, ethical discourses employ beauty terms to describe 
morality and thus problematise the relationship between beauty 
and morality.24 One of the most powerful examples of the potential 
ambiguity between the references to beauty and morality is the 
ancient Greek term τὸ καλόν. This term is not easily translatable, 
and it is difficult –  and, perhaps, not necessary –  to interpret it 
in a single way.25 In some cases, τὸ καλόν can be understood 
as denoting moral excellence, but there are instances in which it 
implies cultural and aesthetic values. In the term καλοσκἀγαθος, 
for instance, καλός often loses aesthetic connotations entirely, as 
this term can be used to denote, for instance, a high class.26 When 
it stands alone, the adjective καλός can refer to good looks, but, 
at the same time, Kenneth Dover notes that ‘kalos and aiskhros are 
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applied very freely indeed by the orators to any action, behaviour 
or achievement which evokes any kind of favourable reaction and 
praise or incurs any kind of contempt, hostility or reproach’.27 In 
addition to this, in some contexts, this word can also refer to suit-
ability and convenience.28
In the case of philosophical texts, the relationship between the 
good and the beautiful is complex not only linguistically, but also 
conceptually. These terms underpin conceptualisations of proper-
ties and the relationship between them. The treatments of the good 
(τὸ ἀγαθόν) and the beautiful (τὸ καλόν) in the works of Plato29 
and Aristotle30 have received quite a lot of attention in recent 
scholarship. The views of Plotinus, especially his account of the 
perception of beauty, are also studied quite often.31 These studies 
show that the philosophical use of beauty terms is a rich area of 
research, but the problem of translating τὸ καλόν and interpreting 
what concept it underpins is not limited to one period or specific 
philosophers.32 There are also problems that concern beauty qua 
property in general, that is to say, beauty is no less problematic 
from the point of view of metaphysics.
Metaphysics of beauty
Arguably, the most recognisable issue concerning beauty in the 
modern Western tradition is the question of the subjectivity or 
objectivity of aesthetic judgements. Unlike ancient philosophers, 
who tend to discuss aesthetic judgements as if they were unprob-
lematically objective, some early modern philosophers famously 
argue that aesthetic judgements are more subjective than objective. 
David Hume, for instance, argues for the subjectivity of aesthetic 
judgements as follows: ‘Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It 
exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind 
perceives a different beauty. One person may even perceive deform-
ity, where another is sensible of beauty; and every individual ought 
to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate 
those of others.’33 Immanuel Kant, one of the more important 
figures in the history of aesthetics, also argues that the judgements 
of beauty are of a subjective kind.34 Nowadays, it is generally recog-
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nised that the strong versions of either subjectivism or objectivism 
are untenable and a different approach, perhaps combining some 
elements of both positions, is needed. Despite the fact that these 
debates have somewhat lost their urgency, certain parts of them 
are still informing contemporary positions on the metaphysics of 
beauty, which is increasingly becoming a more popular area of 
research.35
Kant’s distinction between judgements of free and dependent 
beauty, for instance, is a notable example of an idea from the 
early modern period that is employed in current debates on the 
metaphysics of beauty. Kant argues that judgements of beauty in 
flowers, birds, decorative design and music not set to words are 
some examples of free judgements of taste, because ‘no concept is 
here presupposed of any end for which the manifold should serve 
the given object, and which the latter, therefore, should represent. 
. . . But the beauty of man . . . presupposes a concept of the end 
that defines what the thing has to be, and consequently a concept 
of its perfection; and is therefore merely adherent beauty.’36 This 
notion of dependent beauty is used by some contemporary thinkers 
to deny the unity of all manifestations of beauty, which, arguably, 
is the central problem for the metaphysics of beauty. This problem 
arises from the following phenomenon.
A landscape, a person, a painting, a piece of music and a math-
ematical theorem can be beautiful. The nature of all these objects, 
however, is so different that it is not at all clear that one is referring 
to the same property when one is making these aesthetic judge-
ments. This lack of clarity regarding the reference of the term 
‘beauty’ is commonly recognised as one of the principal problems 
in aesthetics by philosophers, theorists of beauty and those who 
engage with the topic marginally.37 The problem can be phrased 
in different ways, but fundamentally it consists of the question of 
whether all the diverse manifestations of beauty share a common 
subvening property that grounds and unifies them. A subsequent, 
and no less significant, question is whether there are principles of 
beauty; that is, whether there are sufficient and necessary condi-
tions which fully explain and even predict the manifestations of 
aesthetic properties.
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There are, thus, two ways of conceptualising beauty: a pluralist 
and a reductive theory of beauty. The accounts of beauty which I 
call pluralist state that the beauty of an object ought to be under-
stood in terms of the non-aesthetic properties of that kind of object 
only, so that beauty in two objects of different kinds ought to be 
understood as two different kinds of properties. Broadly speaking, 
such accounts state that the instances of beauty found in objects 
of different kinds are different kinds of beauty that can only be 
understood in terms of the nature of those objects that happen to 
be beautiful. Consequently, it is impossible to have a single account 
which would explain all the instances of beauty. Jerrold Levinson 
presents a very clear version of such an argument. According to 
him, in the case of the comparison between human weight, animal 
weight and inanimate weight, it is obvious that the issue at stake 
is the same property –  weight –  because attributing weight to dif-
ferent objects does not change the meaning of the term ‘weight’. 
Then Levinson argues that ‘when it comes to the beauty exhibited 
by a person’s face, a tidepool, a Cézanne still life, and a suspen-
sion bridge by Santiago Calatrava, it is almost impossible to avoid 
remarking that each is, indeed, beautiful in its own way’.38
A pluralist stance is especially often adopted when discussing 
human beauty. Nick Zangwill, for instance, suggests that human 
beauty is ‘clearly dependent beauty. A person is beautiful not as 
an abstract sculpture, but as a human being.’39 Here, he uses the 
Kantian notion of dependent beauty as a property that is always 
dependent on the kind of object in which it manifests itself and, 
therefore, not reducible to a single kind of property. These accounts, 
which I call pluralist, suggest that the instances of beauty originat-
ing from objects of different kinds are, in fact, different kinds of 
properties that are irreducible to a single principle. Similarly, those 
accounts which explain human beauty in terms of the Darwinian 
understanding of sexuality also imply a pluralist understanding of 
beauty.40 The beauty of an object amounts to the excellence of its 
functioning as an object of its kind; for instance, human beauty 
amounts to physical features that signify health and a capacity to 
reproduce.41
Reductive theories of beauty, meanwhile, maintain that all 
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instances of beauty do share something in common. More impor-
tantly, such theories typically offer an account of beauty which 
would account for all (or most) instances of beauty. The metaphysi-
cal accounts of this type propose that all instances of beauty share 
a property, a cognitive process or a circumstance that allows beauty 
to supervene or construct the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for beauty in some other way. In general, reductive accounts have 
been mostly under attack for the last century. Yet a suggestion that 
the meaning attributed to the predicate of the sentence ‘a person is 
beautiful’ is different from the meaning attributed to the predicate 
of the sentence ‘this theorem is beautiful’ is by no means immedi-
ately obvious and requires further explanation. This is the driving 
motivation for the reductive theories. And while historically, reduc-
tive theories often relied on complex theoretical devices to unify 
the diverse manifestations of beauty (Platonic Form is arguably 
the best known example of such a theoretical device), which can 
be critised as unnecessarily burdensome, more recently, Jennifer 
McMahon has shown how a reductive theory of beauty –  which 
draws inspiration from the ancient philosophical accounts –  might 
be conceptualised within a physicalist worldview.42 This project 
also suggests that the references to ancient debates can be used very 
productively today. Yet a thorough and precise understanding of 
ancient thought on the questions pertinent to aesthetics is neces-
sary for such undertakings. This is true not only of well-known 
figures such as Plato (as well as the subsequent Platonist tradition) 
and Aristotle, but also of such schools as the Stoa. The Stoic use of 
beauty terms, after all, problematises the concept of beauty in a way 
which is similar to the issues raised by contemporary philosophers, 
because it raises the question of the unity of the manifestations of 
beauty. An enquiry into the ideas of such Hellenistic schools as the 
Stoa, therefore, is of interest not only from a historical but also 
from a philosophical perspective.
The scope of the study
The development of the Stoa is traditionally divided into three 
stages: the early period, the middle period and the Roman period. 
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Philosophers from each of these periods had different interests and 
characteristics. In addition to these distinctions, some individual 
philosophers are known to diverge from orthodox Stoicism.43 For 
these reasons, it would be too speculative to assume that it is pos-
sible to speak of Stoic ideas as if they constitute a homogeneous 
system of thought. The historical scope of the study of Stoic aes-
thetics, therefore, is inevitably limited.
In order to analyse the Stoic concept of beauty in a coherent 
and historically plausible manner, I narrow down the scope of my 
analysis to the views that can be attributed to Chrysippus. The 
restriction to one philosopher ought to ensure that any coherence 
amongst the views that might emerge is not accidental. The choice 
of this particular Stoic is motivated by several reasons. First, since 
arguments from different areas of philosophy are investigated in 
this book, it is necessary to choose a philosopher who contrib-
uted to all these areas. Chrysippus fulfils such a requirement better 
than any other Stoic. He wrote not only profusely,44 but also on a 
great variety of topics ranging from logic to political theory. All of 
the most important arguments that discuss beauty or use beauty 
vocabulary –  from the definition of beauty as summetria to the 
argument that only the wise man is beautiful –  can be attributed 
to Chrysippus. This does not mean that he is the author of these 
arguments, but the evidence shows that Chrysippus engaged with 
and subscribed to the ideas inherent in these arguments. These 
arguments can, therefore, be investigated as representing his views. 
Second, Chrysippus was the author of and a contributor to some 
of the most important Stoic metaphysical ideas. Some of the inter-
pretations of Stoic arguments in this book require to be tested 
against Stoic metaphysics, and since the most relevant metaphysical 
doctrines can be attributed to Chrysippus, it is both convenient 
and more plausible to concentrate on investigating those Stoic 
concepts of beauty that can be attributed to him.45
Approaching the Stoic concept of beauty by means of Chrysippus’ 
ideas has one more advantage. Chrysippus is a very significant 
figure in the development of early Stoicism; his views represent one 
of the most important stages in the history of this philosophical 
school. It could also be argued that Chrysippus’ views exemplify 
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the original Stoicism,46 while middle and Roman Stoicism can be 
treated as distinct developments of Stoic thought.47 This is not to 
say that the early Stoics were not influenced by their predecessors.48 
These connections are important and at least some of them will be 
investigated in the relevant chapters. It is worth noting from the 
outset, however, that one of the main theses of this work is that 
Stoic views were distinct. As is shown in Chapter 7 in particular, 
the comparison between the Stoic definition of beauty as summetria 
and the Platonic as well as the Aristotelian discussions of beauty 
show that the Stoic definition has a distinct form. The same is true 
of, for instance, the use of summetria in some Pythagorean texts. In 
order to appreciate the Stoic theory, it is necessary to note the ways 
in which the theorisations of beauty attributed to Chrysippus were 
novel and critical of his predecessors’ views.
This approach does not suggest that the ideas discussed are 
Chrysippean alone. It has been shown that there is a strong con-
nection between the views of Posidonius and Chrysippus, for 
example.49 The focus on Chrysippus serves as a methodological 
tool to ground the discussion historically and to lend coherence to 
the reading of the sources. The figure of Chrysippus, thus, anchors 
this discussion and, at the same time, serves as the starting point 
of the enquiry. Once the main evidence is covered, it will become 
clear that Chrysippean aesthetics is Stoic aesthetics, because the 
arguments pertinent to aesthetics are the ones that originate from 
the central Stoic commitments and are shared by many Stoics. The 
differences will be noted but, broadly speaking, they are mostly 
exceptions that prove the rule.
Although there are many advantages to concentrating on 
Chrysippus, such an approach imposes some restrictions on the 
scope of this investigation. Some of them are methodological. Most 
notably, just like the works of many of the early and middle Stoics, 
the works of Chrysippus are not extant. The evidence for his views 
is preserved in the doxographical sources and the works of authors 
critical of the Stoics. The project of this book is a reconstruction of 
these views, which involves some critical discussion of the sources.
There is also some restriction of the scope of this project in 
terms of the topics discussed. While some Stoics engaged in the 
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production and criticism of artworks, Chrysippus neither com-
posed poetry nor wrote on literary criticism or philosophy of art. 
Chrysippus’ predecessor Cleanthes is known for composing the 
Hymn to Zeus, a philosophical poem on Stoic theology,50 while 
the Roman Stoic Seneca wrote tragedies.51 Aratus’ Phaenomena, 
although not a philosophical poem per se, exhibits strong Stoic 
influences.52 Arguably, Stoic ideas even influenced the visual arts, 
as the statues in the library at Pergamum suggest.53 It has also 
been argued that Stoic thought contained substantial reflections on 
questions of craftsmanship and the role of the artist,54 influencing 
Renaissance aesthetic thought.55 Perhaps the most substantial of 
all Stoic engagements with the arts is their contribution to the 
development of Hellenistic literary criticism and musical theory.
The discoveries of papyri at Herculaneum that contain literary 
and musical theories have ignited much interest in Hellenistic liter-
ary and art criticism in recent years. The most prominent example 
is Philodemus’ treatises, which have opened the possibility of 
investigating not only the Epicurean, but also the Stoic philoso-
phy of art.56 This is due to the fact that, for example, in his On 
Poems, Philodemus criticises the Stoic poetic theory.57 Diogenes 
Laertius preserves some corroborating evidence, as he records that 
Posidonius wrote on poetic theory.58 Diogenes of Babylon also 
advocates substantial and original theories on sound, music and 
poetry that are very interesting in their own right. Diogenes exam-
ines the nature of the arts in a way which Chrysippus had not done, 
as far as the extant evidence indicates. Chrysippus’ ideas were only 
one of several influences for the theories produced by Diogenes of 
Babylon59 which constitute a significant development of the scope 
of Stoic enquiry.60
The Stoic philosophy of art is outside the scope of the current 
work, however. This study is primarily concerned with the ideas 
which Chrysippus developed in the context of the traditional Stoic 
areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.61 That 
is not to say that Chrysippus never made any references to or 
produced insights into art or literature, but only that his treatment 
of these areas was rather superficial and accidental. It is known that 
he was, for instance, keen on quoting literature. A particularly vivid 
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anecdote recorded by Diogenes Laertius suggests that, in one of his 
treatises, Chrysippus quoted Euripides’ Medea so extensively that a 
reader referred to it as ‘Chrysippus’ Medea’.62 There is hardly any 
indication, however, that Chrysippus was interested in the Medea 
for its literary value. It is more likely that he cited it for instrumental 
purposes to support his own philosophical agenda.63 The Stoics in 
general, including the Roman Stoics, showed interest in Medea and 
her story. This tragedy is cited and discussed by Epictetus,64 while 
Seneca wrote his own version of it.65 Perhaps it was Chrysippus 
who started this trend amongst the Stoics, although the practice of 
citing poetry or tragedy in order to support philosophical points 
was by no means peculiar to the Stoics.
Although the list of titles of his treatises recorded by Diogenes 
Laertius reveals that Chrysippus wrote treatises titled On Poems 
(Περὶ ποιημάτων) and On How to Listen to Poetry (Περὶ τοῦ 
πῶς δεῖ τῶν ποιημάτων ἀκούειν), these titles are listed under 
the subheading of ‘Ethics dealing with the classification of ethical 
concepts’66 by Diogenes, which suggests that the agenda of 
these treatises was primarily to discuss Stoic ethics rather than 
to comment on literary works for their own sake. Similarly, the 
treatise On Rhetoric (Περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς)67 is listed under ‘Ethics 
dealing with the common view and the sciences and virtues thence 
arising’.68 Diogenes’ classification suggests that the Stoic interest 
in literary works was strongly influenced by ethical discussions, 
although with no surviving evidence, it is impossible to judge with 
certainty the exact content of these treatises.69 Chrysippus also 
composed a treatise titled On Beauty (Περὶ καλοῦ), but it was 
probably dedicated primarily to ethical issues. The best-known 
extant part of this treatise is the argument that only the beautiful is 
the good, and our sources indicate that this argument was intended 
to support the Stoics’ tenet that only virtue is the good.70 The 
treatise On Beauty may have dealt with the aesthetic properties 
of virtue, yet it seems unlikely that Chrysippus also wrote on the 
philosophy of art in this treatise.
The way in which Dionysius of Halicarnassus criticises 
Chrysippus also suggests that he was not an authority on rheto-
ric. Dionysius explains Chrysippus’ failure as a writer by noting 
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that he wrote on syntax, ‘the grouping of propositions, true or 
false, possible and impossible, admissible and variable, ambiguous 
and so forth’,71 rather than on synthesis, ‘the art of composing 
an aesthetically satisfactory (ἡδεῖα καὶ καλή) text’.72 So even in 
antiquity Chrysippus was known as a philosopher concerned with 
logic rather than rhetoric or literary criticism. For this reason, the 
scope of this study is limited to the nature of aesthetic properties 
in metaphysical, epistemological and ethical arguments. It does not 
extend to the philosophy of art, although the conclusions of this 
study will be relevant for the Stoic philosophy of art as well.
Chapter plan
The first section of this work is dedicated to the discussion of 
the Stoic theory of value, especially in regard to the category of 
‘indifferents’ which includes beauty. Chapter 2 is focused on the 
question that naturally arises in this case, namely, the challenge that 
the very categorisation of beauty amongst the objects of indifferent 
value poses for aesthetics. The Stoics notoriously claim that only 
virtue is good, while only vice is bad and everything else, including 
health, wealth, beauty and life itself, are mere indifferents. The 
inclusion of beauty in this list seems to indicate that the Stoics were 
not interested in theorising beauty. This does not necessarily follow. 
A thorough reading of the material shows that beauty is not treated 
as irrelevant in general; our evidence only shows that it is a value 
inferior to virtue. This interpretation is supported by a fairly large 
amount of evidence, including the later Roman Stoic texts, such 
as the works of Epictetus. Most importantly, this interpretation 
shows that the Stoic theory of value and aesthetics are not mutually 
exclusive areas of study.
Chapter 3, ‘The Beautiful and the Good’, starts with the ques-
tion of the relationship between τὸ καλόν (typically signifying 
moral beauty, sometimes translated as an ethical term) and τὸ 
κάλλος (physical beauty). The focus of this chapter is the vague 
relationship between aesthetic and moral values. The Stoic stance 
on this problematic issue is best exemplified by the argument ‘that 
only the beautiful is the good’ (μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι). 
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The reconstruction suggests that, despite the fact that different 
interpretations of this argument are given in the doxographical 
material, the syllogism which accompanied the argument in the 
original Chrysippean version points to a very specific idea. In this 
argument, beauty plays the role of a distinguishing sign peculiar to 
the true good. Beauty signifies the true good and makes it distinct 
from merely apparent goods. It supports the Stoic tenet that virtue 
is the only genuine good by claiming that beauty distinguishes true 
good from other, merely apparent, goods.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to analysing the so-called Stoic paradox 
that only the wise man is beautiful, which implies that young, 
conventionally attractive youths are not. Plutarch’s testimonial and 
critique of these views claims that they commit what in contempo-
rary terms is sometimes called the ‘No True Scotsman’ fallacy, that 
is, an arbitrary redefinition of terms, in this case, aesthetic terms. 
This chapter offers an alternative and more charitable interpreta-
tion of these claims. This reading involves the notion of aesthetic 
functionality, that is, the idea that an object’s aesthetic value is 
determined in reference to the kind of object it is. This interpreta-
tion of the Stoic wise man paradox is consistent with the central 
Stoic tenets about virtue and happiness.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to analysing theological arguments in 
which aesthetic vocabulary plays a prominent role. In these argu-
ments, the beauty of the world is used to make an inference about 
its rational generation. To be precise, the arguments state that 
the presence of beauty in the world indicates that the world must 
have been generated by means of a rational principle and not by 
the random motion of atoms (as argued by the Epicureans). This 
reading is followed by the examination of the issues of how beauty 
is used to form this inference and what theoretical implications the 
use of aesthetic terms in this context underpins. The findings here 
are consistent with the findings in the previous chapters, especially 
in regard to the notion of good order or, to be more precise, well-
functioning order. Thus, a systematic Stoic theory of aesthetics 
begins to emerge. The most substantial evidence for this theory is 
discussed in the following chapter.
The Stoic definition of beauty as summetria of parts with each 
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other and with the whole is undoubtedly a central concept in Stoic 
aesthetic discourse. In Chapter 6, the evidence for this definition is 
presented and discussed. Although the evidence is somewhat frag-
mentary, it is relatively abundant as there are four explicit citations 
of the definition and numerous shorter references equating summe-
tria with beauty. This definition is important because it reveals how 
the Stoics theorised beauty metaphysically. Beauty is a property 
that supervenes on the composition of non-aesthetic properties. 
Since supervenience is generally considered to be a contemporary 
concept, the Stoic theory of categories helps to determine whether 
Stoic physics could support the conceptualisation of such a phe-
nomenon. Finally, the criticism that Plotinus levelled at the Stoic 
definition of beauty, namely, that their theory cannot account for 
why a well-organised virtue, but not a well-organised vice, possesses 
beauty, is introduced and discussed. Arguably, there is one insight 
that has emerged in the previous chapters, namely, the notion of 
functional composition, which would allow the Stoics to respond 
to this Plotinian critique.
Consequently, the Stoic definition of beauty is best understood 
as the claim that aesthetic properties supervene on two aspects of 
an object: (i) the formal properties of the object (summetria of parts 
with each other) and (ii) the functional properties of the object 
(summetria of parts with the whole). The definition states that in 
order for an object to be beautiful, it must possess a harmonious 
composition for the kind of object that it is. This reading is cor-
roborated by noting that the concept of functional beauty was a 
viable theoretical option for thinking about beauty for ancient 
philosophers, and showing that a number of references in the Stoic 
fragments suggest that they employed the notion of functional 
composition in their arguments. The final section of the book situ-
ates this theory in its context.
Chapter 7 presents the argument that the Stoic definition 
of beauty and the way in which beauty vocabulary is used in 
various arguments are remarkably consistent. This coherence 
suggests that while there is no extant Stoic treatise on aesthetics, 
their engagement with this area of philosophy must have been 
thorough and substantial. Their ideas both differed from and 
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corresponded with other aesthetic theories in antiquity. First, 
the evidence of Polycleitus’ theory about the origin of beauty is 
examined, including a discussion of how this theory is received 
and understood in Vitruvius’ On Architecture and related sources. 
The evidence shows that Polycleitean summetriae were not so 
much an attempt to theorise beauty as such, but rather a techni-
cal instruction –  consisting of a series of ratios –  for creating a 
beautiful statue or painting. These ratios were numerous and 
depended on the object depicted. These summetriae relied heavily 
on mathematics and this approach to aesthetic properties found 
its way into philosophy. The Pythagoreans are especially noted for 
the importance they assigned to number. The fragments of early 
fifth-century figures such as Philolaus of Croton show, however, 
that Pythagorean views differed in some important respects from 
the ways in which artists such as Polycleitus accounted for aes-
thetic properties.
The same is true of the ways in which the notion of summetria is 
employed in the works of Plato and Aristotle, both of whom used 
the term in connection with theorising beauty, but in distinct ways. 
There is a large amount of recent scholarship on Plato’s views on 
art, but the primary focus in this case is his views on the origin and 
significance of aesthetic properties in such dialogues as the Philebus 
and the Symposium. The definitions of beauty in Aristotle’s works 
and the conditions for beauty that his extant works posit are also 
discussed. The comparison between Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics 
shows that although the term summetria can be found in the works 
of all of them, it is used differently and for different theoretical 
purposes. The upshot of this is that the Stoic definition of beauty 
as summetria was a distinct theory that accounted for aesthetic 
properties in reductive terms, that is, as a functional structure. It 
rivalled the Platonic accounts in which Forms played the central 
role. Plotinus’ attack on Stoicism shows that this rivalry lasted for 
a long time, and that while Platonism dominated the philosophi-
cal scene in late antiquity, Stoic views survived in other contexts. 
This is evident in Galen’s discussion of the recognisably Stoic view 
within alleged Hippocratic context. Having discussed the ancient 
tradition of aesthetics and the role of Stoic ideas within it, the 
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chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the place of aesthetics 
within Stoicism and the place of Stoicism within aesthetics.
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2
The Problem of Indifferents
‘Mankind, including every description, wish to be loved and respected 
by something; and the common herd will always take the nearest road 
to the completion of their wishes. The respect paid to wealth and 
beauty is the most certain, and unequivocal; and, of course, will always 
attract the vulgar eye of common minds.’
Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman1
The Stoics offered substantial contributions to many areas of phi-
losophy, yet they are undoubtedly best known for their ethics. So 
much so that the term ‘stoic’ entered the common vocabulary 
as an adjective for describing indifference and resilience to tough 
circumstances. This term undoubtedly refers to the notorious Stoic 
argument that only virtue is the good because one of the more 
controversial consequences of this argument is that the things con-
ventionally considered to be the good are indifferents. The Stoic 
indifferents include health, wealth, beauty and life itself. This claim 
has wide-reaching consequences, including some implications for 
aesthetic judgements. Seemingly the most pressing consequence 
of the claim is that it leaves no room for aesthetics. After all, if 
aesthetic value is not a genuine type of value, then what is there to 
say about it? A closer inspection of the Stoic argument concerning 
values, however, shows that this is not as significant a problem as it 
might at first appear.
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The good, the bad and the indifferent
The most extensive descriptions in the extant evidence come from 
Diogenes Laertius and Arius Didymus’ Epitome of Stoic Ethics, 
preserved by Stobaeus. Diogenes Laertius introduces the Stoic 
doctrine by noting that, according to the Stoics, existing things 
can be divided, in accordance with their value, into good, bad 
and neither. While virtues such as prudence (φρόνησις) or justice 
(δικαιοσύνη) belong to the first category and vices to the second, 
the things listed in the third category are as follows: ‘life, health, 
pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, noble birth, and 
their opposites’.2 Then Diogenes references the Stoics who wrote 
on these views: Hecato in his seventh book of the treatise On the 
End (Περὶ τέλους), Apollodorus in his book Ethics (Ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ) 
and Chrysippus (no specific treatise of his is mentioned).3 This list 
is most likely not exhaustive, and it shows that this doctrine was 
widely adopted by the Stoics.4
Although all the value categories have some pertinence to Stoic 
thought on aesthetics,5 the category of the indifferents ought to be 
addressed first because it raises the question that is fundamental 
for studying Stoic aesthetics: namely, the question of the Stoic 
attitude towards aesthetic values. One very significant point to note 
from the outset is the vocabulary. The term for beauty, τὸ κάλλος, 
used in these texts denotes bodily beauty. The differences between 
various kinds of beauty and the reasons they are important will 
be addressed in due course, once the necessary evidence has been 
discussed. For now, it is enough to note that bodily beauty is an 
appropriate place to start because it is the simplest, or at least the 
most familiar, kind of beauty. Determining its status as a value will 
pave the way for enquiring into more complex types of beauty, such 
as abstract and moral beauty.
The starting point of this study, therefore, is the question of 
the meaning of the category ‘indifferent’ and how the Stoic con-
ceptualisation of beauty was affected by beauty’s belonging to this 
category. The mere fact that the Stoics introduced such a category 
is notable. It distinguished them from their contemporaries and 
earned them their reputation as controversial philosophers. In 
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order to  appreciate the Stoic stance, it is important to note that 
their taxonomy of values has various subcategories and, arguably, 
the most notable subcategory is that of the indifferents which are 
‘preferred’.
Diogenes Laertius’ list of the three categories of the Stoic value 
system is immediately followed by the remark that these examples 
of indifferents are of the species ‘preferred’. Then he offers a further 
elaboration of the category ‘indifferent’ as follows:
διχῶς δὲ λέγεσθαι ἀδιάφορα· ἅπαξ μὲν τὰ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε 
πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συνεργοῦντα, ὡς ἔχει πλοῦτος, δόξα, ὑγίεια, 
ἰσχὺς καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων εὐδαιμονεῖν, 
τῆς ποιᾶς αὐτῶν χρήσεως εὐδαιμονικῆς οὔσης ἢ κακοδαιμονικῆς. 
ἄλλως δὲ λέγεται ἀδιάφορα τὰ μήθ᾽ ὁρμῆς μήτ᾽ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά, 
ὡς ἔχει τὸ ἀρτίας ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιττάς, ἢ ἐκτεῖναι 
τὸν δάκτυλον ἢ συστεῖλαι, τῶν προτέρων ἀδιαφόρων οὐκέθ᾽ οὕτω 
λεγομένων· ὁρμῆς γάρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά. διὸ τὰ 
μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκλέγεται, <τὰ δὲ ἀπεκλέγεται>, τῶν [δ’] ἑτέρων ἐπίσης 
ἐχόντων πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγήν.
‘Indifferent’ is used in two senses: unconditionally, of things which 
contribute neither to happiness nor unhappiness as is the case with 
wealth, reputation, health, strength and the like. For it is possible to be 
happy even without these, though the manner of using them is con-
stitutive of happiness and unhappiness. In another sense those things 
are called indifferent which activate neither impulse nor repulsion, as 
in the case of having an odd or even number of hairs on one’s head, or 
stretching or contracting a finger. But the previous indifferents are not 
spoken of in this sense. For they are capable of activating impulse and 
repulsion. Hence some of them are selected and others deselected, but 
the second type is entirely equal with respect to choice and avoidance.6
The same doctrine is recorded and described in a similar way 
in Arius Didymus’ Epitome of Stoic Ethics. The content is almost 
exactly the same, with the exception of the examples of the genu-
inely indifferent things. In the text preserved by Stobaeus, those are 
pointing a finger in one rather than another direction, or picking 
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something, such as a leaf or a twig, up in some way.7 According to 
both of these accounts, there are two kinds of indifferent things: 
those that are subject to impulse or repulsion and those that are 
not. The latter are indifferent in the common sense, as the example 
of having an even or odd number of hairs shows. People generally 
place no value on such things and, therefore, they do not care 
whether they have an odd or an even number of hairs. The former, 
meanwhile, belong to the peculiar Stoic sense of indifferent, and 
it is quite important to distinguish between the two types of indif-
ferents in order to appreciate the Stoic position.
The Stoic indifferent is the kind of object or phenomenon which 
provokes a reaction in a person. This reaction consists of two stages. 
The first stage is either pursuit or avoidance and the second stage 
is either choice or rejection. The latter follows the former and 
constitutes an attitude a person adopts towards a certain object in 
respect to that object’s value. To be more precise, when a person 
encounters some object, the first reaction is either to pursue it or 
to avoid it. Yet one is not obliged to act in accordance with this 
first impression. In this way, one can ‘select’ or ‘deselect’ whether 
to adopt a certain attitude towards the object or, in other words, 
one forms a choice.8 As the very first sentence of Diogenes’ passage 
indicates, the goal of the act of choosing is happiness. The things 
that are indifferent in the Stoic sense of the term are of indifferent 
value in respect to happiness.
The two attitudes one can have towards an object, the pursuit 
and the choice, form the foundation of the Stoic doctrine of value. 
Notably, the two attitudes have different objects. Whereas anything 
can be pursued, only virtue is an object of choice.9 Consequently, 
the enquiry into the role that aesthetic properties play in the Stoic 
ethical system has to be twofold. On the one hand, there is the ques-
tion of the connection between virtues and aesthetic properties; on 
the other hand, there is also the question of the consequences of 
the claim that beauty is a preferred indifferent. Virtue, a genuine 
good, and its relation to aesthetic properties10 will be discussed 
in the following chapter. The remainder of this chapter will be 
focused on the objects that one ‘deselects’, that is, the ones that 
are indifferent in the Stoic sense of the word. These are the objects 
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of pursuit and avoidance, yet they are not choice-worthy, which 
raises the questions of how their value ought to be understood and 
what is the significance of the fact that beauty is found amongst the 
objects of pursuit.
Polemics
The list of the objects that are indifferent only is rather long and 
contains various things that are conventionally considered to be 
good or bad. Certainly the best way to appreciate such an idiosyn-
cratic position is by contextualising the argument and thus noting 
what position the Stoics were reacting to with their claims.
Arguably, the primary target is the Peripatetic school and its 
founder, Aristotle. Although Aristotle agrees with those who main-
tain that happiness consists of virtue,11 he adds that some external 
goods are also necessary for happiness. Friends, wealth or political 
power are necessary assets without which it is impossible or at 
least very hard to attain happiness. Such properties as low birth, 
unattractiveness or childlessness, meanwhile, necessarily detract 
from happiness.12 This is due to the fact that the lack of certain 
external goods constitutes an impediment to happiness while hap-
piness consists in complete and unobstructed activities.13 Aristotle’s 
position is motivated by reasoning that the lack of certain goods 
impedes the disadvantaged person’s ability to exercise the actions 
that would, in ideal circumstances, constitute happiness. Those 
who deny this, for one reason or another, are talking nonsense, 
according to the arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics.
The Stoics were, of course, such nonsense-speakers.14 Cicero’s 
On Ends contains evidence that the disagreement between the 
Peripatetics and the Stoics was a noted debate. In this treatise, the 
Stoic spokesperson Cato presents an account that contrasts the 
Peripatetic and the Stoic accounts of the good, especially in respect 
to such issues as bodily well-being and the property of being rich. 
The contrast between the quite common-sensical Peripatetic and 
the fairly radical Stoic accounts raises the question of why the latter 
disagreed with the former or, to put it otherwise, what exactly is the 
error, according to the Stoics, that the Peripatetics make in their 
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account of the good. It is interesting to note that the Stoics did not 
necessarily present their position as radical. On the contrary, there 
is extant evidence of Chrysippus claiming that the Stoic position is 
the one in accordance with common conceptions,15 that is, the true 
impression imprinted on all human minds.16
One might be tempted to dismiss such a claim, but it is worth 
considering in what ways the Stoic system could appeal to common 
conceptions. Arguably, by bearing in mind that the Stoic posi-
tion is motivated by an appeal to common conceptions, one can 
obtain a more nuanced insight into the Stoic critique of Peripatetic 
ethics, which goes as follows in the On Ends. First, Cato reports 
that, according to the Peripatetics, life cannot be complete without 
the conventional goods (illi enim corporis commodis compleri vitam 
beatam putant), which is in line with what is to be found in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Then he states that, according to the Stoics, 
external goods are not relevant at all to having a happy life.17 
Subsequently, Cato adds the following arguments:
etenim, si et sapere expetendum sit et valere, coniunctum utrumque magis 
expetendum sit quam sapere solum, neque tamen, si utrumque sit aestima-
tione dignum, pluris sit coniunctum quam sapere ipsum separatim. nam 
qui valitudinem aestimatione aliqua dignam iudicamus neque eam tamen 
in bonis ponimus, idem censemus nullam esse tantam aestimationem, ut ea 
virtuti anteponatur. quod idem Peripatetici non tenent, quibus dicendum 
est, quae et honesta actio sit et sine dolore, eam magis esse expetendam, 
quam si esset eadem actio cum dolore. nobis aliter videtur, recte secusne, 
postea; sed potestne rerum maior esse dissensio?
If wisdom and health are both worth seeking, then the two together 
are more worth seeking than wisdom alone. But if each commands 
some value, it does not follow that the two together are worth more 
than wisdom on its own. In judging that health commands a certain 
value, but not deeming it a good, we thereby consider that there is 
no value great enough to take precedence over virtue. This is not the 
Peripatetic position. They have to say that an act that is both virtuous 
and painless is more worth seeking than a virtuous act accompanied by 
pain. We think differently. Whether rightly or wrongly is a question 
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to be considered later. But there could hardly be a greater difference 
between the two views.18
As Cato points out, the crucial difference between the Peripatetic 
and the Stoic positions is fairly straightforward. At first sight, the 
argument that positing two, rather than one, components for hap-
piness somehow diminishes the value of one of those components 
might seem weak, but this is not the entire point of the argument. 
Cato’s point concerns the relationship that these components share 
with happiness, and he is pinpointing a peculiar consequence of the 
Peripatetic position. Whereas the Stoic claim that virtue is the only 
good posits virtue as both the necessary and the sufficient condi-
tion for happiness, the Aristotelian model of happiness implies 
that there are two components that together form necessary and 
sufficient conditions for happiness. This means that virtue is not 
sufficient for a happy life. Thus Aristotle, according to the Stoic 
view, downgrades virtue from having a very strong relation to hap-
piness to a somewhat open-ended one. Cato’s point is, therefore, a 
pertinent one. This position is, moreover, consistent with the Stoic 
rejection of external goods as necessary for happiness. In addition 
to this, this position has another notable consequence, namely 
the notorious claim that even women and slaves have access to 
rationality.19 In this respect, the Stoics differed significantly from 
their predecessors and contemporaries. Hardly any extant evidence 
explains the motivation for adopting such a genuinely egalitarian 
stance. It is, however, in line with the way in which the Stoics 
theorise rationality and criticise, for instance, the Peripatetics. If 
virtue can only lead to happiness when it is accompanied by other 
attributes, then the role it plays in regard to happiness is necessarily 
only partial. Stoic egalitarianism, by contrast, makes rationality 
a much more powerful phenomenon. It is clear that despite not 
rejecting conventional cultural practices in general,20 the Stoics 
were firmly committed to the view that no external circumstance 
or hindrance stands in the way of one’s happiness.
Although the Stoic stance was notorious, they cannot be credited 
with being the first school to question the value of the conven-
tional goods. On this point, the Stoics were greatly influenced by 
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Socrates, and their indebtedness to Socratic thought has been noted 
before in the scholarship.21 In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates consist-
ently pronounces that the conventional goods (health, wealth, 
beauty and so on) are, in fact, neither good nor bad by themselves, 
but they can participate in the good or the bad or neither.22 In 
the Euthydemus, it appears that these things become good or bad 
depending on whether ignorance or wisdom guides them.23 A very 
similar argument is presented by Seneca, and it is worth looking at 
this text more closely as it contains not only a notable similarity but 
also some remarkable differences.
In the letter explaining the difference between the Stoic concept 
of the good and the other, more conventional, concepts,24 Seneca 
provides a brief but pointed distinction between the genuine goods 
and the indifferents. Having explained that defining the good as that 
which rouses the soul’s impulse towards itself is insufficient because 
harmful activities can also arouse the soul’s impulse, Seneca states that 
the following Stoic definition is better: ‘the good is that which stimu-
lates a mental impulse towards itself in accordance with nature and is 
worth pursuing only when it begins to be worth choosing’.25 Seneca 
illustrates this distinction with the examples of military, diplomatic 
and judiciary services which by themselves are of indifferent value, but 
when these activities ‘are conducted honourably, they start to be good 
and make the transition from being uncertain to being good’.26
Seneca’s argument appears to be Socratic because it contains 
the statement that an act changes from the class of the indifferents 
to the class of the good when it is conducted in a certain way.27 
Yet there are also similarities to the description of the Stoic value 
system preserved by Diogenes Laertius: most notably, Seneca also 
implies that there is a difference between the relationship that a 
person has with the conventional goods and the genuine good. 
This is especially evident in the definition of the good which Seneca 
describes as the one acceptable to the Stoics, and which is cited 
in the paragraph above. The things that are pursued (patendum) 
belong to the category of the conventional goods, but only the 
proper good belongs to the category of the things that are chosen 
(expetendum).28 The language which described virtue as the only 
and proper good as choice-worthy is very important, because it 
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suggests that the conventional goods are still not choice-worthy, 
even when they are found in what Seneca described as the category 
of the good which is underpinned by rational acts and approach.
Seneca’s use of the term ‘good’ is a little confusing, but this is 
due to the context. He is teaching the Stoic doctrine by contrasting 
it with the conventional notions of the good and, for this reason, he 
uses the term ‘good’ in both the conventional and the Stoic sense 
of the term.29 The choice-worthiness of the conventional goods, 
however, can only arise from their association with virtue; nothing 
inherent in these acts can make them the good. Seneca calls acts 
such as virtuously performed military service ‘the good’ in order to 
explain to Lucilius the virtue that does all the work in creating the 
value of the act. The conventional goods do not become the good 
in the Stoic sense, because the agent never stands in the same rela-
tionship to them (which are objects of pursuit) as to the genuine 
good (which is the only choice-worthy object). Here the difference 
between the Socratic and the Stoic claims is starting to emerge.
As Tad Brennan points out, the Socratic stance is significantly 
different from the Stoic view in two respects. First, the Stoics 
would never say that wealth is sometimes good, ‘for, among other 
things, if this portion of wealth on this occasion really were a 
good, that is, really benefited its possessor, then an agent would 
have reason to feel that the loss of that wealth on that occasion, 
or the failure to attain that wealth on that occasion, really was a 
loss of something genuinely good; and this is not a conclusion the 
Stoics would support’.30 Second, there is a difference between the 
Socratic claim that wealth is a good thing and the Stoic claim that 
the correct use of wealth is a good thing. The value lies in the action 
and action alone, according to the Stoics, and it can never transfer 
to an object of that action.31 The relationship that a person forms 
with a certain object is of crucial importance for understanding the 
Stoic category of indifferents, as the extant evidence shows.
Indifferent preferences
The polemics with other schools illustrates how sweeping is the 
Stoic treatment of value. No room is left for ascribing genuine 
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value, that is, the status of the good, to the conventional goods. 
At the same time, it is worth bearing in mind that the description 
of Stoic value emphasises that one makes a choice with happiness 
in view. The Stoic notion of indifferents denotes the relationship 
between the objects in the category of the indifferents and happi-
ness, not the relationship that a person has with those objects per 
se. This means that a person is making an error by thinking that, 
for example, being rich will constitute her happiness. She is not 
making an error by thinking that being rich is preferable to being 
poor in general. This point is elaborated by the Stoic spokesperson 
Cato in Cicero’s On Ends. He explains that there is no reason to 
avoid performing certain actions just because they are not good (or, 
equally, avoid things even if they are not genuinely evil). Certain 
actions, he argues, have the property of ‘reasonableness’, which 
means that one can give a rational motivation for that action. 
Then he adds the following: ‘since there may yet be something 
useful about what is neither a virtue nor a vice, it should not be 
rejected. Included in this category is also a certain kind of action, 
such that reason demands that one bring about or create one of the 
intermediates.’32
Arguably, nothing clarifies the Stoic stance on the indifferents 
better than the notorious disagreement within the school. Aristo of 
Chios diverged from the orthodox Stoics by denying that any of the 
indifferents can have the status of being preferred, even in a second-
ary way. The refusal to recognise any hierarchy within the sphere of 
indifferents marks Aristo as an outlier within the Stoic tradition, so 
much so that, in Cicero’s On Ends, Cato says that Aristo’s refusal 
to recognise the hierarchy of indifferents throws the whole of life 
into chaos.33 Aristo’s position appears to have been supported by 
the argument that the value of things such as health depends on the 
circumstances of the person. Consequently, health has no inherent 
value that might originate from its nature. For this reason, one 
ought not to assign a permanent value and thus establish a hierar-
chy of values within the category of the indifferents, according to 
Sextus Empiricus’ report of Aristo’s views.34 In Diogenes Laertius’ 
record of Aristo’s views, there is an illuminating illustration. The 
wise man, according to Aristo, is like a good actor who plays a part 
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in the proper way regardless of whether he puts on the mask of 
Agamemnon, the commander of the Achaeans in the Trojan War, 
or Thersites, a minor character in the Iliad, remarkable for lacking 
in both his looks and his character.35 The idea behind Aristo’s 
position is that the orthodox Stoic position concedes too much to 
the Peripatetic claim about the necessity of the conventional goods 
for happiness. It also illustrates Aristo’s argument found in Sextus 
Empiricus very well. An orthodox Stoic in the shoes of Thersites 
would value good looks and wit,36 but he would not do so in the 
shoes of Agamemnon. This shows that the value of the indifferents 
is entirely circumstantial and ought not to be ascribed to their 
inherent nature.37
There is some evidence to suggest that these Homeric characters 
were standard examples in the internal Stoic debates on value. 
Epictetus, for instance, also uses the examples of Thersites and 
another Homeric hero, Achilles, in the context of discussing the 
value of the indifferents. It is not clear whether Epictetus is target-
ing Aristo in particular by advocating the view that certain indif-
ferents are, in fact, ‘preferred’, but this text is nonetheless an apt 
illustration of the difference between the positions of Aristo and the 
orthodox Stoics. More importantly for the purposes of the current 
work, this passage is a rare case of a Stoic philosopher discussing 
the notion of a preferred indifferent with an explicit reference to 
beauty.
Epictetus on beauty
This passage is found in Epictetus’ treatment of the faculty of 
expression (that is, eloquence), or to be more precise, Epictetus’ 
admonition of those who shun such skills and call them not worth 
acquiring. In order to illustrate their error, Epictetus employs an 
analogy with beauty as follows:
τὸ δ᾿ αἴρειν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς φραστικῆς καὶ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι μηδεμίαν 
ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὐ μόνον ἀχαρίστου ἐστὶ πρὸς τοὺς δεδωκότας, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ δειλοῦ. ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος φοβεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ, μή, εἴπερ ἐστί 
τις δύναμις κατὰ τὸν τόπον, οὐ δυνηθῶμεν αὐτῆς καταφρονῆσαι. 
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τοιοῦτοί εἰσι καὶ οἱ λέγοντες μηδεμίαν εἶναι παραλλαγὴν κάλλους 
πρὸς αἶσχος. εἶτα ὁμοίως ἦν κινηθῆναι τὸν Θερσίτην ἰδόντα καὶ τὸν 
Ἀχιλλέα; ὁμοίως τὴν Ἑλένην καὶ ἣν ἔτυχε γυναῖκα; καὶ ταῦτα μωρὰ 
καὶ ἄγροικα καὶ οὐκ εἰδότων τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν, ἀλλὰ φοβουμένων 
μὴ ἄν τις αἴσθηται τῆς διαφορᾶς, εὐθὺς συναρπασθεὶς καὶ ἡττηθεὶς 
ἀπέλθῃ. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγα τοῦτο, ἀπολιπεῖν ἑκάστῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν 
ἣν ἔχει καὶ ἀπολιπόντα ἰδεῖν τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ 
κράτιστον τῶν ὄντων καταμαθεῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν παντὶ μεταδιώκειν, 
περὶ τοῦτο ἐσπουδακέναι, πάρεργα τἆλλα πρὸς τοῦτο πεποιημένον, 
οὐ μέντοι ἀμελοῦντα οὐδ᾿ ἐκείνων κατὰ δύναμιν. καὶ γὰρ ὀφθαλμῶν 
ἐπιμελητέον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὡς τοῦ κρατίστου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων διὰ τὸ 
κράτιστον· ὅτι ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἄλλως ἕξει κατὰ φύσιν εἰ μὴ ἐν τούτοις 
εὐλογιστοῦν καὶ τὰ ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ ἕτερα αἱρούμενον.
But to do away with the faculty of expression and say that in reality it 
is nothing, is not only ungrateful to those who have given it to us, but 
cowardly too. For someone who would want to do that seems to me to 
be afraid that, if there is any such faculty, we may not be able to despise 
it. Such is the case, too, with those who claim that there is no difference 
between beauty and ugliness. What, could one be affected in the same 
way by the sight of Thersites and that of Achilles? Or by the sight of Helen 
and that of some ordinary woman? No, that is mere foolishness, indicat-
ing a lack of cultivation in people who are ignorant of the specific nature 
of each reality, and who fear that if one comes to appreciate its excellence, 
one will at once be carried away and placed within its power. No, the 
important thing is this, to leave each thing in the possession of its own 
specific faculty and then to consider the value of that faculty, and to learn 
what is the most excellent of all things, and to pursue that in everything, 
and make it the chief object of one’s concern, regarding everything else 
as of secondary value by comparison, yet without neglecting even those 
other things, so far as possible. For we must take care of our eyes too, 
though not as being the most excellent thing, but for the sake of what 
is most excellent, because it cannot attain its natural perfection unless it 
uses our eyes with prudence and chooses some things instead of others.38
Epictetus argues that only an ignorant and boorish person would 
be sufficiently terrified of preferred indifferents not to recognise that 
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Achilles was more beautiful than Thersites. As mentioned above, 
this is very likely an attack on Aristo or those who held similar posi-
tions, as the motivation for preferring one indifferent over another 
is not only clearly explained but also vehemently advocated. More 
pertinent for current purposes is the fact that this passage spells 
out in greater detail the orthodox Stoic attitude towards bodily 
beauty as a preferred indifferent. In the cases of both eloquence 
and bodily beauty, the correct manner of action is to recognise the 
actual value of every object and to treat them appropriately, rather 
than to deny that the preferred indifferents are valuable in any sense 
whatsoever.39 It is clear that Epictetus does not consider beauty to 
be of such a high value as to be the good. Beauty has no power at all 
to constitute one’s happiness and therefore it is not choice-worthy 
in this text as well as in, for example, Diogenes Laertius’ account of 
the Stoic theory of value. Beauty is, however, an object of pursuit. 
And this text is especially helpful in spelling out what this means. 
The fact that beauty inspires impulsion (and its opposite inspires 
repulsion) means it is a certain kind of value, and thus it is prefer-
able to its opposite. The status of being a ‘preferred’ indifferent 
renders such properties as beauty genuinely preferable. It turns out, 
then, that it is not at all the case that the Stoics are indifferent to 
beauty.
Pleasure
Before concluding the analysis of the Stoic doctrine of indifferents, 
it is necessary to discuss briefly another item on the list that plays 
a fairly important role in aesthetic discourse: namely, pleasure. 
The Stoic treatment of pleasure is quite prominent in their ethics, 
primarily due to the polemics with their contemporary Epicureans. 
Their radical stance on the status of pleasure as a value has a bearing 
on the views that the Stoics, their adversaries and critics, put forth 
regarding the issue of aesthetic pleasure.40 The Stoics have a distinct 
account of the nature of the inclination towards one rather than the 
other object which, arguably, directly addresses some of the central 
points of the Epicurean position.
Typically, pleasure plays a significant role in determining values, 
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because of the argument that pleasure indicates what is preferable or 
not preferable by nature. Pleasure plays such a role in the accounts 
of the famous hedonist philosophers such as the Cyrenaics and the 
Epicureans. Very little evidence on the Cyrenaics is extant, but it 
is a notorious school, not least because it is the only philosophical 
school in the ancient Greek tradition that posited pleasure, rather 
than happiness, as the τέλος of human life.41 Notably, these are pri-
marily the bodily pleasures.42 The existing sources suggest that the 
Cyrenaics only recognise the so-called kinetic pleasures and claim 
that bodily pains are greater than mental ones.43 The distinction 
between katastematic and kinetic pleasures features prominently 
in the Epicurean philosophy and can be explained as follows: the 
katastematic pleasures are derived from the absence of pain, and the 
kinetic ones are derived from active sensations.44 The Cyrenaics are 
notable for the prioritisation of the latter, but the Epicureans take 
a rather different approach.
The Epicurean account states that, if studied carefully, the 
pattern of desires shows that they ultimately refer to the health 
of the body and the calmness of the mind, and these conditions 
constitute happiness. Pleasure, therefore, is the good.45 Pleasure is 
not, however, the good in an unqualified way. Epicurus establishes 
an elaborate hierarchy of pleasures and a hard distinction between 
natural pleasures that constitute happiness and the others that are 
only marginally relevant or, in some cases, completely irrelevant 
to happiness.46 This hierarchy results in the claim that, according 
to Epicurus, the greatest pleasures are in fact derived from mere 
sustenance of the body and the calm of a philosophising mind.47 
The katastematic pleasures, therefore, play a crucial role in the 
Epicurean account of happiness.48 In this respect, the Epicureans 
differ significantly from the Cyrenaics.49
Although accounts of the hedonists differ, they share one 
common assumption, namely, that pleasure is the sole indicator of 
what is choice-worthy by nature or, in other words, the good. And it 
is precisely this very fundamental notion, that pleasure is indicative 
of and constitutes the good, which is the target of the Stoic treat-
ment of pleasure. The Stoics deny that it is pleasure that motivates 
living beings even in their most basic pursuits. Instead, all living 
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beings strive for self-preservation or, to put it differently, what is 
in accordance with their nature. Pleasure is a mere by-product of 
attaining the things that are in accordance with nature.50 Those 
who posit pleasure as the determiner of value, then, are making a 
mistake in missing the actual fundamental motivation of human 
and animal actions. Pleasure might follow the attainment of the 
good, but it is not the good itself. Consequently, it makes no sense 
to pursue pleasure per se.
It is important to note that the argument about the origin of 
value has immense consequences for the way in which conventional 
external goods are valued. Pleasure is genuinely irrelevant to the 
making of judgements of value, because it is a property that may 
or may not supervene on what is the actual good. The people who 
pursue wealth, for example, because of the pleasure that it might 
bring them, are making a gross misjudgement of what would actu-
ally benefit them, as pleasure by itself has no power to constitute 
the good. Seneca’s texts are often useful for providing examples 
of the central tenets of Stoicism, and he supports this argument 
with the vivid illustration of a baby animal that strives to stand even 
against pain.51 The inclination for morality and right action devel-
ops from these natural inclinations.52 This leads to the question of 
how the Stoics account for this natural attraction to those things 
that are in accordance with one’s nature. This question, however, 
requires a substantial discussion, and therefore it will be addressed 
in the following chapter.
Concluding remarks
Several noteworthy points emerge from the reading of the Stoic 
sources presented in this chapter. One of them is that the doctrine 
of indifferents or, more specifically, the claim that beauty is one 
of the indifferents, did not constitute an obstacle for the Stoics 
in holding views on aesthetic issues and, consequently, it is far 
from being crucial to understanding the Stoic stance regarding 
aesthetic value. It is certainly not irrelevant, yet it tells us fairly little 
about the Stoic understanding of aesthetic value. This is a positive 
conclusion for the study of questions pertinent to aesthetics. This 
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reading shows that the fact that the Stoics categorised beauty as a 
preferred indifferent does not constitute an impediment to their 
interest in beauty. Such a categorisation tells us neither how a 
good Stoic ought to judge aesthetic properties (in the sense of 
determining whether an aesthetic property is present or not) nor 
what constitutes the value of aesthetic properties. Stoic views on 
aesthetic properties simply cannot be explained in terms of their 
ethics, and therefore need to be studied separately.
In addition to this quite significant starting point, the doctrine 
of indifferents contributes two pertinent points to the enquiry into 
Stoic thought on aesthetic judgements. First, one of its conse-
quences is that the pursuit of beauty does not lead to happiness. 
This might lead one to assume that the Stoics were not interested 
in the issues pertaining to beauty at all, but such a reading presents 
Stoicism in its most radical form (represented by Aristo of Chios). 
The more orthodox version of Stoicism does not rule out discussing 
preferables, and even valuing them.53 The belief that the pursuit of 
beauty does not lead to happiness, thus, is also far from a fatal blow 
to the interest in aesthetics more generally. In general, the accounts 
connecting beauty and morality are exceptional, although it is not 
impossible to find some examples.54 It is more typical to come 
across theories that treat enquiries into ethical issues, such as what 
life one ought to lead, and enquiries into aesthetical issues, such as 
how aesthetic judgements are made, as separate. This is not to say 
that there can be no overlap, but rather that one cannot get answers 
to aesthetic questions by looking at ethical doctrines.
Second, beauty is far from an indifferent in the common sense 
of the word ‘indifferent’; it is something we are propelled to by 
impulse, thus indicating that it is something attractive by nature. 
In some cases, it is quite clear what is naturally attractive about, 
for example, health or life. In the case of beauty, however, the 
answer is less clear. What is the cognitive content of the impulse 
towards beauty? What is it that we ‘see’ that renders the seen object 
beautiful? The notion of pursuit and the impulse to pursue lead to 
the question of the nature of aesthetic values qua values. In order 
to find answers to these questions, it is necessary to look past the 
doctrine of the indifferents and into other extant Stoic texts that 
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use aesthetic vocabulary. The following chapter is dedicated to the 
discussion of the question that started emerging at the end of the 
previous section, namely: what is it that constitutes the inherent 
attractiveness of certain objects? The most important case of objects 
that display this peculiar kind of inherent attractiveness are virtues. 
For this reason, the following chapter focuses on those objects that 
are not only pursued but also chosen.
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The Beautiful and the Good
‘We aim at Order and hope for Beauty.’
Denman Ross, A Theory of Pure Design1
The term τὸ κάλλος, found in the Stoic category of the preferred 
indifferents discussed in the previous chapter, primarily refers to 
visual/bodily beauty, but it is not the only aesthetic term used by 
the Stoics. Another one, τὸ καλόν, arguably plays a more signifi-
cant role due to its association with the good. By virtue of denoting 
the good, τὸ καλόν falls into the category of being choice-worthy. 
There is a small group of arguments designed to prove that only the 
beautiful2 is the good (μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι). The first 
important point is the nuanced meaning of the term τὸ καλόν, 
and the argument for the aesthetic interpretation of this term in 
the context of this Stoic argument is given in the section below. 
The second point is the meaning and significance of the argument, 
which is far from clear. It is worth noting that ancient sources 
describe it as marginal. In Cicero’s On Ends, for instance, one of 
the main sources for this argument, the Stoic spokesman Cato calls 
it one of the auxiliary proofs of the standard Stoic thesis that the 
only good is virtue.3 Apart from Cicero, different versions of the 
argument are found in the works of Diogenes Laertius, Seneca 
and Plutarch. Despite certain differences, all the versions preserve 
the fundamental structure of the argument. This argument is 
always presented as a proof that only the beautiful is the good, and 
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it always has the same conclusion: that the good is the beautiful, 
although the middle stages, being ‘chosen’, ‘praiseworthy’ and so 
on, vary from one testimonial to another. This formulation raises a 
number of questions. Our sources do not specify how the proposi-
tions of this syllogism are linked4 or what precisely the conclusion 
of the argument implies. In addition to this, it is necessary to ask 
what relationship between the good and the beautiful this syllogism 
posits more generally, and what motivated the Stoics to employ 
an aesthetic term in the context of ethical discourse. Although the 
meaning of the argument is a little obscure, it is not only a promis-
ing source for determining the Stoic position on the relationship 
between the good and the beautiful –  one of the fundamental 
questions in the field of aesthetics –  but also for examining how 
ideas about beauty were embedded in Stoic philosophy.
Translation and interpretation
Before discussing the argument as a whole, it is necessary to discuss 
in greater detail both the term τὸ καλόν (which has been translated 
as ‘the beautiful’ so far) and the notion of ‘the good’.
The good
The argument μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι has a connection with 
the idea that virtue is a special kind, the highest, of the goods. The 
notion of the highest good was not invented by the Stoics; it is a 
very important concept in ancient schools of thought,5 and there 
are many different philosophical treatments of this concept. The 
Stoics were known for restricting the scope of the highest good to 
virtue alone. According to them, virtue is not only moral but also 
epistemic, because virtue consists of rationality.6 In the previous 
section, it was shown that orthodox Stoics were not so radical as 
not to recognise some value in the conventional goods. Their highly 
nuanced understanding of the goods, one that allows more than 
virtue to be of some value, still demarcates virtue as a fundamental 
type of good. Virtues are fundamental goods because, unlike con-
ventional goods, they ground happiness by virtue of constituting 
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the τέλος of human life.7 For this reason, they are choice-worthy8 
and not just objects of simple pursuit, like the conventional goods.
Whether an object is choice-worthy or not might seem to be 
a matter of pure rational deliberation, but this is not entirely the 
case. There is some evidence suggesting that the Stoics also main-
tained that the good has an inherent attractiveness recognisable 
even to those not capable of rational deliberation. Sextus Empiricus 
refers to the Stoic view that even irrational animals find beauty (τὸ 
καλόν) choice-worthy. It is important to note that this argument is 
presented as a support to the Stoic claim that only the beautiful is 
the good. In the context of criticising the Epicurean and the Stoic 
arguments on the good, Sextus records and refutes the Stoic belief 
that only the beautiful is the good as follows:
ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν δοξάζοντες δείκνυσθαι 
νομίζουσιν, ὅτι φύσει τοῦτο αἱρετόν ἐστι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων 
ζῴων. ὁρῶμεν γάρ, φασίν, ὥς τινα γενναῖα ζῷα, καθάπερ ταῦροι 
καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνες, καίπερ μηδεμιᾶς αὐτοῖς ὑποκειμένης τέρψεως καὶ 
ἡδονῆς διαγωνίζεται μέχρι θανάτου. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὲ οἱ ὑπὲρ 
πατρίδος ἢ γονέων ἢ τέκνων εἰς ἀναίρεσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιδιδόντες οὐκ 
ἄν ποτε τοῦτ’ ἐποίουν, μηδεμιᾶς αὐτοῖς ἐλπιζομένης μετὰ θάνατον 
ἡδονῆς, εἰ μὴ φυσικῶς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τούτους τε καὶ πᾶν τὸ 
γενναῖον ἀεὶ ζῷον ἐπεσπᾶτο πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ αἵρεσιν.
But even those who hold that only the beautiful is good think that it 
is proved by the irrational animals that this is desirable by nature. For 
we see, they say, how certain noble animals, such as bulls and cocks, 
contend unto the death even when they have no feeling of delight and 
pleasure. And those men who have given themselves over to destruc-
tion for the sake of country or parents or children would never have 
done so, when they had no hope of pleasure after death, unless the 
beautiful and good has naturally drawn them, and every noble animal, 
to desire it.9
The statement suggesting that even irrational animals perceive 
beauty as choice-worthy appears to refer to the well-known Stoic 
argument against the Epicurean tenet that pleasure is the good. 
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The Stoics responded to Epicurean hedonism by claiming that 
animals are drawn to what is in accordance with their nature, and 
they derive pleasure from that which is in accordance with the 
natural. Pleasure, therefore, is not a primary, but only a derivative 
impulse.10 For the purposes of this chapter, the more interesting 
notion is the inherent attractiveness of τὸ καλόν. Once it is ruled 
out that the attractiveness of the good is motivated by pleasure, it 
becomes necessary to provide another explanation. According to 
the passage from Sextus above, the Stoics posit τὸ καλόν to do this 
job.
τὸ καλόν
The question of how to interpret τὸ καλόν overlaps significantly 
with the question of how to translate it. There is a tendency to 
translate the Greek word τὸ καλόν (and its Latin equivalent hones-
tum) found in the Stoic texts as ethical terms, such as moral excel-
lence or honour.11 This is often a natural translation and it might 
seem that it is the best choice in the case of the argument μόνον τὸ 
καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι as well, bearing in mind how virtue-centred 
Stoic beliefs in ethics are.
I would argue, however, that the term has an aesthetic aspect 
in the context of this argument and, for this reason, it is more 
appropriate to translate τὸ καλόν (and, to a lesser extent, hones-
tum) as ‘the beautiful’ in this case.12 The choice of translation that 
emphasises the aesthetic aspect of the term is primarily motivated 
by the fact that this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of this 
aspect. Putting an emphasis on the aesthetic dimension of the term 
serves as a useful tool for illuminating and clarifying the conceptual 
commitments of the argument as a whole. One might worry that 
this is a circular methodology, especially if the upshot of the argu-
ment is just to show that τὸ καλόν is used as an aesthetic term here. 
This is not quite the case, however. The focus of this chapter is the 
investigation of the conceptualisation of the aesthetic properties 
that are inherent in virtue. That the term τὸ καλόν has an aesthetic 
aspect can be concluded for the following reasons.13
The most appropriate starting point for investigating whether a 
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term has an aesthetic dimension or not would be to define what it 
is that we are looking for, that is, what ‘aesthetic’ refers to. There 
is, however, a risk of anachronism in adopting such an approach. 
The contemporary analyses of the ‘aesthetic’ are influenced by the 
aesthetic tradition springing from the eighteenth century and thus 
they might be not very helpful for examining ancient Greek ideas. 
For this reason, the starting point of the discussion of what the 
‘aesthetic’ is in Stoic thought and, more pertinently, whether τὸ 
καλόν has this property, in the ancient texts containing the Stoic 
explanations of the special aspects of τὸ καλόν.
In Book 7, section 100 of the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 
Diogenes Laertius cites a cluster of various Stoic claims that are in 
some way related to τὸ καλόν. The first, and the most relevant for 
current purposes, states the following:
καλὸν δὲ λέγουσι τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν παρὰ τὸ πάντας ἀπέχειν τοὺς 
ἐπιζητουμένους ἀριθμοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἢ τὸ τελέως σύμμετρον.
The reason why they characterise the perfect good as beautiful is 
that it has in full all the measures required by nature or has perfect 
proportion.14
This testimony appears to give either two reasons, or two alterna-
tive formulations of the same reason, for why the good is called 
‘beautiful’ by the Stoics. The similarity of content in both parts of 
the disjunction seems to indicate that these are alternative formula-
tions of the same concept. The second might be Diogenes Laertius’ 
simpler re-formulation of the idea, although it is also possible that 
he was citing two different sources. In any case, both formula-
tions are useful. The second one is more straightforward, since it 
contains a reference to summetria. This, notably, is a concept that 
features prominently in the Stoic definition of beauty. The concept, 
together with the whole definition, will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
For now, it is enough to note that this is a distinct concept and it 
has, without a doubt, strong links to aesthetic phenomena, as it is 
used to explain both visual beauty and the beauty of the soul.15
For the purposes of the current chapter, however, the first 
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 formulation in Diogenes Laertius’ text is more useful. The perfect 
good is said to be καλόν by virtue of possessing τοὺς ἀριθμούς. 
The good is defined by using the same vocabulary in another 
source, Stobaeus, who cites the Stoics as claiming that ‘a right 
action is a proper function which possesses all the measures (τοὺς 
ἀριθμούς)’.16 The term οἱ ἀριθμοί here must refer to something 
like proportionality, and, in that case, the passage states that the 
Stoics describe the good as καλόν, because it is proportional to 
what is in accordance with nature.17 And although the aesthetic 
dimension of the Stoic notion of the good is rarely discussed, it is 
worth noting that this reading is in line with the standard prevalent 
understanding of the Stoic notion of the good.
In his seminal paper On the Stoic Conception of the Good, Michael 
Frede outlines the difference between the appropriate action and 
what the Stoics call the proper function as follows: ‘roughly speak-
ing, an appropriate action is one in doing which one does what is 
the right thing to do –  namely, in general, one in which one goes 
for what is conducive to one’s survival and avoids what is detrimen-
tal to it. But a right or virtuous action requires in addition that one 
does this with the right motivation, for the right reason; it requires 
that it be an action borne of virtue and wisdom . . .’.18 In his sub-
sequent discussion of this Stoic view, Frede notes that the evidence 
suggests that these actions possess internal order and consistency.19 
The Stoic right action, then, has certain formal20 properties.
The term οἱ ἀριθμοί in Stobaeus’ passage, thus, must explicitly 
refer to some kind of formal property, such as being proportioned 
in such a way as to be highly consistent and harmonious. In short, 
it must refer to being well-proportioned. The ground for ascribing 
the property of καλόν to the good is the fact that the latter shares 
something in common with the former, that is, οἱ ἀριθμοί, which 
is some kind of structural pattern. This is the ground for the aes-
thetic understanding of τὸ καλόν. And although it has been noted 
by Frede that τὸ καλόν (in the Stoic argument that only τὸ καλόν 
is the good) refers to a ‘certain attractiveness which makes it an 
appropriate object for admiration, praise, and the like’,21 my inclu-
sion of these texts into the discussion of Stoic aesthetics requires a 
further explanation.
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The first worry here might be that τὸ καλόν can be an ethical 
concept even if it is formal. Formal properties play a prominent 
role primarily in the areas of logic and aesthetics, but it is not 
impossible to find ethical notions that have formal properties as 
well. Justice can be theorised as having formal properties. If, for 
example, in order for a city to be just, it would have to be ordered 
in a specific way, then justice –  an ethical notion –  acquires certain 
formal features.22 My goal is not to rule out the ethical reading 
entirely, however. Rather, the aim is to point out that if a concept 
has formal features, it can have aesthetic properties too, by virtue 
of having those formal features. If proportionality is the underlying 
cause of aesthetic properties, then a proportionally ordered ethical 
concept can be beautiful just like a proportionally ordered chair 
could. The important point here is that the aesthetic reading does 
not rule out the ethical one, but it shows something that ethical 
reading by itself does not quite capture, that is, that the issue at 
stake is not just an order but a beautiful order. Perhaps a useful 
analogy here would be beautiful mathematical theorems. By calling 
a theorem beautiful, a mathematician signals that this theorem has 
some special property that comparable theorems lack, thus making 
them inferior to the beautiful theorem.23 If we read τὸ καλόν as a 
notion that does the same job as ‘beauty’ in the case of an especially 
good mathematical theorem, then this helps to explain why calling 
the good τὸ καλόν accounts for its inherent attractiveness. The 
perfect good is said to be καλόν because it has formal properties 
ordered in accordance with what is required by nature, and it is 
this formal ordering that renders it attractive and thus recognisable 
even by irrational animals.
The formality of the notion τὸ καλόν, then, is crucial for this 
reading.24 If there was no mention of οἱ ἀριθμοί, one could argue 
that τὸ καλόν here is used in the sense denoting what is ‘fitting’ 
or ‘appropriate’. However, as a whole, the passage describes fitting 
‘numbers’, that is, formal features. The issue at stake, therefore, is 
compositionality, which is an aesthetic concept. In addition to this, 
the reference to the summetria in Diogenes Laertius’ report on the 
reason(s) why the good is καλόν already mentioned above cements 
the connection between the good and aesthetic properties.
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In addition to this, if the term ‘beautiful’ was used merely as 
a metaphor for moral excellence, the intermediate stages of the 
argument, such as praiseworthiness, would be redundant or even 
misleading, because they evoke the notion of admiration. It could 
be argued that admiration can be directed at moral excellence, but 
this would not reflect the content of this argument well.25 The 
argument already starts with the term ‘the good’, which means that 
the issue at stake is positive value with a moral aspect, and moves 
on to prove that the phenomenon denoted by this term has an 
additional property. This suggests that the argument proves that 
the good –  the genuine Stoic good –  has this special property. The 
argument is more nuanced than a simple statement that the good 
is moral excellence and, therefore, the term ‘beauty’ expresses more 
adequately the message of this argument. For these reasons, the 
aesthetic translation of τὸ καλόν is adopted in this chapter. My 
hypothesis is that aesthetic vocabulary adds a dimension to this 
argument that could not be expressed in more straightforwardly 
ethical language, and by using an aesthetic translation of the rel-
evant terms I aim to explicitly engage with the question of what 
role the aesthetic overtones of the good are supposed to play.
Before concluding this part of the discussion, it is necessary to 
address the concern that a more neutral translation of the term τὸ 
καλόν, such as ‘fine’, is a better solution. While it is a fair option, it 
is worth noting that it does not actually solve any problems. If we 
chose this translation, we would still end up with the argument in 
which true goodness is marked by special language. It is hard to see 
why saying ‘the true good is fine’ is any more illuminating than ‘the 
true good is beautiful’. Both versions ascribe a special feature to the 
good, but it is not obvious that the former does it more clearly than 
the latter. By thinking about τὸ καλόν as a more neutral concept, 
such as ‘fineness’, one might avoid some problems that arise when 
the ethical and the aesthetic are associated. Those problems will 
inevitably emerge again, however, when one comes to the part of 
Diogenes Laertius’ passage which suggests that the Stoics claimed 
the good to be καλόν by virtue of being summetros.
Before moving on to the discussion of how this argument 
conceptualises the relationship between aesthetic properties and 
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morality, another note about translation is necessary. An important 
source of the Stoic ideas on this topic are Seneca’s works in which 
τὸ καλόν is rendered as honestum.26 The aesthetic translation of 
this term is, in general, hardly appropriate. Yet given the fact that 
Seneca is discussing the very same concept that, in Greek, has an 
aesthetic aspect, his texts employing honestum will be used in this 
chapter as well. In the context of discussing this particular Stoic 
doctrine (and in this context alone), honestum is effectively read 
as having an aesthetic aspect, just like τὸ καλόν. Seneca writes in 
Latin and so he uses Latin vocabulary, but there is no apparent 
change in the content of the Stoic argument that he expounds. 
Although τὸ καλόν turns into honestum, it is still playing the same 
role in the Latin argument (demarcating the true good from other, 
only apparently good) as in the Greek. I will even argue later in 
this chapter that Seneca, writing in Latin, presented the argument 
in a way which resembles the original Chrysippean meaning more 
accurately than Diogenes Laertius, writing in Greek. This is not the 
argument for adopting such a translation in all cases of honestum, 
as such an argument would, of course, not be correct. It would, 
equally, not be correct to give a different meaning to the argument 
because it is translated into Latin. For the sake of philological sensi-
tivity, I leave the term honestum untranslated, but I do not consider 
this term to be problematic for my project of investigating what 
conceptual understanding was signified by the aesthetic vocabulary 
of the original, Chrysippean version of the argument μόνον τὸ 
καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.
The argument
Various versions of this argument are often found in the context 
of discussing happiness, especially in connection with the Stoic 
claim that only the wise man is happy.27 It is important to note, 
however, that the argument itself is not specifically about the hap-
piness or beauty of the wise man; rather, the argument μόνον τὸ 
καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι (abbreviated as KA) establishes a more general 
truth, and then its conclusion is applied to the wise man as well as 
other cases.28 The scope of this chapter is limited to analysing the 
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argument in its abstract form by focusing on conceptual connec-
tions. The question of how the relationship between the good and 
the beautiful manifests itself in specific instances according to the 
Stoics is addressed in the following chapters.
Two issues ought to be noted: the authorship, and the unity of the 
argument. The author of this argument is unknown. The sources, 
nonetheless, provide some information about who employed it. The 
most common attribution is to Chrysippus, as he is mentioned by 
both Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch. Both of them even record the 
name of the specific treatise, that is, On Beauty (Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ). 
There is not enough evidence to suggest that Chrysippus was the 
author of this argument, but it is not unlikely, especially bearing in 
mind that other Stoics who, according to our sources, advocated 
this argument in their works lived after Chrysippus.29 The fact that 
this argument is recorded by Cicero and Seneca indicates that it 
was known in Roman Stoic circles as well.
This raises the question of whether this argument always main-
tained the same meaning, even when employed by different Stoic 
philosophers coming from different intellectual backgrounds. On 
the one hand, all the versions of this argument appear to have a 
similar form and exactly the same conclusion. Diogenes Laertius 
and Plutarch record the syllogism as titled ‘that only the beautiful 
is the good’. Cicero does not name the argument in the same way, 
but he uses the phrase in close proximity for describing the results 
of the argument in both On Ends and Tusculan Disputations.30 
Although Seneca does not provide the syllogistic part of the argu-
ment, he extensively comments on the meaning of the claim that 
only the beautiful is the good in his Letters. Another example, a 
passage of Philo, contains only the title of this argument, ‘that only 
the beautiful is the good’.31 This indicates that the argument was 
treated by many philosophers as representing a view commonly 
held by many Stoics. It is possible that different Stoics ascribed 
different conceptual interpretations to the KA argument. In fact, 
I show that ancient sources interpret this belief in two different 
ways in the following section. The syllogistic part of this argument, 
however, has clear implications, and I argue that it shows one of 
these interpretations to be more accurate than the other.
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Diogenes Laertius and Seneca
In his work The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius 
provides a wide spectrum of Stoic views on beauty. First, he states 
that according to the Stoics, the good is the beautiful, because it is 
proportionate to the use made of it.32 In the following paragraph, 
he explains that the Stoics said that the good is the beautiful because 
it has all the ‘measures’ required by nature (τοὺς ἐπιζητουμένους 
ἀριθμοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως) or has a perfect summetria,33 cited in 
full above. Then he presents four subspecies of the beautiful (τὸ 
καλόν) under which good deeds are accomplished. The next defini-
tion states that the beautiful is that which renders its possessor 
praiseworthy,34 and then, in another sense, it denotes good aptitude 
for one’s proper function.35 The last definition in this passage states 
that the beautiful is that which lends additional grace to something, 
as in the case of the wise man.36 These definitions are interesting 
and important in their own right,37 but the most relevant passage 
for the topic of the current chapter is the paragraph which follows 
this cluster of different definitions. It states the following:
Λέγουσι δὲ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν 
τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ· εἶναι 
δὲ τοῦτο ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς, ᾧ ἐστιν ἴσον τὸ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν 
καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἰσοδυναμεῖν τῷ καλῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ 
τούτῳ. ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, καλόν ἐστιν· ἔστι δὲ καλόν· ἀγαθὸν 
ἄρα ἐστί.
And they say that only the beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise 
On Goods, Book 3, and Chrysippus in his work On Beauty. They hold, 
that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: 
which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that 
the term ‘good’ has equal force with the term ‘beautiful’, which comes 
to the same thing. ‘Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beauti-
ful, therefore, it is good.’38
According to Diogenes Laertius, the argument that only the 
beautiful is the good suggests the equivalence of the good and the 
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beautiful. If Diogenes Laertius has recorded this accurately, then 
these two Stoics presented a very radical idea. The equivalence of 
ethical and aesthetic value implies that the good shares the proper-
ties of the beautiful, and the beautiful shares the properties of the 
good.39 While the first part of this suggestion is relatively unprob-
lematic, the second part is controversial. It is very counterintuitive 
to say that some objects are good by virtue of being beautiful. There 
does not seem to be any reason to attribute more than aesthetic 
value to beauty, especially if it possesses such a property merely by 
virtue of possessing certain formal features.40 In fact, some philoso-
phers have argued that it is appropriate to deny aesthetic value to 
an object on the basis of its lack of moral value.41 Even though the 
Stoic notion of the good is not equivalent to morality in a more 
conventional sense due to its epistemic nature, all these considera-
tions still apply.
It is noteworthy that Diogenes introduces the argument with 
the phrase ‘which is equivalent to saying’ (ᾧ ἐστιν ἴσον), which 
suggests that this interpretation is either his own comment or a 
comment from the source he is using for the Stoic views,42 not a 
part of the doctrine proposed by Chrysippus and Hecato. It is not 
at all clear that these earlier Stoics proposed the equivalence of the 
good and the beautiful. Another reason for questioning whether 
this is an accurate interpretation of the KA argument is the exist-
ence of an alternative reading. At the very beginning of Letter 120, 
Seneca presents and describes the Stoic43 claim that the good and 
the beautiful are distinct. After greeting Lucilius, Seneca sets out 
to answer the question which Lucilius had asked in the previous 
letter, namely, how human beings acquire the concepts of the good 
and the beautiful. Before answering his question in detail, Seneca 
briefly summarises what he calls the Stoic position in the following 
manner:
Haec duo apud alios diversa sunt, apud nos tantum divisa. Quid sit 
hoc dicam. Bonum putant esse aliqui id quod utile est. Itaque hoc et 
divitiis et equo et vino et calceo nomen inponunt; tanta fit apud illos boni 
vilitas et adeo in sordida usque descendit. Honestum putant cui ratio recti 
officii constat, tamquam pie curatam patris senectutem, adiutam amici 
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paupertatem, fortem expeditionem, prudentem moderatamque sententiam. 
<Nos> ista duo quidem facimus, sed ex uno. Nihil est bonum nisi quod 
honestum est; quod honestum, est utique bonum. Supervacuum iudico 
adicere quid inter ista discriminis sit, cum saepe dixerim. Hoc unum 
dicam, nihil nobis videri <bonum> quo quis et male uti potest; vides 
autem divitiis, nobilitate, viribus quam multi male utantur.
These two are, in the view of others, different; in our view they are 
merely distinct. I will explain. Some think that the good is that which 
is useful. Therefore they apply this term to wealth, to a horse, to wine, 
and to a shoe. That is how cheap they think the good is and how utterly 
they think it descends into vulgarity. They think that honestum is that 
which is characterised by a reasoning out of one’s correct responsibil-
ity; e.g., the faithful care of one’s father in old age, relief of a friend’s 
poverty, courageous behaviour on campaign, the utterance of sensible 
and moderate views [in the Senate]. We contend that these are indeed 
two things, but that they are rooted in one. Nothing is good except 
what is honestum; what is honestum is certainly good. I think it unneces-
sary to add what distinguishes them, since I have said it often. I will 
say just this one thing, that we believe that nothing is <good> which 
someone can also use badly; however, you see how many people make 
bad use of wealth, high birth, and strength.44
Seneca’s interpretation of this argument might appear very 
similar to the one presented by Diogenes Laertius at first sight, 
but there is an important difference. Although Seneca stated that 
‘nothing is good except what is beautiful; what is beautiful is 
certainly good’, he also wrote that the good and the beautiful are 
‘distinct’ properties rooted ‘in one’. In his reading, the good and 
the beautiful are not tied by identity, but only related by their 
origin. 
The syllogism
The mere fact that Seneca and Diogenes Laertius present different 
versions of the argument raises an interesting question. It is possible 
that Diogenes Laertius, a doxographer, misrepresented the ideas of 
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Chrysippus and Hecato, but it is equally possible that Seneca had 
his own original interpretation of the argument which differed from 
the earlier versions. The simplest way of answering this question is 
by comparing the two versions with the other available evidence.
One piece of evidence comes from Plutarch, who also records 
Chrysippus’ argument that only the beautiful is the good. In his On 
Stoic Self-Contradictions, Plutarch extensively criticises Chrysippus’ 
beliefs by juxtaposing them. In order to do that, Plutarch typi-
cally quotes extracts from various treatises written by Chrysippus 
and tries to show that they contradict each other. In one specific 
passage, Plutarch quotes Chrysippus as saying that although actions 
performed in accordance with virtue are congenial, some of them 
(such as extending one’s finger courageously) are not examples 
of virtuous behaviour.45 Subsequently, Plutarch cites Chrysippus’ 
KA argument and claims that Chrysippus is contradicting himself, 
because in one of his treatises he says that certain actions performed 
in accordance with virtue are examples of great behaviour, while in 
another treatise he states that all good is praiseworthy.46 Then he 
adds the following:
καὶ μὴν ἐν τῷ Περὶ καλοῦ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ μόνον τὸ καλὸν 
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοιούτοις λόγοις κέχρηται· ‘τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἱρετόν, τὸ δ’ 
αἱρετὸν ἀρεστόν, τὸ δ’ ἀρεστὸν ἐπαινετόν, τὸ δ’ ἐπαινετὸν καλόν’ 
καὶ πάλιν· ‘τὸ ἀγαθὸν χαρτόν, τὸ δὲ χαρτὸν σεμνόν, τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν 
καλόν.’
Moreover, in the treatise On Beauty to demonstrate that only the 
beautiful is good he has employed arguments like this: ‘what is good is 
chosen, what is chosen is approved, what is approved is admired, what 
is admired is beautiful’ and again ‘what is good is gratifying, what is 
gratifying is grand, what is grand is beautiful’.47
Plutarch’s version shows that the KA argument was supported 
by a syllogism. This is a very useful piece of evidence for the fol-
lowing reason. In order to determine whether Diogenes Laertius 
or Seneca presents a more accurate commentary on the KA argu-
ment, it is sufficient to discover what this syllogism implies. The 
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argument in its syllogistic form is found not only in Plutarch, but 
also in Cicero. In fact, Cicero records it several times in slightly 
different forms. Two versions of this argument can be found in 
a single paragraph in Book 3 of the On Ends, in which the Stoic 
spokesman Cato expounds the Stoic48 view regarding the τέλος of 
human life. Although Cato does not ascribe the KA argument to 
any particular Stoic, it can be plausibly treated as belonging to the 
group of arguments which Plutarch ascribed to Chrysippus and 
Hecato.49 The argument itself is presented as a rhetorical support 
for the proposition that living in agreement with nature is the 
τέλος of human beings and, therefore, all wise men lead happy and 
fortunate lives.50 The KA syllogism is one of the auxiliary logical 
proofs51 reinforcing this belief. Cato presents two versions, and the 
first, the shorter one, goes as follows:
Quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne est 
honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est.
Whatever is good is praiseworthy; whatever is praiseworthy is hones-
tum; therefore whatever is good is honestum.52
Cicero also records a refutation of this argument. The refutation 
consists in denying the premise that everything that is good is 
praiseworthy.53 In order to address this criticism, Cato presents the 
following argument:
Illud autem perabsurdum, bonum esse aliquid quod non expetendum sit, 
aut expetendum quod non placens, aut si id, non etiam diligendum; ergo 
et probandum; ita etiam laudabile; id autem honestum. Ita fit ut quod 
bonum sit id etiam honestum sit.
But it would be the height of absurdity for there to be a good that 
should not be sought; or something to be sought which was not pleas-
ing, or pleasing but not worthy of choice, and so also commendable, 
and so also praiseworthy; but then it is honestum. So it is the case that 
whatever is good is also honestum.54
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Although their length is different, both arguments share certain 
notions: the good, the praiseworthy and the beautiful. This suggests 
that the elongation of the argument does not change its meaning; it 
simply refines its form, possibly in order to make it more resistant 
to criticism. This version replaces the problematic premise with a 
more acceptable one while reaching exactly the same conclusion.
Cicero also records the third version of the KA argument in his 
Tusculan Disputations. Once again, the intermediate stages differ 
but the conclusion of the argument remains the same. Just as in 
the On Moral Ends, the context is a discussion of the nature of 
the happy life. After stating that strong emotions (regardless of 
whether they are positive or negative) are the opposite of wisdom 
and reason, Cicero concludes that the wise man is always happy 
because he is free from disturbances caused by emotions. Then this 
version of the KA argument follows:
Atque etiam omne bonum laetabile est; quod autem laetabile, id prae-
dicandum et prae se ferendum; quod tale autem, id etiam gloriosum; si 
vero glorosium, certe laudabile; quod laudabile autem, profecto etiam 
honestum: quod bonum igitur, id honestum.
Again, every good is a source of joy. What is a source of joy should be 
proclaimed and displayed; such a thing is also glorious but if glorious, 
it is certainly praiseworthy; but what is praiseworthy is surely also 
honestum, so what is good is honestum.55
An interesting part of this particular passage is the changing 
mood of the propositions. Some of the propositions are affirma-
tive and some are conditional statements. This might be a clue 
to the original form of the syllogism. Bearing in mind that inde-
monstrables, the fundamentals of Stoic logic, were hypothetical 
syllogisms,56 it is quite likely that originally this argument was a 
hypothetical modus ponens type of syllogism as well.
In addition to this, there are several other questions to be raised 
about the form of this argument. The first is whether the multiple 
versions of this syllogism ought to be treated as one argument or 
as several arguments. On the one hand, it might seem appropriate 
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to treat these arguments as different, because every version has dif-
ferent intermediate stages. On the other hand, the only difference 
between all the arguments is the number of middle stages, while 
the first term (the good), the last term (the beautiful), one of the 
middle stages (the praiseworthy) and the title-conclusion (only the 
beautiful is the good) are the same in every version. This is clearly 
the skeleton of the argument and the additional stages present in 
some versions expand the argument without changing its meaning.
There are two possible explanations why this argument has a flex-
ible form. The first is suggested by the Stoic spokesperson Cato in 
Cicero’s On Ends, where he explicitly states that the longer version 
of the KA argument is meant to refute those critics who deny that 
the good is praiseworthy. This indicates that the Stoic philosophers 
modified the same idea in order to make it more convincing or 
appropriate for their needs. The most likely reasons for adapting 
the argument by modifying its form are either to accommodate 
criticism or to fit the argument into a specific context.
The second possible explanation is suggested by Plutarch. When 
Plutarch introduces the KA argument cited above, he refers to it in 
the plural (τοιούτοις λόγοις κέχρηται). This phrase indicates that 
the argument might have come in different forms from its early 
development.57 These two suggestions are not mutually exclusive, 
but regardless of whether Chrysippus intended this argument to 
come in different forms or not, it ended up developing in this 
way, with the conceptual unity preserved by the skeleton of the 
argument.58
Against Diogenes Laertius
Having discussed some basic issues about the form of the syllogism, 
I move on to discuss its meaning and whether Seneca’s or Diogenes 
Laertius’ reading represents its implications more accurately. There 
are two possible ways of interpreting the meaning of the KA argu-
ment. It can be read as (i) an equivalency statement (or Diogenes 
Laertius’ interpretation); (ii) an attributive statement (or Seneca’s 
interpretation).59
Diogenes Laertius comments that the good and the beautiful 
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are tied by identity –  to be the beautiful is to be the good, and to 
be the good is to be the beautiful. This conclusion, however, does 
not follow from the KA argument. In order for Diogenes Laertius’ 
commentary to be correct, the copula ‘is’ should be an identity 
statement. This would not only be an unusual type of logic, but also 
would not reflect the content of the evidence accurately. In a typical 
syllogism, a proposition ‘all As are Bs’ distributes terms from sub-
jects to predicate (similarly, in a conditional, terms are distributed 
from antecedent to consequent), but not the other way around. As 
a syllogism, the argument that the good is the beautiful only proves 
the proposition stated in its conclusion –  it does not imply that the 
beautiful is also the good, in the same way that the statement ‘all 
cats are animals’ does not imply that all animals are cats.
Another reason to reject this interpretation is the presence of the 
word ‘only’ in the title of the argument. Without ‘only’, the title 
and the conclusion of this argument would be proposing opposite 
results. The title would state that the beautiful is the good (B is G), 
while the body of the argument would reach the conclusion that 
the good is the beautiful (G is B). If, however, ‘only’ is added to the 
title, then the title matches the conclusion of the argument. The 
context of the argument shows that this argument was intended to 
support the claim that virtue is the only good, that is, that the only 
type of good –  virtue –  is the true good. The title of the argument 
reflects this idea as well. The statement that only the beautiful is the 
good indicates that the true good is that which is also the beautiful 
and, consequently, that which is not the beautiful is not the good 
(¬B is ¬G).
This argument does not simply state that the good is the beauti-
ful and the beautiful is the good, as if they shared identity. It 
suggests that beauty is a special attribute of the true good which 
distinguishes it from all the other, only apparent, goods.
The succession of terms which constitutes the body of the argu-
ment can be understood as follows: the good falls into the area of 
the praiseworthy; the praiseworthy falls into the area of the beauti-
ful; therefore, the good falls into the area of the beautiful and thus 
the good is the beautiful. It shows that the good and the beautiful 
are connected not by identity, but by a set and subset relationship. 
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It can be rephrased as claiming that of all the possible sets of the 
good, only that good which is a subset of the beautiful is actually 
the good. Consequently, the phrasing of the argument suggests that 
the possession of an attribute of beauty distinguishes the true goods 
from all other types of goods.60 This shows that Diogenes Laertius 
represents this argument not quite accurately.
Attribution
The reading of the KA argument as a statement of attribution is 
exemplified by Seneca’s suggestion that beauty and the good are 
distinct.61 In fact, Seneca’s description of the relationship between 
the good and the beautiful is closer to the implications of the KA 
syllogism (found, according to our sources, in Chrysippus’ On 
Beauty) than any other interpretation of this argument analysed so 
far.
The question of what the ‘distinction’ between the good and 
honestum consist in is crucial for determining the meaning of the 
argument precisely, and Seneca’s other letters are quite informative 
in respect to this. When concluding the passage cited above, Seneca 
claims that he has discussed the difference between the good and 
the beautiful elsewhere.62 Brad Inwood suggests that this is a refer-
ence to Letter 118. In this letter, Seneca discusses happiness and how 
those who have the wrong conception of what is the good cannot 
live tranquil and happy lives. Then he provides the standard Stoic 
definition of the good as life in accordance with nature,63 and states 
that this good is honestum. This leads him to elaborate on the rela-
tionship between the good and honestum in the following manner:
Locus ipse me admonet ut quid intersit inter bonum honestumque dicam. 
Aliquid inter se mixtum habent et inseparabile: nec potest bonum esse nisi 
cui aliquid honesti inest, et honestum utique bonum est. Quid ergo inter 
duo interest? Honestum est perfectum bonum, quo beata vita completur, 
cuius contactu alia quoque bona fiunt. Quod dico talest: sunt quaedam 
neque bona neque mala, tamquam militia, legatio, iurisdictio. Haec cum 
honeste administrata sunt, bona esse incipiunt et ex dubio in bonum 
transeunt. Bonum societate honesti fit, honestum per se bonum est; bonum 
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ex honesto fluit, honestum ex se est. Quod bonum est malum esse potuit; 
quod honestum est nisi bonum esse non potuit.
This point reminds me to mention the difference between the good and 
honestum. They do share something with each other which is insepara-
ble from them. Only what has something honestum in it can be good, 
and the honestum is certainly good. So what is the difference between 
them? The honestum is the perfected good, by which the happy life is 
made complete and by contact with which other things are also made 
good. Here is the kind of thing I mean. There are certain things which 
are neither good nor bad, like military service, diplomatic service, and 
service as a judge. When they are conducted with honestum, they start 
to be good and make the transition from being uncertain to being 
good. Alliance with honestum makes something good, but honestum is 
good all on its own. Good flows from honestum; honestum depends only 
on itself. What is good could have been bad. What is honestum couldn’t 
have been otherwise than good.64
This passage spells out what is implied by the KA argument. The 
honestum is the perfected good, and when indifferent activities are 
performed with the honestum, they become the good. Since hon-
estum does not change the activities themselves, but only the way 
in which they are carried out, it must affect change by structuring 
those activities. It is a structured good. The actual, the Stoic, good 
is the good that contains certain formal properties. The actual good 
is a subset of honestum and hence certain formal properties that 
are inherent in honestum are an attribute of the true good. As an 
attribute, it distinguishes the actual good from only seeming goods. 
The formal properties, which are also aesthetic properties, are the 
indications of the actual good.65
Seneca also says that the honestum is in the sphere of the good, 
but presumably this is to prevent the counter-example of some thing 
with the property of the honestum which is in some way bad. To have 
honestum is necessary and sufficient for having the good in the par-
ticular Stoic notion of the good. Yet in terms of the general notion 
of the good, the Stoics recognise a distinction between the good and 
the honestum, as they recognise only the latter as the actual good.
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This leaves us with the conclusion that Seneca commented on 
the meaning of the KA argument more accurately than Diogenes 
Laertius. The difference lies in the nuance, however. Diogenes 
Laertius’ account simply abbreviates the same argument, but omits 
a rather significant nuance, that is, that τὸ καλόν and the good 
are left conceptually distinct by the Stoic syllogism. Neither the 
logical form of this argument nor other Stoic commentaries imply 
the identity of the good and the beautiful, as Diogenes Laertius 
suggests. Seneca’s more nuanced reading presents a more accurate 
discussion of the relationship between τὸ καλόν/honestum and the 
good.
Theoretical virtue
So far I have argued that the beauty of the good in the syllo-
gism titled μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι is best understood as an 
attribute of the good. This leaves the question of why the Stoics 
were interested in attributing aesthetic properties to the good. The 
easiest way of answering this question is by breaking it down into 
two parts: first, why were the Stoics motivated to assign formal 
values to the good and, second, what would they gain by focusing 
on the aesthetic aspect of those values?
The answer to the first question has already been discussed in 
the scholarship on Stoicism. When discussing the Stoic claim that 
virtue is that which ultimately confers benefits, Chris Gill notes the 
following:
Goodness is defined by the conferring of benefit or the beneficial. It is 
also manifested in the wholeness, structure, cohesion, and in this sense 
the ‘perfection’, of a whole series of types of entities. The link between 
these two strands is, by inference at least, that goodness benefits by 
the very fact that it provides or constitutes the cohesion or structure 
of entities as unified wholes. Similar points can be made about virtue. 
Virtue is that element or factor that consistently and invariably ben-
efits, as distinct from providing localized or intermittent benefits. The 
virtues, in themselves, constitute a structured and unified whole or 
set. They also confer structure and unity on the entities in which they 
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are present, and thus enable the perfection of them as wholes. The 
benefit or goodness which virtue confers –  or, in another sense, which 
it consists in –  derives from its character of being structured whole and 
from its role of conferring structure on entities considered as wholes.66
This way of interpreting the Stoic notion of virtues shows that 
formal properties are important for understanding how virtues 
affect their possessors. They confer benefit by ordering one’s 
behaviour, beliefs and so on. Although Gill does not use an aes-
thetic vocabulary in this interpretation, his work is enlightening 
for thinking about the Stoic connection between virtue and the 
beautiful. If something, let’s say an act, has formal properties and 
thus a structure, it can also be well structured or poorly structured. 
In the former case, formal aesthetic properties become present. 
Virtue, of course, can only manifest itself in the case of exception-
ally good order and structure. Interest in aesthetic properties and 
the questions pertinent to them, therefore, naturally emerge from 
the Stoic conceptualisation of virtue and ethical commitments. The 
claims that acting virtuously is in accordance with human nature 
and leads to happiness, the τέλος of human life, are central to 
Stoic ethics. Presumably, virtue confers benefits not because it has 
simply any kind of structuring capacity, but because it structures 
in accordance with what is best in human beings. Virtue organises 
beliefs and behaviour in the most rational way so that a person 
lives her life in the way which is dictated by her nature and is most 
beneficial. Claiming that virtues are beautiful, therefore, is a natural 
consequence of the Stoic ethics.
This raises an interesting issue regarding the differences between 
ethical goodness and moral beauty, because they appear to be very 
similar or even identical. Virtues confer benefit in respect to their 
structuring capacity, but they themselves also have a certain struc-
ture which gives them aesthetic value. It seems that at least to some 
extent, Chrysippus was aiming to show that there is a significant 
overlap between ethical good and aesthetic value.
It is possible to draw an analogy between the Stoic use of aesthetic 
properties as special attributes of the good and the use of aesthetic 
properties by scientists as special attributes of especially apt scien-
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tific theories.67 This analogy is intended to illustrate more generally 
the motivation for attributing aesthetic properties to objects excel-
ling at their function, which is useful for understanding the Stoic 
position as well. In the case of especially apt, ‘beautiful’ theories, 
beauty is typically called a ‘theoretical virtue’. The term ‘theoreti-
cal virtue’ is given to special properties that are not related to the 
content of a scientific theory, yet they make that theory preferable. 
Simplicity, coherence, elegance and sometimes beauty are examples 
of such properties. When a scientist is faced with two theories with 
equal truth value and she prefers the one which she considers to be, 
for instance, the more elegant, she makes the judgement based on 
the theoretical virtue –  elegance –  possessed by one of the theories. 
Although the question of how scientific theories acquire aesthetic 
values is very complex in its own right,68 the notion of a theoretical 
virtue, nonetheless, might help to shed some light on the motiva-
tion for attributing aesthetic value to the good.
In the cases of both scientific theories and the Stoic concept of 
the good, beauty is what could be called a secondary-level value. It 
is clear that those who attribute beauty to either the good or espe-
cially apt scientific theories think that the fundamental value lies in 
the goodness or the correctness of the theory. Beauty supervenes as a 
kind of secondary value on properties that are intrinsically valuable 
themselves. The advantage of attributing this secondary value is its 
distinguishing aspect –  it helps to create a hierarchy of values. This 
is especially clear in Seneca’s passage cited above in which he states 
that although there are many goods, the Stoics consider as truly 
good only those that are also καλόν. Similarly, beautiful scientific 
explanations are preferable to non-beautiful explanations when all 
the other parameters are equal. It seems that some Stoics, just like 
some contemporary scientists and philosophers of science, claim 
that certain propositions will unfailingly produce in us a sensation 
of beauty as a mark of the superiority of these propositions.
Concluding remarks
An interesting question which follows from this discussion is how 
objective the attribution of the property of beauty is. Does beauty 
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originate in the mind of a perceiver or do certain properties, origi-
nating in an object itself, render them beautiful to a perceiver? Those 
who analyse the beauty of scientific theories often choose the former 
option;69 the Stoic argument, however, implies the latter option. 
These approaches differ on account of their agendas. The difference 
between investigating the role of beauty in scientific theories and 
in the KA argument lies in the fact that whereas the former aims 
to explain why some scientists experience beauty when faced with 
certain scientific explanations, this Stoic argument aims to convince 
us that the true good is the beautiful. Thus, for those Stoics who 
propose this argument, beauty is a property built into the world.
This, in its turn, raises the question of what renders virtues 
or especially apt scientific explanations beautiful. In the case of 
Stoicism, there is good reason to suspect that it is a kind of ordering. 
But what kind of ordering, exactly? The next section is dedicated to 
the examination of some particular cases of virtues in action, which 
will bring us closer to determining the central concepts and claims 
in the Stoic theory of beauty.
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56. For a thorough discussion of Stoic indemonstrables, see Bobzien 
(1996).
57. This suggestion is dependent on the reading of ‘λόγοις’ as ‘argu-
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 The Beautiful and the Good 77
61. See Cicero Off. 1.95, for the Panaetian account of τὸ πρέπον/decorum 
(an aesthetic term, cf. Dyck (1996: 241)), which also theoretically 
distinguishes the aesthetic and the moral.
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4
‘The wise man is no true Scotsman’: 
The Stoics on Human Beauty
‘The critique of beauty is never a critique of beautiful objects but always 
of ideas, ideologies, social practices and cultural hierarchies.’
Dave Beech, ‘Art and the Politics of Beauty’1
The previous section was dedicated to exploring the role of beauty 
in the Stoic value system. Virtue, it was established, has formal 
features that pave the way for it having aesthetic properties. This 
chapter develops the enquiry into Stoic aesthetics by focusing on 
the evidence that reports the idiosyncratic Stoic views of human 
beauty, primarily the claim that only the wise man is beautiful. 
It also addresses the related question of the Stoic manner of 
theorising love. Although the main evidence comes from a single 
passage, a highly critical report of Stoic views composed by 
Plutarch, there are two distinct points of interest here. First is 
the question of what the claim that only the wise man is beauti-
ful tells us about the Stoic conception of beauty. The second 
question of interest is the nature of the love relationship. The 
latter is a far more important question than it might appear at 
first sight, because in the previous chapters it was argued that 
beauty acts as an important attribute of virtue. Given that love 
is defined as a response to beauty by the Stoics,2 the question of 
what kind of relationship this response is and how it relates to the 
natural attraction of virtue naturally follows. The enquiry into 
the passages that deal with the wise man and his love of youths, 
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therefore, ought to shed more light on the Stoic view that virtue 
is inherently attractive.
Plutarch’s attack
There are several extant passages on the Stoic account of love, 
beauty and their relationship, but none of them are quite as 
vivid and extensive as Plutarch’s critique of this account. In his 
Conspectus of the Essay ‘The Stoics Talk More Paradoxically than the 
Poets’, Plutarch criticises various Stoic claims about the wise man. 
His starting point is the following group of claims:
Ὁ Εὐριπίδου Ἰόλαος ἐξ ἀδρανοῦς καὶ παρήλικος εὐχῇ τινι νέος καὶ 
ἰσχυρὸς ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην ἄφνω γέγονεν· ὁ δὲ τῶν Στωικῶν σοφὸς χθὲς 
μὲν ἦν αἴσχιστος ἅμα καὶ κάκιστος, τήμερον δ’ ἄφνω μεταβέβληκεν 
εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ γέγονεν ἐκ ῥυσοῦ καὶ ὠχροῦ καὶ κατ’ Αἰσχύλον 
‘ἐξ ὀσφυαλγοῦς καὶ ὀδυνοσπάδος λυγροῦ γέροντος’ εὐπρεπὴς 
θεοειδὴς καλλίμορφος. καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τὴν ῥυσότητα 
καὶ φαλακρότητα καὶ ἀμορφίαν ἀφῄρηκεν, ὅπως φανείη καλός· 
ὁ δὲ τούτων σοφός, οὐκ ἀπολιπόντος τὸ σῶμα τοῦ γήρως ἀλλὰ 
καὶ <κακὰ> προσεπιθέντος καὶ προσεπιχώσαντος, μένων κυρτός, 
ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, νωδὸς ἑτερόφθαλμος οὔτ’ αἰσχρὸς οὔτε δύσμορφος 
οὔτε κακοπρόσωπός ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ Στωικὸς ἔρως, ὥσπερ οἱ κάνθαροι 
λέγονται τὸ μὲν μύρον ἀπολείπειν τὰ δὲ δυσώδη διώκειν, οὕτως 
τοῖς αἰσχίστοις καὶ ἀμορφοτάτοις ὁμιλῶν, ὅταν εἰς εὐμορφίαν καὶ 
κάλλος ὑπὸ σοφίας μεταβάλωσιν, ἀποτρέπεται.
Euripides’ Iolaus has changed suddenly from being feeble and elderly 
to being youthful and strong by means of a prayer; but the Stoic wise 
man, who yesterday was most ugly and, at the same time, most vicious, 
today suddenly becomes virtuous and changes from being wrinkled, 
sallow and, as Aeschylus says ‘from a wretched old man with a sore 
back, racked by pain’, to being good-looking, godlike and beautiful. 
Athena has removed Odysseus’ wrinkles, baldness and ugliness, so that 
he would appear beautiful, but the body of the Stoic wise man not only 
remains old, but also acquires bad things and gets burdened by them. 
And while he remains –  if he happened to be such –  hunchbacked, 
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toothless and one-eyed, he is neither ugly nor misshapen nor ugly-
faced. For the Stoic love consorts with the ugliest and most unshapely 
and turns away from them whenever they change into shapeliness and 
beauty by means of wisdom in the same way that dung beetles are said 
to avoid perfume and seek foul-smelling things.3
In a manner typical of Plutarch when he writes about the 
Hellenistic schools, several distinct groups of claims are jumbled 
together in this passage: i) the claim that the change from ignorance 
to wisdom is sudden and instantaneous; ii) the claim that only 
the wise man is beautiful; iii) the claim that the wise man might 
pursue promising youths as love interests. The confusing picture 
that Plutarch draws in this passage is the result of his applying the 
implications of one claim to another. Thus, for instance, the claim 
that Stoic love seeks the foul is the result, according to Plutarch, of 
claims ii) and iii). Plutarch’s reading is hardly fair because he takes 
the three Stoic claims out of their respective contexts.
In order to interpret the Stoic claims more charitably, it is neces-
sary to examine the claims on the wise man and the claims on love 
separately, with their respective contexts in view. Only then will it 
be possible to say how –  or if –  these claims are related.
No true Scotsman
Plutarch’s vivid criticism ridicules the idea that an ugly man who 
is supposed to be beautiful will fall in love with a beautiful youth 
who is supposed to be ugly. Although Plutarch’s text is quite rhe-
torical, there is more than rhetoric at stake. His remarks suggest a 
substantial criticism of this Stoic claim, that is, Plutarch suggests 
that the Stoic statement about the beauty of the wise man is a 
kind of a fallacy. This is for the following reason: if I provide an 
argument which claims that a young boy who is conventionally 
perceived as beautiful is not beautiful, but an old man who is 
conventionally perceived as not beautiful is actually beautiful, then 
all I am doing is redefining the term ‘beautiful’. Such a statement 
does not offer any explanation of the problematic term; it simply 
changes its definition. This move is comparable to the so-called No 
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True Scotsman fallacy.4 It might be the case that Plutarch’s criti-
cism is fair. A harsh critic of Stoicism such as Plutarch, however, 
is not necessarily the most reliable source for detailing the nuances 
of Stoic beliefs and presenting them in the best light. It is useful, 
therefore, to approach this question of the relationship between 
wisdom and beauty, as well as the question of whether Plutarch’s 
critique is accurate, by looking at some additional evidence. The 
nature of the Stoic paradoxes about the wise man in general is 
revealing background information for interpreting the claims about 
the wise man’s beauty.
Paradoxes: what kind of a claim is this?
Plutarch describes the Stoic beliefs about the wise man as ‘para-
doxes’, which seems to be intended to convey a critical view of these 
claims, but there is evidence to suggest that the Stoics themselves 
called their views ‘paradoxes’ (παράδοξα).5 The reason the Stoics 
chose this name is not in the extant evidence. The term seems to 
have distinguished a certain class of auxiliary statements that sup-
ported the central Stoic tenet that only virtue is the good. Perhaps 
by giving a special name to these claims, the Stoics signified their 
awareness that these ideas would challenge the conventional opin-
ions on what the good was.
In Plutarch’s texts, the term appears to be critical, and it is 
noteworthy that there are other cases of the adjective ‘paradoxical’ 
(παράδοξος) being used to denote something strange, extraordi-
nary or surprising.6 Although one might expect that, in a philo-
sophical context, the term would refer to a logical paradox, such as 
the Liar, the paradoxicality in this case does not seem to amount to 
much more than idiosyncrasy. The Stoic paradoxes typically state 
that only the wise man is x, where x is some property commonly 
deemed to be desirable, such as being wealthy, free, beautiful, 
happy and in possession of various kinds of knowledge. Although 
certainly strange, there is no contradiction in these claims; at most, 
they require an explanation. There is, furthermore, no evidence to 
suggest that Stoic logic produced logical puzzles for any purpose 
(unlike Zeno of Elea, for instance). On the contrary, there is 
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evidence that Chrysippus, a noted logician of his times,7 offered 
solutions to known paradoxes. He suggested to stop answering the 
questions that constitute the sorites paradox when they become 
tricky and one can no longer answer with certainty.8 It is also worth 
noting that Plutarch is not focused on criticising the argumenta-
tion itself, but only its conclusion, namely, that only the wise man 
is beautiful. This shows that the idiosyncrasy of the claim is the 
target of his criticism.
The context suggests the same. Throughout the Conspectus of the 
Essay ‘The Stoics Talk More Paradoxically than the Poets’, Plutarch 
makes parallel comparisons of Stoic beliefs and poets’ tales. The 
wise man’s transformation into beauty while remaining in the same 
state physically is compared to the episode in the Odyssey in which 
Athena rejuvenated Odysseus. Plutarch writes that while Athena 
actually enhanced the physical features of Odysseus,9 the Stoic wise 
man remains in the same state and, therefore, the Stoics speak more 
paradoxically, that is, they make a more counterintuitive claim than 
Homer, who was telling a story involving magical elements.
Hypothetical scenarios
The question that naturally follows is why the Stoics posited such a 
claim, the oddity of which they themselves appear to acknowledge. 
The central notion in all of the Stoic paradoxes is the wise man. 
What is so special about wise men that allows them –  and only 
them! –  to own all the conventional good?
Arguably, the starting point ought to be the claim that all the 
beliefs that the wise man holds are true, because he assents to true 
impressions only.10 The existence of such a person is an intrigu-
ing possibility philosophically, and examining the case of a person 
who only holds true beliefs can be used in arguments in various 
ways. Positing the notion of the wise man is especially useful for 
exploring the motivations and implications of various philosophi-
cal positions. It is relatively common to use the notion of a per-
fectly rational person to argue that such a person would act in a 
certain way and, therefore, this course of behaviour is normative. 
Philosophers also examine the hypothetical mental content of a 
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perfectly rational person and on that basis draw general conclusions 
about metaphysical or epistemological features of the world.11
In the case of the Stoic wise man, the assertions that only the 
wise man is happy, free, wealthy and so on are used to defend the 
Stoic idea that the only good is virtue, arguably the central Stoic 
ethical doctrine. The Stoics also employ the notion of the wise 
man to investigate how his special cognitive state enables him to 
act in problematic situations. Since the wise man has a superior 
kind of understanding of when to assent and when to withhold his 
assent to impressions, he is also able to make judgements of how 
one ought to act in any given situation. Determining what the 
wise man would do when faced with a decision either about one’s 
lifestyle or a course of action in a difficult situation shows how one 
ought to act in such a case. When read this way, the Stoic claims 
about the wise man are hypothetical explorations. An interesting 
consequence of this reading is that the issue at stake is not whether 
the wise man exists, but how such a person would act if he existed.
The hypothetical reading sheds some light on the motivation 
for the wise man paradoxes. To be precise, by saying that only the 
wise man is in possession of what is generally deemed to be the 
good, the Stoics aim to explore the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for various goods, with the conclusion that their conception 
of the good, although restrictive from a conventional point of view, 
fits those conditions the best.
The claims about the goods that only the wise man has are many 
and various. Only the wise man, for instance, is said to be free,12 
happy13 and beautiful.14 Cicero’s Stoic Paradoxes is an important 
source in this case because it contains not only the paradoxes but 
also lengthy explanations of why the Stoics made these claims. The 
claim that only the wise man is free, for instance, is related to the 
claim that the wise man never does anything against his will in the 
following manner:
Quid est enim libertas? Potestas vivendi, ut velis. Quis igitur vivit, ut volt, 
nisi qui recte vivit? qui gaudet officio, cui vivendi via considerata atque 
provisa est, qui ne legibus quidem propter metum paret, sed eas sequitur 
et colit, quia id salutare esse maxime iudicat, qui nihil dicit, nihil facit, 
84 The Stoic Theory of Beauty
nihil cogitat denique nisi libenter ac libere, cuius omnia consilia resque 
omnes, quas gerit, ab ipso proficiscuntur eodemque referuntur, nec est ulla 
res, quae plus apud eum polleat quam ipsius voluntas atque iudicium . . . 
Soli igitur hoc contingit sapienti, ut nihil faciat invitus, nihil dolens, nihil 
coactus.
For what is freedom? The power to live as you will. Who then lives 
as he wills except one who follows the things that are right, who 
delights in his duty, who has a well-considered path of life mapped 
out before him, who does not obey even the laws because of fear but 
follows and respects them because he judges that to be conducive to 
health, whose every utterance and action and even thought is voluntary 
and free, whose enterprises and courses of conduct all take their start 
from himself and likewise have their end in himself, there being no 
other thing that has more influence with him than his own will and 
 judgement? . . . It therefore befalls the wise man alone that he does 
nothing against his will nor with regret nor by compulsion.15
This passage shows that, according to the Stoics, conventional 
notions of freedom are conceptually inadequate, because a person 
who is said to be free conventionally is still often compelled to 
act against his will and by virtue of this he is not truly free. The 
meaningful and coherent attribute of freedom can only be found in 
a perfectly rational person because only such a person acts without 
any restrictions on his will. Although this argument might seem to 
be just a sophistic move which replaces the meaning of terms –  the 
so-called No True Scotsman fallacy –  it is important to note that it 
contains an element of conceptual analysis which renders the argu-
ment more rigorous than it might appear at first sight. The Stoics 
do not merely change the meaning of the term ‘free’, because the 
argument supplied with the paradoxical claim shows that the con-
ventional use of this term is inconsistent with its actual meaning. 
The Stoic doctrine that posits rationality as the foundation of any 
good provides a better account of what it means to possess the 
good.
A similar strategy is used to establish that only the wise man is 
rich,16 happy17 and beautiful.18 In all of these cases, the notion of 
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the wise man is used to analyse such concepts as freedom, happi-
ness and wealth. The wise man is compared with those people who 
are thought to have these desirable properties in order to show that 
only the former can truly be said to possess the good. Interestingly, 
the Stoic claims aim to show that the Stoic paradoxes are the rea-
sonable option on the table, while the conventional understanding 
of such properties as freedom or wealth have flaws that contradict 
the very meaning of those properties. It is inappropriate and incor-
rect, for instance, to call a man who is compelled to act in certain 
ways free. In the same way, a person who is conventionally free, 
wealthy and beautiful is still in some sense not free, not wealthy and 
not beautiful. Only rationality genuinely grounds these properties. 
A description of the wise man as someone who has all the goods, 
therefore, is an exploration of how being perfectly rational is the 
foundation of having all the other goods.
It is also worth noting that the wise man paradoxes apply not 
only to properties, but also to activities. Diogenes Laertius records 
the Stoic claim that the wise man would engage in dialectic, because 
dialectic would enable him to distinguish between true and false, 
plausibility and ambiguity,19 followed by the claim that only the 
wise man is a dialectician.20 In Stobaeus, the Stoics are reported as 
claiming that only the wise man can be a lover of music and litera-
ture.21 Only wise men are also said to be priests, for they study and 
engage in all things relevant to religion.22 According to Chrysippus, 
only wise men are kings because only they have the knowledge of 
good and evil necessary for the ruler, and only they are fit to be 
magistrates, judges and orators.23
Presumably, these paradoxes are also motivated by the view that 
only wise men are able to engage in these activities in a proper 
sense, because only wise men have a rationality-based approach 
which guarantees that any act they undertake is performed in the 
way that genuinely fulfils the description of the act. Arguably, it is 
very important to interpret these claims in a hypothetical manner 
in order to make sense of them. The message here is not that 
people who typically perform these activities are, in some sense, 
frauds, or that they ought to be replaced by philosopher priests and 
philosopher kings.24 The Stoics, as far as it is possible to tell from 
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the extant evidence, did not have a utopian political programme 
with a philosopher king as the proper ruler.25 Instead, these claims 
explore hypothetically the significance of being rational. It is only 
rationality, according to the Stoics, that guarantees the possession 
of the goods in a genuine way, regardless of whether those goods 
are certain properties, expertises or professions.26 For this reason, 
the wise man’s case is best understood as an exploration of what 
it takes to possess the good, rather than a prescriptive doctrine or 
an explicit critique of standard cultural practices. If we take the 
Stoic paradoxes to be nuanced explorations of value in the manner 
proposed, then the meaning of the claims about the wise man’s 
beauty become clearer as well.
Where does the wise man’s beauty come from?
So far, it has been argued that the claims about the wise man can 
be understood as the Stoic conceptual analysis of the good. This 
is an especially important point when it comes to beauty, because 
this interpretation suggests that there is more at stake than a mere 
redefinition of beauty terms in the claim that only the wise man 
is beautiful. It is, in other words, not the case that the Stoics 
committed the so-called No True Scotsman fallacy. The paradox 
stating that only the wise man is beautiful does not simply redefine 
beauty. Instead, it is –  just like the other wise man paradoxes –  a 
hypothetical argument motivated by an attempt to analyse the 
foundations of any good and to prove that the fundamental condi-
tion of gaining even the conventional goods is virtue.
The paradox is also not simply equating beauty with wisdom, 
despite the fact that the appearance of the latter is immediately 
followed by the former.27 In his Stoic Paradoxes, Cicero records 
the Stoic explanation of why only the wise man is free or wealthy. 
I have argued that this explanation shows that statements of the 
form ‘only the wise man is x’ indicate that virtue is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for gaining any good. By analysing conceptu-
ally what it means to have a particular good, the Stoics argued that 
it is impossible to have a coherent concept of that good without 
including virtue as a necessary and sufficient condition. This is 
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not the same kind of move as the replacement of the good with 
virtue. It is clear that the claim that only the wise man is wealthy, 
for instance, does not imply that wisdom is true wealth, but that 
one cannot be said to be genuinely wealthy without also possessing 
wisdom. Wisdom grounds the goods, rather than replaces them. It 
is not plausible, for this reason, to assume that the claim that only 
the wise man is beautiful redefines beauty as wisdom.
At the very end of Book 3 of Cicero’s On Ends, the Stoic spokes-
person Cato talks about the Stoic paradoxes, including the one 
about the beauty of the wise man, as follows:
Recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher 
appellabitur-animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis-, recte 
solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, 
recte invictus . . .
The one who alone knows how properly to use all things is the owner 
of all things. Such a person will rightly be called beautiful too, since 
the soul’s features are more beautiful than those of the body; and 
uniquely free, the servant of no master, the slave of no appetite, truly 
unconquerable.28
In this passage, the wise man is said to be simply more beauti-
ful than a physically attractive person. There is no claim that the 
latter is ugly, as Plutarch extrapolates in his criticism of the Stoic 
paradoxes. Instead, the beauty of the wise man is said to be greater 
because the beauty of the soul is greater than that of the body. Just 
as in the case of professions and expertises, the point here is not 
to deny that conventionally attractive people are attractive, but 
that this attractiveness pales in comparison with the beauty of the 
soul and, effectively, only wise people are beautiful. This raises the 
question of what it is about the beauty of the soul that makes it so 
much greater than the beauty of the body.
An important passage to consider here is a short definition of 
beauty cited by Diogenes Laertius amongst other Stoic claims 
employing aesthetic vocabulary.29 This definition is presented as 
follows:
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. . . ἄλλως δὲ τὸ ἐπικοσμοῦν, ὅταν λέγωμεν μόνον τὸν σοφὸν ἀγαθὸν 
καὶ καλὸν εἶναι.
. . . while in yet another sense the beautiful is that which lends new 
grace to anything, as when we say of the wise man that he alone is good 
and beautiful.30
This very short passage shows that the claim about the wise man’s 
beauty is not made on the basis of merely proclaiming the superior-
ity of the soul over the body. The beauty of the wise man is a kind 
of embellishment. Beauty, therefore, is a property that the wise man 
acquires on account of becoming wise, but it is not synonymous 
with it, since the Stoic virtue is certainly not an embellishment. 
This raises the question of what changes when one moves from 
ignorance to wisdom. The passage from Arius Didymus’ Epitome is 
a useful source for answering this question, as it contains the same 
claim about the superiority of the soul over the body, but with the 
following details:
τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οὔσης κυριωτέρας τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὸ κατὰ 
φύσιν ζῆν φασὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ φύσιν ὄντα καὶ προηγμένα 
πλείονα τὴν ἀξίαν ἔχειν τῶν περὶ σῶμα καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, οἷον εὐφυίαν 
ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεράγειν τῆς τοῦ σώματος εὐφυίας καὶ ὁμοίως 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν.
Since the soul is more in control than the body, they say that, with 
respect to living in accord with nature, things concerning the soul 
which are in accord with nature and preferable also have more value 
than things concerning the body and externals. Thus, in relation to 
virtue, natural ability of the mind surpasses the natural ability of the 
body and they say that the same holds for the other things.31
This passage explains that the superiority of the soul over the 
body refers to being in accord with nature, which is a crucial point. 
The accord with nature is a central notion in Stoic philosophy, as 
it features prominently in the definitions of happiness and virtue.32 
In Stoic epistemology, acting in accordance with nature means 
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assenting to cognitive impressions only and thus achieving the 
state of pure rationality.33 The Stoics are known for stating that the 
nature of human beings is to be rational, and rationality is a very 
important –  if not the most important –  part of being a human.34 
The claim that the wise man is the only one who is beautiful, 
therefore, can be unpacked as the claim that the wise man alone has 
the type of beauty which is important and appropriate for human 
beings.
This would also resolve the supposed self-contradiction regarding 
the simultaneous beauty and ugliness of a youth, which is pointed 
out by Plutarch in his critique of the Stoic claims about human 
beauty. It is likely that the Stoics did recognise that the young 
man does possesses bodily beauty in a conventional way.35 When 
compared to the wise man, however, his beauty is lesser, because it 
is not of the kind that is truly significant for human beings, given 
the kind of beings they are. The beauty of the soul possessed by 
the wise man is both different and, in a sense, more relevant for a 
human being than bodily beauty. Bodily beauty only concerns the 
proportion of limbs and, therefore, it concerns only a fairly small 
part of being human. The wise man’s beauty, by contrast, concerns 
what is peculiarly human, that is, the rationality which is the very 
foundation of human nature. The extent of such a person’s beauty, 
therefore, is naturally greater.
This introduces a conceptualisation of beauty not mentioned 
previously. Beauty is conceptualised as a property that arises when 
an object fulfils its function or a person fulfils her role perfectly. In 
this study, this type of conceptualisation of beauty will be called the 
functional theory of beauty. The detailed analysis of this theory is 
presented in Chapter 6, but for now, it is enough to note that this 
is the kind of explanation that emerges from the claim that only the 
wise man is beautiful.
There is, furthermore, another layer to the wise man’s beauty. 
In the previous chapter it was shown that virtues possess aesthetic 
properties because they possess formal properties or, to put it 
simply, because they are well structured. This, however, differs 
from the functional explanation of the wise man’s beauty. There 
is a passage in Cicero which draws an explicit parallel between the 
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beauty of the body and the beauty of the soul in terms of formal 
properties. When discussing the notions of health and disease in his 
Tusculan Disputations,36 Cicero states that, according to the Stoics, 
good proportion is responsible for both the beauty of the body and 
the beauty of the soul in the following way:
Et ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam 
suavitate eaque dicitur pulchritudo, sic in animo opinionum iudicio-
rumque aequabilitas et constantia cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate 
virtutem subsequens aut virtutis vim ipsam continens pulchritudo vocatur.
And as in the body a certain proportionate shape of the limbs com-
bined with a certain charm of colouring is described as beauty; so in 
the soul the name of beauty is given to an equipoise and consistency of 
beliefs and judgements, combined with a certain steadiness and stabil-
ity, following upon virtue and comprising the true essence of virtue.37
The wise man and a conventionally handsome youth possess two 
distinct, yet not genuinely different, kinds of beauty. Both types 
can be reduced to the same principle, that is, a certain proportion-
ality. What distinguishes the beauty of the soul from the bodily 
beauty is the fact that the former is more ‘functional’.38 Given the 
kind of beings human beings are, this is the more profound beauty, 
as it arises from perfectly fulfilling one’s role as a human being. The 
formal and the functional ways of accounting for the presence of 
aesthetic properties, then, are not mutually exclusive. The way in 
which they contribute to the Stoic theory of beauty more generally 
is discussed in Chapter 6. For the purposes of the current chapter, 
it is enough to note that such an account of beauty quite aptly 
explains the meaning of the Stoic paradox that only the wise man 
is beautiful.
Love
There still remains the problem of the Stoic account of love. A few 
pertinent testimonials are preserved in Arius Didymus’ Epitome, 
including the following definition of love:
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διὸ καί φασιν ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα. τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν αὐτὸ 
μόνον ἀδιάφορον εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γίνεταί ποτε καὶ περὶ φαύλους. τὸν 
δὲ ἔρωτα οὔτε ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι οὔτε τινὸς φαύλου πράγματος, ἀλλ’ 
ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλους ἔμφασιν.
Hence they also say that the person who has good sense will fall in love. 
To love by itself is merely indifferent, since it sometimes occurs in the 
case of the worthless as well. But erotic love is not an appetite nor is it 
directed at any worthless thing; rather it is an inclination to forming an 
attachment arising from the impression of beauty.39
According to this definition –  also preserved by Diogenes 
Laertius –  love is a response to aesthetic features. This text puts 
a strong emphasis on the claim that proper erotic love is not an 
appetite (ἐπιθυμία), which implicitly suggests it is not pursued 
for the sake of pleasure.40 Instead, it is a response to an impres-
sion of beauty. This claim is a bit vague, and one might wonder 
whether appetite cannot arise from the impression of beauty as 
well. Arguably, this passage suggests that an appetite is a response 
to the pleasure and pleasure alone. The impression of beauty must 
be a different type of reaction. It seems likely that this passage 
establishes a dichotomy between love as a psychological response 
and love as an epistemic response. This passage does not make clear 
what would be the epistemic contents of this impression of beauty, 
but one might argue that it is the apt ordering,41 on the basis of 
another piece of evidence. Here, the Stoic claim that the wise man 
falls in love is explained as follows:
τὸν δὲ ἔρωτά φασιν ἐπιβολὴν εἶναι φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος 
ἐμφαινόμενον νέων ὡραίων· δι’ ὃ καὶ ἐρωτικὸν εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ 
ἐρασθήσεσθαι τῶν ἀξιεράστων, εὐγενῶν ὄντων καὶ εὐφυῶν.
They say that erotic love is an inclination to forming an attachment 
resulting from the beauty displayed by young men in their prime. As a 
result the wise man is erotic and falls in love with those worthy of erotic 
love, the well-bred and naturally suitable.42
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Those worthy of erotic love are well-bred and naturally suitable 
(εὐφυῶν). By itself, the meaning of this statement is not very clear 
and raises the question of what this aptitude consists of. The fol-
lowing passage containing Zeno’s description of a desirable youth 
cited in Clement’s The Instructor, however, illustrates what such 
statements might refer to:
καλήν τινα καὶ ἀξιέραστον ὑπογράφειν ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἔοικε Ζήνων εἰκόνα 
νεανίου καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνδριαντουργεῖ· ἔστω, φησί, καθαρὸν 
τὸ πρόσωπον, ὀφρὺς μὴ καθειμένη μηδὲ ὄμμα ἀναπεπταμένον 
μηδὲ ἀνακεκλασμένον, μὴ ὕπτιος ὁ τράχηλος μηδὲ ἀνιέμενα τὰ 
τοῦ σώματος μέλη, ἀλλὰ [τὰ] μετέωρα ἐντόνοις ὅμοια, ὀρθόν οὗς 
πρὸς τὸν λόγον [ὀξύτης καὶ κατοκωχὴ τῶν ὀρθῶς εἰρημένων] καὶ 
σχηματισμοὶ καὶ κινήσεις μηδὲν ἐνδιδοῦσα τοῖς ἀκολάστοις ἐλπίδος 
αἰδὼς μὲν ἐπανθείτω καὶ ἀρρενωπία, ἀπέστω δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν 
μυροπωλίων καὶ χρυσοχοείων καὶ ἐριοπωλίων ἄλυς καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἐργαστηρίων, ἔνθα ἑταιρικῶς κεκοσμημέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ 
τέγους καθεζόμεναι διημερεύουσιν.
Zeno of Citium seems to sketch a beautiful and properly loveable 
image of a young man. He sculpts him like this:
Let his countenance be pure; his brow not relaxed; his eye not wide 
open nor half-closed; his neck not thrown back; nor the limbs of his 
body relaxed, but keyed up like strings under tension; his ear cocked 
for the logos; and his bearing and movement giving no hope to the 
licentious. Let modesty and a manly look flower upon him, but away 
with the excitement of perfumers’ shops and goldsmiths and wool 
shops –  and indeed all the other shops, where women spend the whole 
day adorned like courtesans, as though they were sitting in a brothel.43
There are no actual physical features on the list. No, for example, 
description of the facial features or the shape of the body parts is 
provided.44 Indeed, the description seems to be formulated in such 
a way as to emphasise the good receptive qualities of the youth. 
Everything about this youth, from his behaviour to the way he 
stands, shows him to be good material to impart philosophical 
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teachings to. The passive demeanour of the youth does not mean 
that he is not keen on wisdom or that he is indifferent to the 
type of education he receives. It seems reasonable to suppose that 
once Zeno’s youth was persuaded to pursue philosophy, his ears 
became cocked for the logos. The word ὀξύτης usually indicates 
the sharpness of hearing, but here, paired with the logos, this word 
must be describing not so much hearing itself as a directed effort 
to hear something, listening, or paying attention. The youth, thus, 
is an attentive listener to the logos.45 Zeno, therefore, describes not 
just any youth one might happen to see, but someone who has 
proven himself to be worthy of philosophical teaching by follow-
ing instructions and exhibiting keenness for learning philosophy.46 
A short fragment preserved by Diogenes Laertius supports this 
reading because it explains the affection of the wise man towards 
the youth as arising from the latter’s endowment for virtue.47
Such a description, I would argue, is best explained in terms of 
functionality, that is, what is appropriate for the youth given the 
kind of being he is. The nature of human beings is to be rational, 
and beauty manifests in a young man who shows by his bearing 
an inclination to learning and virtue.48 This kind of beauty is, of 
course, not as significant as the mature intellectual beauty of the 
wise man, but it can also be understood as a legitimate kind of 
beauty in the Stoic aesthetic framework. This, in turn, elicits love in 
the wise man for the youth. In this way, the notion of functionality 
–  in the sense of actions and properties that are appropriate for the 
kind of being that someone is –  allows us to interpret this difficult 
material on human beauty in a rather elegant way.
One small problematic point remains, namely Plutarch’s claim 
that the Stoic notion of love is comparable to the pursuit of foul 
things by beetles, because the wise man stops loving the young men 
(who are not yet wise and hence not beautiful according to the 
Stoics’ own understanding) once they turn wise, and hence, beauti-
ful. This critique is presumably based on Plutarch’s extrapolation 
from the Stoic definition of love as the response to beauty in youths 
who are ‘in bloom’.49 If that is the case, then Plutarch represents the 
Stoic position correctly, but whether it is a fair criticism is not so 
clear. The latter depends on what motivated the Stoic claim. There 
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are two, not mutually exclusive, possibilities here, both of them 
arising from the fact that it is quite evident that love in the Stoic 
fragments is strongly associated with patronage and guidance.50
First, the format of the claim resembles other claims about the 
wise man in which certain common practices are tested by the 
rational agent. The statement that the wise man would fall in love is 
comparable to, for instance, the statement that the wise man would 
get married.51 According to this reading, the Stoics are simply refer-
ring to ancient Greek notions of love as a cultural practice. Their 
claim amounts to saying that it is not irrational to engage in such 
a relationship of love as long as the youth shows the promise of 
virtue. In the case of this reading, the notion of love would not be 
philosophically motivated at all; instead, what we find in the extant 
evidence is the philosophically motivated approach to a common 
phenomenon.
The second option is a more philosophically motivated reading. 
As was mentioned above, love in the extant Stoic fragments is 
strongly associated with tutelage.52 As such, it is an appropriate 
response to the kind of beauty which originates in the inclina-
tion to virtue requiring nourishing and tutelage. The love for a 
fully wise person, however, does not have such a purpose. It is, 
therefore, reasonable that such love would cease once its object 
fully develops rationally and no longer requires further guidance.53 
To many thinkers, this account of love might undoubtedly appear 
unsatisfactorily pragmatic, but it is not entirely surprising to find 
such ideas in Stoic texts. In the hands of the Stoics, the devoted 
theorists of rationality, love is just another opportunity to develop 
and promote what is the best in human beings.
Concluding remarks
The Stoic account of human beauty indicates that there is a func-
tional aspect of the phenomenon that proper aesthetic judgements 
ought to depict. It is necessary to investigate another case of beauty, 
that of the world, before drawing any conclusions about how formal 
properties and functionality are combined by the Stoic understand-
ing of aesthetic properties. These texts will be addressed in the 
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following chapter. For now, it is worth noting that, from a more 
general philosophical point of view, the interesting point that the 
Stoic account makes is showing that a formal account of aesthetic 
properties can be ‘contextualised’, that is, one could claim that 
the formal features have a reference point. One could argue that 
the reference point ‘human nature’ is as vague a notion as can be. 
But a parallel could be found in evolutionary aesthetics. This is not 
to say, of course, that the Stoics were even remotely committed to 
something like evolution; quite the opposite. The common ground 
is the idea that humans find beautiful what they are made –  either 
intentionally or untentionally, by a designer or by evolution –  to 
find attractive.54 The design of the world and the role of beauty in 
this design are explored in the following chapter.
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Beauty in Stoic Theological Arguments
‘. . . adaptation of means to an end will find itself recognised as one 
of the implements or elements of beauty. But it will not be the mani-
festation of means to any end or service outside of themselves, as a 
machine is adapted to do a certain work; it will be rather the adaptation 
of means to an end within themselves, as life manifests itself by the 
structure and activity of the living body. The more perfectly this body 
is fitted to manifest life, the more beautiful will it be.’
Charles Carroll Everett, The Science of Thought: A System of Logic1
Beauty vocabulary features rather prominently in Stoic theologi-
cal arguments. Beauty terms are attested to in at least three such 
arguments. Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods contains two 
of them: Cleanthes’ statement that the beauty of the world is 
one of the proofs for the existence of god2 and Chrysippus’ 
claim that if one saw a beautiful house, one would know that it 
was built by human beings rather than by mice.3 Plutarch also 
cites Chrysippus as saying that the peacock was created for the 
beauty of its tail.4 In these extant fragments, beauty is ‘reverse 
engineered’ in order to make inferences about the underlying 
generative process. The inference typically takes the form of a 
material entailment, and the very nature of beauty is used as 
evidence. For this reason, these arguments are useful evidence for 
the Stoic theorisation of aesthetic properties. They are also useful 
for answering the question of what is it that we perceive when we 
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perceive beauty, and thus building on the conclusions reached in 
the previous chapters.
The beautiful world and its design
In Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, Balbus, the Stoic spokes-
person, states that if Posidonius’ sphere were brought to barbarian 
lands such as Scythia or Britain, no one in these lands would think 
that this mechanism was not a product of reason.5 Posidonius’ 
sphere is a mechanism consisting of a revolving sun, a moon and 
five planets.6 When moving, it exhibits the effects of night and day. 
In the same work, an Academic philosopher, Cotta, attributes to 
Chrysippus the following argument:
Et ‘Si domus pulchra sit, intellegamus eam dominis’ inquit ‘aedificatam 
esse non muribus; sic igitur mundum deorum domum existimare debemus’. 
Ita prorsus existimarem, si illum aedificatum, non quem ad modum docebo 
a natura conformatum putarem.
Chrysippus also states: ‘If a beautiful house appeared before our eyes, 
we would realise that it had been built by the owners, and not by mice; 
so we must likewise realise that the universe is the home of the gods.’ 
I should certainly agree, if I thought that the universe had been built, 
rather than, as I shall show, fashioned by nature.7
Posidonius’ sphere and Chrysippus’ house are two different 
examples underpinned by the same argument. In the first case, the 
complexity of the structure makes it evident that it is a product of 
reason. In the second case, Chrysippus’ analogy between a beautiful 
house and the universe could be interpreted as saying that just as 
a house cannot be built by mice, so the world cannot be generated 
by atoms, the smallest, indivisible particles that can be found in the 
world. The existence of the world, therefore, requires intentional 
design which, in its own turn, requires an intelligent creator.
It has been pointed out that these arguments appear to be prede-
cessors to the intelligent design arguments. One of the most recent 
interpretations of this kind is found in David Sedley’s monograph 
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Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity. Sedley points out the 
resemblance of the Stoic Posidonius’ sphere argument to one of the 
best-known versions of the argument from design, that is, Paley’s 
watch analogy.8 Paley’s argument states that an examination of a 
watch leads one to discover that the parts of a watch fit together 
in such a way as to indicate intentional design and, subsequently, 
the conclusion that the watch had a maker. According to Paley, 
the same inference can be drawn for organic objects, for example, 
plants, animals and human beings, in order to conclude that they 
were designed by god.9 Sedley suggests that Posidonius’ sphere is 
a Stoic version of an argument from design,10 defining this type of 
argument as belonging to ‘a family of arguments aimed at demon-
strating the existence of a creator god’.11
The similarity between this Stoic argument and Paley’s argument 
is, as Sedley points out, remarkable. Yet in addition to positing a 
creator god, these arguments presuppose a certain conceptualisa-
tion of that deity. To be more precise, according to Paley’s watch-
maker analogy, god created the world intentionally and ab initio, 
which is consistent with the monotheistic theological view. Merely 
stating that the world was generated rationally by a rational creator, 
however, does not constitute a typical creationist view, because the 
latter is more narrow. The Stoics are part of the tradition which 
used the notion of god in diverse ways, often in scientific and philo-
sophical enquiries.12 In fact, the early Christian thinkers, genuine 
creationists, emphasise the difference between their own views of 
genesis and the account of world-generation proposed by Greek 
philosophers.13 The presence of matter means the world creation is 
not truly ab initio, since there is another primal element involved. 
It makes god not the sole creator, but only a partner in creation. 
This shows that the mere presence of matter in the process of world 
creation complicates the creationist interpretation of Stoic thought.
More importantly, the argument about the beautiful house does 
not commit the Stoics to very much. It is certainly true that the 
world according to this and similar arguments is made in some 
rational manner, but such a claim still leaves a number of pos-
sibilities about world creation open. The context of this quotation 
and the demarcation of the exact words of Chrysippus are worth 
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noting here. The passage consists of a citation and a comment, and 
while the citation (‘If a beautiful house appeared before our eyes, 
we would realise that it had been built by the owners, and not by 
mice; so we must likewise realise that the universe is the home of 
the gods’)14 can be assumed to be Chrysippus’, the text indicates 
that the comment which states that the universe was created rather 
than fashioned by nature belongs to Cotta, an Academic spokes-
person. Cotta, of course, is not necessarily committed to represent-
ing Chrysippus’ meaning accurately and therefore it is possible to 
question whether it was Chrysippus himself who claimed that the 
analogy showed that the world had been built rather than ‘fash-
ioned by nature’. If Cotta’s commentary is bracketed off, a subtly 
different interpretation of the passage becomes possible. When 
read on its own, Chrysippus’ argument only seeks to establish 
that a rational process, rather than an irrational and accidental 
one, is responsible for the creation of the world. The formulation 
is parallel to Paley’s argument from design, but the context of this 
argument suggests that the purpose of Chrysippus’ claim might 
differ in some respects.
Chrysippus’ argument is most likely an attack on Epicurean 
physics.15 If this argument is read as indicating Chrysippus’ com-
mitment to downward causation, then Chrysippus was criticising 
the Epicureans for claiming that atomic particles rather than an 
intelligent designer were the causes of generation. In this case, 
Chrysippus’ argument would equate mice with atoms, but this 
does not seem to be a coherent point. Houses, after all, are not 
made of mice. Chrysippus must have been making a point about 
the method of generation, rather than the components of genera-
tion. The Epicureans held that the principle which generates the 
world is the properties of atoms.16 Thus in Chrysippus’ argument, 
mice are comparable to atoms in the sense that just as the irrational 
nature of mice does not allow them to be builders of houses, so the 
nature of atomic motion does not allow them to be the principle of 
generation. The properties of atoms are too limited and therefore 
insufficient to make them the generative principle of the world. 
Chrysippus was clearly interested in showing that the world could 
not have come into existence by the mechanical17 and sometimes 
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even random18 motion of atoms, but this passage only shows that 
he thought there must be a rational generative principle, not that 
the world was designed intentionally ab initio. The Stoic spokes-
man Balbus makes it quite explicit that the Stoic argument is 
designed to refute the Epicurean doctrine of atomic motion when 
he states that, according to the Epicurean way of reasoning, it is 
just as plausible to believe that if numerous copies of the alphabet’s 
twenty-one letters made of gold or similar material were shaken 
together and thrown on the ground, they would produce a copy 
of Ennius’ Annals.19 Although there is a striking resemblance to 
the arguments from design, these Stoic claims are only concerned 
with rejecting the Epicurean idea that arbitrary motion was partly 
responsible for the world’s generation.
This, of course, does not rule out the possibility that the Stoics 
might be creationists of some kind –  depending how one defines 
creationism and its branches –  but such a question is outside the 
scope of this work. For the purposes of this study, the only perti-
nent issue is that the Stoic claim about the presence of beauty in 
the world cannot be explained in quite the same way as the claims 
by the early moderns. In order to examine the peculiarities of the 
Stoic account, it is necessary to focus on the specific description 
of the Stoic god. According to the Stoics, the principle which 
generates the world, often called god/ intelligence/fate/Zeus20 as 
well as nature and fire,21 is an entity that is constantly present 
in the world. The immanence of the god in the world raises the 
question of how the god designs the world in such a way, and 
how exactly aesthetic properties are imparted into the world so 
that they can be used for forming inferences about the generation 
of the world.
Timaeus
Before examining the extant Stoic evidence further, it is necessary 
to discuss the significant background role that Plato’s Timaeus 
plays here. It is often noted in the scholarship that the Timaeus was 
one of the most important influences on Stoic physics.22 Beauty, as 
well as the cosmic creator’s intention to create beauty, are found in 
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the Platonic account of the generation of the world as well, and it 
is worth noting their significance for the Stoics.
According to Timaeus, the main spokesperson in the dialogue, 
the creator of the world of becoming generated the world because 
he was good (and thus not envious), and therefore wanted every-
thing to become as much like himself as possible.23 Then Timaeus 
describes the elemental generation with a reference to geometrical 
principles and the generation of the world from the elements, 
including the spherical shape of the world. But it is the descrip-
tion of the making of the soul of the world which is the most 
relevant part of the Platonic account for present purposes. First, 
the cosmic creator mixes the components of ‘being’, ‘identity’ and 
‘difference’.24 This mixture is then divided by the creator according 
to a series of proportions. The constituents of the mixture enable 
the world soul to be cognisant,25 while the proportions introduce 
bodily motion of the heavenly bodies and time.26 This ordering, 
however, is also responsible for the aesthetic properties inherent in 
the world, because it is not permissible for the best (τῷ ἀρίστῳ) to 
produce anything but the most beautiful (τὸ κάλλιστον).27 This 
indicates that aesthetic properties originate from the formal divi-
sions of the world. In this respect, the Stoic account resembles the 
one found in the Timaeus.28
In Plato’s dialogue, however, the creator uses the pattern of 
Being to construct the world (as opposed to Becoming).29 The 
Platonic account, thus, involves the forms, the existence of which 
the Stoics deny.30 If the pattern of the proportion that generates 
the structure of the world (and, at the same time, its beauty) is not 
copied from anything outside of the universe, then it must come 
from the god or the active principle inherent in the world. The 
most obvious solution is to claim that the pattern of proportion 
comes from god’s mind. Some extant evidence shows that the 
Stoics claimed the forms only exist in the mind.31 This, however, 
leads to the possibly even more complex question of how the god’s 
thought translates into a creative act. This question is addressed in 
the following section, and it will lead, in its turn, to a further ques-
tion especially pertinent to aesthetics, a kind of aesthetic version 
of the problem of theodicy. In the Platonic universe, the patterns 
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responsible for beauty are set in place at the genesis. The Stoic god, 
however, is ever-present in the world. This leads to the problem of 
theodicy and the question of whether god shapes every object that 
is beautiful, as well as, for example, gnats and mud.
The activities of the Stoic god
In Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Professors, the Stoic metaphysical 
belief that ‘the substance of what exists . . . needs to be set in 
motion and shaped by some cause’ is immediately followed by an 
analogy which compares the world with a sculpture in the follow-
ing manner:
. . . ὡς χαλκούργημα περικαλλὲς θεασάμενοι ποθοῦμεν μαθεῖν τὸν 
τεχνίτην ἅτε καθ’ αὑτὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀκινήτου καθεστώσης, οὕτω 
καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων ὕλην θεωροῦντες κινουμένην καὶ ἐν μορφῇ τε 
καὶ διακοσμήσει τυγχάνουσαν εὐλόγως ἂν σκεπτοίμεθα τὸ κινοῦν 
αὐτὴν καὶ πολυειδῶς μορφοῦν αἴτιον.
. . . when we look at a very beautiful bronze we want to know the artist 
(since in itself the matter is in an immobile condition), so when we see 
the matter of the universe moving and possessing form and structure 
we might reasonably enquire into the cause which moves and shapes it 
into many forms.32
Then the argument concludes that it is an all-pervading, fun-
damental power which shapes the world and is analogous to the 
human soul pervading the body.33 At first sight, this analogy seems 
to suggest the idea that god creates like a craftsman and the work 
generated is the product of an outside designer. At the same time, 
the notion of pervasiveness makes such an interpretation a little 
bit more difficult, because it invites us to think of god as the soul 
of the world rather than its external creator.34 The way in which 
a human soul ‘works’ on the human body is very different from 
the way in which a craftsman works on bronze. The soul not only 
shapes a human being in premeditated and intentional ways, it also 
is the human being. The properties and the acts of the soul are, 
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presumably, determined by its nature. The rational soul renders 
human beings rational not because it designs them, but because 
its nature renders any object in which it is present to possess the 
property of being rational. The passage, therefore, seems to present 
two different accounts of the generation of the world. It might be 
the case that the analogy with a sculptor is not a citation from a 
Stoic source but Sextus’ own addition intended to illustrate the 
Stoic claims, yet it is not clear whether that could have been the 
case. This chapter offers a different way of reconciling these two 
apparently contradictory conceptualisations of divine generation 
by investigating the meaning of the notion τέχνη, a term typically 
associated with the activities of a craftsman, and determining what 
kind of activity it presupposes.
Mixtures
The standard answer to the question of how the Stoic god affects 
the world is by means of pervading it, which is a rather vague 
description. Chrysippus’ doctrine of mixtures,35 however, provides 
information about the technical aspects of the Stoic god’s activity. 
The Chrysippean notion of mixture can be understood as following 
from materialist commitments. According to the Stoics, the world 
is generated by two entities: matter (or the passive principle) and 
god (also called fire, the active principle and by other names).36 
Any philosopher who commits to the claim that there is a single 
principle underlying the whole of existence has to give an account 
explaining why phenomenally different objects exist. The Stoics 
were not strong ontological monists, because they held that there 
are two fundamental generative principles, but they still had to 
answer the question of how the plurality of phenomenal objects is 
produced by only two entities. In his work On Mixture, Alexander 
of Aphrodisias, a Peripatetic commentator, records that Chrysippus 
presented three kinds of mixtures as a solution to this problem.37 
Alexander elaborately criticises Chrysippus’ views in favour of 
Aristotle’s account of mixtures and, in the process, provides a fairly 
detailed account of the mixtures, including an explanation of the 
significance of the difference between the mixtures. Alexander 
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cites Chrysippus as arguing that ‘we could not have this differ-
ence in presentations if bodies had been juxtaposed by juncture 
whatever way they were mixed’,38 which suggests two points. First, 
Chrysippus held that mixtures can provide an account of how a 
plurality of objects can be produced by a limited number of base 
principles. Second, different types of mixtures produce different 
properties. Chrysippus held that juxtaposition, for instance, the 
most basic form of mixture in which constituents are simply put 
together without interacting with each other in a substantive way, 
does not account for the great variety of observable phenomenal 
objects. Amongst the arguments which Alexander presents in order 
to refute Chrysippus, there is one which directly addresses the 
problem of the role of god in the process of generation and mainte-
nance of the world in the following way:
πῶς δ’ οὐκ ἀνάξια τῆς θείας προλήψεως τό τε τὸν θεὸν διὰ πάσης 
τῆς ὑποκειμένης πᾶσιν ὕλης κεχωρηκέναι λέγειν καὶ μένειν ἐν αὐτῇ, 
ὁποία ποτ’ ἂν ᾖ, καὶ τὸ προηγούμενον ἔχειν ἔργον, τὸ ἀεί τι γεννᾶν 
τε καὶ διαπλάσσειν τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς γενέσθαι δυναμένων, καὶ ποιεῖν 
τὸν θεὸν δημιουργὸν σκωλήκων τε καὶ ἐμπίδων, ἀτέχνως ὥσπερ 
κορόπλαθόν τινα τῷ πηλῷ σχολάζοντα καὶ πᾶν τὸ δυνάμενον ἐξ 
αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο ποιοῦντα;
Surely it demeans our preconception of the deity to say that God 
pervades the whole of the matter underlying everything and remains 
in it, whatever it might be like, and has as its premeditated task the 
perpetual generation and moulding of anything that can come to be 
from it; and for them to make God a craftsman of grubs and gnats, 
simply devoting himself like a modeller to clay, and making everything 
that can be created from it?39
In this passage, the Stoic view that god pervades everything 
and remains in everything is criticised by Alexander because it 
contradicts a common preconception of gods as lofty beings above 
mundane things. Alexander raises a serious theological problem 
about the presence of god in mundane objects, and the way in 
which Chrysippus tackled the problem of theodicy is discussed 
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below. In order to understand Chrysippus’ position, it is necessary 
to determine the manner in which the Stoic god is present in the 
world.
The explanation of what this idea entails can be found in the 
Stoic theory of mixtures criticised by Alexander. According to 
him, Chrysippus recognised three kinds of mixtures: juxtaposition, 
fusion and blending.40 Juxtaposition (παράθεσις) occurs when 
the components of a mixture are juxtaposed ‘by juncture’ (καθ’ 
ἁρμήν), and each constituent preserves its surface and properties. 
The example given for this type of a mixture is a pile of beans and 
wheat grains. During the process of fusion (σύγχυσις), meanwhile, 
both the substances and the properties of constituents are com-
pletely destroyed. Such a process occurs when medical drugs and 
a disease are jointly destroyed and a new entity is produced. The 
third type of mixing is blending (κρᾶσις). This occurs when the 
substances and qualities of the entities that are mixed coextend 
mutually, while preserving their own identity. An important char-
acteristic of this mixture is that the blended bodies are able to be 
separated again.41
Unfortunately, it is not spelled out very clearly in the On 
Mixture by means of which type of mixture god pervades matter. 
An informative passage comes immediately after Alexander has 
described each of the mixtures. In this passage, Alexander discusses 
the application of the Stoic mixture theory in the following way:
καὶ τῶν στοιχείων δέ φασι τῶν τεσσάρων τὰ δύο, τό τε πῦρ καὶ 
τὸν ἀέρα, λεπτομερῆ τε καὶ κοῦφα καὶ εὔτονα ὄντα, διὰ τῶν δύο, 
γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος, παχυμερῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ ἀτόνων ὄντων 
διαπεφοιτηκέναι ὅλα δι’ ὅλων, σώζοντα τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν καὶ 
συνέχειαν αὐτά τε καὶ ἐκεῖνα. δηλητήριά τε τὰ φθείροντα καὶ τὰς 
ὀσμάς, ὅσαι τοιαῦται, ἡγοῦνται κιρνᾶσθαι τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πάσχουσιν, 
ὅλα δι’ ὅλων παρατιθέμενα. καὶ τὸ φῶς δὲ τῷ ἀέρι ὁ Χρύσιππος 
κιρνᾶσθαι λέγει. καὶ αὕτη μὲν ἡ περὶ κράσεως δόξα Χρυσίππου τε 
καὶ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν φιλοσοφούντων.
And they say that two of the four elements, Fire and Air, being rare, 
light, and having tension, completely pervade Earth and Water which 
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are dense, heavy and lack tension; and that each pair preserves its own 
nature and continuity. They think that drugs that are deleterious, and 
all such odours, are mixed with the bodies affected by them in a total 
juxtaposition. Chrysippus also thinks that light is mixed with air. This 
is Chrysippus’ theory of blending and that of the philosophers who 
follow him.42
On the one hand, the language of this passage is not very illu-
minating. It is not very clear whether Alexander is presenting a 
collection of distinct beliefs, some examples of different mixtures or 
a group of Stoic beliefs. This lack of clarity is increased by inconsist-
ent terminology. Instead of using the same terms as he did in the 
definitions of mixtures, Alexander uses the term διαπεφοιτηκέναι 
for pervasion. Similarly, although at the end of the passage he says 
that this is Chrysippus’ theory of κρᾶσις, a term which he used to 
describe blending earlier, we cannot be certain that Alexander actu-
ally intended to say that all of the instances of mixture described 
above were blending, because he uses the term κρᾶσις very loosely 
throughout this treatise.43
On the other hand, it is possible to compare the passage above 
with the descriptions of three kinds of mixtures and to determine 
which one of the mixtures fits most accurately the description of 
how god pervades matter. The very first sentence states that fire and 
air (which are synonymous with the active principle in Stoicism)44 
completely pervade earth and water (which are synonymous with 
matter),45 while preserving their own natures. This statement sug-
gests that god pervades matter in the manner of blending.
A similar conclusion can be reached by investigating the detailed 
descriptions of all the mixtures. The mixture by juxtaposition 
clearly produces the kind of properties that are sometimes called 
mechanical or summative.46 When the constituents of a mixture 
correspond to each other by juxtaposition, they simply exist in 
combination; there is no binding activity between them. To use the 
example given by Chrysippus, the property of being a pile of wheat 
grains and beans is reducible to the properties of beans and grains. 
This kind of mixture cannot be involved in the generation of the 
world, because if god just juxtaposed with matter, the world as we 
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know it, with a plurality of objects, would not exist. This mixture 
does, however, produce some objects in the world.
Fusion (σύγχυσις)47 is defined as a process by means of which 
the constituents are jointly destroyed and transformed into a new 
entity. An example of such a phenomenon is a medicine and a 
disease when they are jointly destroyed (συμφθειρομένων), and a 
new object comes into existence. Claiming that god’s substance is 
in some sense destroyed in the process of creating new substances 
would contradict another Stoic claim, that is, that the god is con-
stantly present throughout the world. It is likely, therefore, that 
fusion was used to explain the origin of various substances but it 
did not apply to the process of god’s pervading the world.48
Blending, meanwhile, is a highly suitable option. According to 
Alexander, an example of this type of mixture is the smell of incense 
spreading across large expanses of air while preserving its peculiar 
quality, that is, its smell.49 Chrysippus’ notorious claim that a drop 
of wine mixed in the sea spreads throughout the whole sea is 
another example of this mixture.50 The most important aspect of 
blending is that the new compounds inherit the qualities of their 
constituents. Although the constituents combine thoroughly in 
this type of mixture, they do not lose their original properties. At 
the same time, the resulting mixture has to be productive of new 
properties, otherwise this type of mixture would not differ from 
juxtaposition. When the smell of incense spreads through air and 
mixes with it, the resulting properties of smell supervene on the 
properties of pure incense smell and air.
The advantage of describing the mixture of god and matter as 
blending is the fact that this type of mixture would preserve the 
properties of god. God’s properties must be in some way prominent 
throughout the existence of the world if god is the active principle 
that maintains the world.51 By means of blending, the property of 
rationality spreads throughout matter. This is the manner in which 
the active principle is able to order the world. Thus the property of 
rationality in the construction of the world is due to the fact that 
one part of that compound that is the world is rational.
Blending, therefore, is in some sense the most significant mixture 
for explaining how the world is generated, but in order to under-
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stand how the Stoics conceptualised the ontology of the world, it 
is important to take into account all three mixtures. On the most 
fundamental level, there is blending of the god and matter. That is 
the process which accounts for the existence of the world as it is. It is 
not, however, necessary for explaining absolutely everything. Health 
in a recovering patient is best explained by fusion; the properties of a 
pile of beans and grains are best explained as resulting from juxtapo-
sition. God’s pervasion of the world does not necessarily play a role 
in every single explanation of why some particular object is the way 
it is. In some cases, it is more appropriate to explain the existence of 
some property in reference to the underlying mechanical processes.
The force which enables those processes to take place is, of 
course, the rationally designing god, but it designs on a grounding 
level, producing a framework for other processes to occur in. The 
fragments which suggest that god is concentrated in aether also 
confirm this interpretation to the extent that it shows that god’s 
pervasion of the world refers to generating cosmic principles which 
pervade the world from a specific central point.52 This suggests that 
the description of the Stoic god as operating like the soul is prefer-
able to the description of the god as a sculptor. Yet it is certainly 
the case that the acts of the Stoic god are often described as techne, 
which suggests craftsman-like acts. This leads to the central ques-
tion of the nature of god’s acts, that is, god’s techne.
God’s τέχνη
Although not all the relevant evidence compares god to a crafts-
man, it is not uncommon to find a fragment which describes the 
generation of god as τέχνη. When Diogenes Laertius reports Stoic 
theological views, for instance, he presents the following definition 
of the active generative principle which in this case is called φύσις:
δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς 
γένεσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές·
Nature in their view is a τεχνικόν fire going on its way to create; which 
is equivalent to a fiery, τεχνοειδές breath.53
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This passage shows that the Stoic god generates and maintains 
the world in a way which can be described as τέχνη, but it also 
raises the question of what the notion of τέχνη entails. What does it 
mean for god to be τεχνικόν? The term τέχνη is widely used by the 
Stoics in various arguments,54 yet, arguably, especially illuminating 
for this purpose is Olympiodorus’ On Plato’s Gorgias, the work 
dedicated to the investigation of the relationship between rhetoric 
and τέχνη. As part of his analysis, Olympiodorus surveys various 
accounts of τέχνη, including a discussion of the ways in which the 
first three heads of the Stoa defined τέχνη. He records the views of 
the early Stoics as follows:
Κλεάνθης τοίνυν λέγει ὅτι ‘τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῷ πάντα ἀνύουσα’. 
ἀτελὴς δ’ ἐστὶν οὗτος ὁ ὅρος, καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἕξις τίς ἐστιν ὁδῷ πάντα 
ποιοῦσα· ὅθεν ὁ Χρύσιππος προσθεὶς τὸ ‘μετὰ φαντασιῶν’ εἶπεν ὅτι 
‘τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῷ προϊοῦσα μετὰ φαντασιῶν’ . . . Ζήνων δέ 
φησιν ὅτι ‘τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένον 
πρός τι τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.
Cleanthes says that τέχνη is a tenor which achieves everything 
methodically. This definition is incomplete. After all, nature also is a 
tenor which does everything methodically. That is why Chrysippus 
added ‘with impressions’, and said that τέχνη is a tenor which advances 
methodically with impressions . . . Zeno says that τέχνη is a systematic 
collection of cognitions unified by practice for some goal advantageous 
in life.55
All these definitions are intended to explain the nature of τέχνη, 
a skill-based activity. Three Stoic definitions of τέχνη share the 
notion that the fundamental aspect of τέχνη is the employment of 
a method. The Stoics presumably take τέχνη to be an alternative to 
ignorance and accident.56 This suggests that in order to perform an 
action with τέχνη, one must be capable of reasoning about means 
and ends as well as understanding what sort of action would result 
in a desired outcome. In other words, one must have a grasp of the 
functionality of certain actions.
It is important, however, to note the difference between the 
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terms used in Zeno’s definition on the one hand and by Cleanthes 
and Chrysippus on the other. According to Zeno, τέχνη works 
towards τέλος. This suggests that an action produced by τέχνη is 
intentionally aimed at achieving a certain goal and thus such an 
action is teleological. Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ definitions of 
τέχνη, by contrast, do not use teleological language as explicitly 
as Zeno’s. In these definitions, the prominent term is ὁδός which 
implies systematicity or methodical action. Zeno clearly thought 
that actions produced by τέχνη were necessarily goal-directed; 
the same cannot be said with certainty about Chrysippus and 
Cleanthes. It is probable that Zeno’s definition with its strong 
teleological emphasis was found to be problematic.57 Zeno’s defini-
tion could be criticised by pointing out, for example, that it does 
not account for the expertise required for skill-based activity. This 
definition cannot rule out the following scenario. A woman decides 
that she wants to make statues. She inspects many statues (thus 
gaining σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων) and then simply makes a statue 
herself. By doing this, she achieves τέλος and, at the same time, 
having fulfilled all of Zeno’s conditions, she immediately comes to 
possess the τέχνη of a sculptor. This example illustrates that Zeno’s 
definition does not distinguish sufficiently between expert and 
amateur. It does not account for the necessary condition of being a 
skilled shoemaker –  namely, a consistent success in producing shoes 
whenever she makes shoes.
Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ definitions, which state that τέχνη 
is a tenor which achieves everything methodically, address the gap 
left by Zeno’s definition. According to these definitions, expertise 
(τέχνη) consists of an ability to perform an action in a methodical 
manner. Systematicity is an important addition, because it accounts 
for expert knowledge which an amateur lacks. A skill-based action 
is determined by the properties inherent in the skill rather than the 
intentions of an agent. By virtue of having a skill, an expert has a 
method of acting which allows her to perform a task in an appropri-
ate and a successful manner while following relevant impressions. 
This slight change in the way in which the early Stoics defined 
τέχνη is extremely significant. The definitions of τέχνη in early 
Stoic thought clearly indicate that τέχνη is a functional activity, yet 
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the concept of functionality changed between Zeno and Cleanthes 
from intentional functionality to methodical functionality. The 
latter is motivated by the requirements imposed by a system in 
which an object functions or by the nature of an object itself.
This distinction has important consequences for the concep-
tualisation of the divine activity. As Olympiodorus notes in the 
passage cited above, the definition of τέχνη and the definition of 
the generation of nature (φύσις) are identical in Cleanthes’ work, 
and they are only slightly different in the works of Chrysippus who 
adds that τέχνη, unlike φύσις, proceeds methodically ‘with impres-
sions’. This might strike one as a somewhat surprising distinction. 
In Diogenes Laertius’ passage, nature is described as generative 
fire which is τεχνικός. It is, therefore, odd to find a distinction 
between the activities of nature and τέχνη. If we assume that the 
definition of τέχνη preserved by Olympiodorus primarily refers 
to τέχνη manifesting in human beings, however, the apparent 
inconsistency disappears. The need to follow impressions is primar-
ily applicable to human beings because humans, unlike god, are 
prone to epistemic errors.58 Humans can only reach the methodical 
consistency of nature’s generation when they act methodically with 
their impressions. Given the fact that god is perfectly rational and 
never irrational, the condition of following impressions does not 
apply to him in a meaningful way.
This provides enough evidence for answering the question of 
how the mental content of the Stoic god translates into generative 
action. God’s τέχνη is a know-how. God is the kind of entity that 
has the ability to produce in a certain way, and it is entirely defined 
by that ability as it is the active principle. An interesting subse-
quent question is whether this activity is intentional. An analogy 
with craftwork suggests that intention is necessary to trigger the 
action which is then directed by the know-how. In the case of god, 
however, the ability to generate is the definitive feature. It does 
nothing but generate the world because it is the kind of entity that 
does this.
In either case, this clarifies how the Stoic god can be compared 
to the world soul and the sculptor at the same time. In terms of 
the constitution of the world, god is the ever-present fundamental 
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generative principle. Its generative powers, however, are a kind 
of divine know-how, and in this respect god is the methodically 
working force which orders the world in a systematic way, just like 
a craftsman. One point of especially great interest is the question 
of the extent to which god sculpts the object in the world directly. 
Arguably, there is no need for such a sculpting entity, because the 
world is shaped by the processes set in motion by the fundamental 
rational ordering of the active principle.59 These processes constitute 
such phenomena as piles of grain and wheat, or health and disease. 
This reading implies a certain non-transitivity of explanation in 
the Stoic theoretical framework. The case of theodicy shows more 
clearly than the evidence discussed so far how the Stoics address the 
issue of the scope of god’s creative activity.
Theodicy
In the passage cited earlier in this chapter, Alexander of Aphrodisias 
objects to the Stoic belief that god is constantly present in the 
world by saying that god could not possibly be present in mundane 
objects, such as grubs and gnats.60 This criticism is based not only 
on the fact that the Stoic concept of god does not conform to more 
conventional beliefs; it also contains a substantial philosophical 
objection. It is not at all clear what the presence of divine rational-
ity accomplishes in such an object as for example, a puddle. It is 
neither manifest nor does there seem to be a reason for it to be 
there. It seems, therefore, that it is a mistake to envisage divine 
rationality as being directly present in every object it generates. 
Yet it is uncharitable to conclude that Chrysippus missed such an 
important drawback of his own theory without considering how he 
might have avoided making such a problematic assertion.
The theory of mixtures would have been a useful theoretical 
device to address this problem. The Stoic god blends with matter 
thus producing elements which can then further blend and perhaps 
even fuse61 to create the substance of a gnat. Divine rationality can 
be present at the mixture level of a gnat by ordering matter without 
being manifest directly, that is, without making a gnat rational, 
only originating from a rationally designed system.62
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An especially interesting case of a theodicean argument is recorded 
by Plutarch. This Stoic argument uses the presence of beauty to 
form a very peculiar inference about the functional role of a par-
ticular object in the world. Plutarch’s On Stoic Self-Contradictions 
contains a brief argument about the beauty of the peacock’s tail, 
which is grouped with a number of other Chrysippean arguments 
dealing with theodicy. According to Plutarch, after arguing that 
mice and bed-bugs are not vicious, but beneficial for human beings 
–  because they force people to wake up on time and be hygienic 
–  Chrysippus states that beauty is the reason for the existence of 
many animals in the world in the following way:63
γράψας τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ φύσεως, [ὡς] ὅτι πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκα 
κάλλους ἡ φύσις ἐνήνοχε φιλοκαλοῦσα καὶ χαίρουσα τῇ ποικιλίᾳ, 
καὶ λόγον ἐπειπὼν παραλογώτατον ὡς ὁ ταὼς ἕνεκα τῆς οὐρᾶς 
γέγονε διὰ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῆς, αὖθις ἐν τῷ Περὶ πολιτείας νεανικῶς 
ἐπιτετίμηκε τοῖς ταὼς τρέφουσι καὶ ἀηδόνας, ὥσπερ ἀντινομοθετῶν 
τῷ τοῦ κόσμου νομοθέτῃ καὶ τῆς φύσεως καταγελῶν φιλοκαλούσης 
περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων, οἷς ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῇ πόλει τόπον οὐ δίδωσι. 
πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἐγκαλεῖν τοῖς τρέφουσιν ἃ γεννῶσαν ἐπαινεῖ 
τὴν πρόνοιαν; ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ φύσεως εἰπὼν ὅτι ‘οἱ 
κόρεις εὐχρήστως ἐξυπνίζουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ οἱ μύες ἐπιστρέφουσιν 
ἡμᾶς μὴ ἀμελῶς ἕκαστα τιθέναι, φιλοκαλεῖν δὲ τὴν φύσιν τῇ 
ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι’, ταῦτα κατὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε· ‘γένοιτο 
δ’ ἂν μάλιστα τούτου ἔμφασις ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ ταώ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ 
ἐπιφαίνει τὸ ζῷον γεγονέναι ἕνεκα τῆς κέρκου καὶ οὐκ ἀνάπαλιν, τῷ 
<δ’> ἄρρενι γενομένῳ οὕτως τὸ θῆλυ συνηκολούθηκεν.’
Furthermore, after he had written in the books On Nature that beauty 
is the purpose for which many of the animals have been produced 
by nature, since she loves the beautiful and delights in diversity, and 
had appended a most irrational argument, namely that the peacock’s 
tail on account of its beauty is the purpose for which the peacock has 
come to be, in his work On Commonwealth again he has vehemently 
censured people who keep peacocks and nightingales. It is as if he were 
legislating competition with the lawgiver of the universe and deriding 
nature for bestowing her love of the beautiful upon animals of a kind to 
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which the sage denies room in the city. Is it not clearly absurd to object 
to those who keep the creatures that he praises providence for creating? 
Well, in the fifth book On Nature after having said that bugs are useful 
in waking us up and mice in making us attentive about putting things 
away carefully and that nature probably loves the beautiful as she 
delights in diversity he has stated the following in so many words: ‘The 
tail of the peacock would be an especially impressive example of this, 
for here nature makes it evident that the creature has come to be for the 
sake of the tail and not contrariwise, <and> the existence of the male, 
which had this origin, implied the existence of the female.64
Although the citations of Chrysippus are very tangled in this 
passage, they clearly contain the very peculiar claim that peacocks 
come into existence for the sake of the beauty of their tails. To be 
precise, not only peacocks, but also peahens exist so that peacock 
tails are present in the world. The beauty of a peacock’s tail neces-
sitates the existence of a whole species of peafowl. This suggests that 
god’s activity is in some respect constrained. Beautiful tails do not 
exist just by themselves; the existence of beauty requires a whole 
system of other properties to support it. While the generativity of 
the Stoic god is grounded in its rationality, it is also constrained by 
it. The outcomes of a generative process are dictated not by the will 
of god in the sense that it can will anything at all, but by rational 
constraints. It is possible to rephrase this in a way which does not 
involve the language of constraint, as such terms might seem to be 
an inappropriate way to describe the Stoic god. The Stoics would 
probably say that rationality is the will of god in the sense that 
god would not and cannot will anything irrational. This, however, 
amounts to the same result –  god’s activity is determined and 
limited by its rationality in the same way as the properties of a skill 
determine how and what a skill-based action produces.
If Plutarch is reporting correctly and the argument about the 
usefulness of mice and bed-bugs was followed by the argument 
about peacocks in Chrysippus’ On Nature, then the latter argument 
ought to be interpreted as explaining the role of evil in the world. 
The role of evil in the case of the peacock argument is played by 
peahens and even peacocks themselves minus their tails, while the 
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good for the sake of which peahens and peacocks exist is the beauty 
of the tails. Of course, peahens and peacocks are not evil per se, so 
it is unlikely that this is a straightforward theodicean argument. 
Arguably, Chrysippus used the peacock argument to comple-
ment a more counterintuitive argument about the usefulness of 
mice and bed-bugs, and Plutarch records it in order to present 
Chrysippus’ views in a more unfavourable light. Chrysippus’ claim 
about peafowl might have been based on the following reasoning: 
we might say that the only point in the existence of peafowl is the 
beauty of a peacock’s tail, but it would not follow that peacocks 
themselves and peahens are bad or useless. There is a use not only 
for the best part of a species, but also for the rest that constitutes 
a supporting system. We cannot conclude that some objects or 
creatures are not useful.65
This or a similar line of reasoning is consistent with the stronger 
and more specific claim that mice and bed-bugs come into exist-
ence for the sake of the utility and overall well-being of human-
kind, even if it might not seem so at first sight. The point of this 
argument is not to convince the critics of the Stoics that certain 
things are necessary evils; rather, it aims to show that seeming evils 
are not actually such. Later Stoics, for instance Seneca, employ the 
idea that the world is diverse –  and ought to be accepted as such 
–  for their moral teachings.66 The moral lesson of these arguments 
is that human beings ought to learn to understand what is actually 
good for them, and then they would not find conventional evils to 
be bad.67
Poikilia and proportion
Interestingly, the diversity of the world is associated with aesthet-
ics in the Stoic theoretical framework. The passage from Plutarch 
cited above contains a quote of Chrysippus saying that nature is 
beauty-loving and delights in poikilia (φιλοκαλεῖν δὲ τὴν φύσιν τῇ 
ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι).68 Although this fragment is a very 
small piece of evidence by itself, additional evidence for the Stoic 
use of poikilia can be found in Latin texts, especially in Cicero’s On 
the Nature of the Gods.
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Before looking closely into how the Stoic spokesperson Balbus 
applies the notion of poikilia to Stoic theology, it is important to 
acknowledge that there are at least two ways of conceptualising 
beauty in this treatise. The first and arguably more prominent one 
is the understanding of beauty as arising from a certain structure 
or order. When discussing the intelligence of stars Balbus states the 
following:
Sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxume declarat ordo 
eorum atque constantia; nihil est enim quod ratione et numero moveri 
possit sine consilio, in quo nihil est temerarium nihil varium nihil 
fortuitum.
What especially denotes that the stars are conscious and intelligent is 
their consistent regularity and the absence of random or fortuitous 
variation, for no such rational, ordered movement can be conducted 
without planning.69
The argument here is simple: the ordered motion would not be 
possible without a premeditated rational action. The rationality 
of an action here refers to acting not arbitrarily but for the sake 
of a certain goal –  in this case, order. Without this, the motion is 
random and, thus, irrational. This passage suggests that rationality 
manifests as order, and order ought to be understood as a matter of 
proportion, and it follows that beauty can be denoted numerically. 
This indicates that beauty is a formal property. In addition to this, 
it is a formal property underpinned by design. Beautiful objects are 
beautiful because their structure is skilfully executed. The skilful 
execution imparts the properties of rationality and, arguably, func-
tionality to these structures so that no act of theirs, as the text says, 
is an accident without a purpose.
The second aesthetic concept that comes from the Stoic theologi-
cal fragments is the above-mentioned notion of poikilia. Having 
given the four reasons why the Stoics maintain the existence of 
the gods (the last of them being the beauty in the motions of the 
heavenly bodies), Balbus distinguishes the three aims of providence 
for the world as follows:
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Talis igitur mens mundi cum sit ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel 
providential appellari recte possit (Graece enim πρόνοια dicitur), haec 
potissimum providet et in is maxime est occupata, primum ut mundus 
quam aptissimus sit ad permanendum, deinde ut nulla re egeat, maxume 
autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo sit atque omnis ornatus.
Such, then, is the mind of the universe, and for this reason it can be 
justly termed ‘Prudence’ or ‘Providence’ (for its name in Greek is 
pronoia); hence its chief provision and preoccupation is to ensure first, 
that the universe is most suitably ordered for survival; secondly, that it 
is deficient in no respect; and above all, that its beauty is outstanding 
in its universal adornment.70
The very last word in this passage, ornatus, indicates that there 
might be more to the beauty of the world than proportion. The 
word indicates the property of being embellished, ornate, deco-
rated; in short, the aesthetic property that cannot be reduced to 
proportionality, as in the case of the heavenly bodies. This is not the 
only instance of this notion occurring in this treatise. In the context 
of discussing how well-designed human bodies are, Balbus states 
that the human eye is an adept judge of art, including paintings, 
sculptures and engravings, and then adds that ‘our eyes assess beauty 
and order and the propriety, so to say, of colours and shapes’.71 The 
eye, according to this passage, judges not only the arrangement but 
also the colour when determining beauty. Beauty, then, consists of 
certain ornateness that involves colours and shapes. This is quite 
likely the same kind of beauty as that found in the citation of 
Chrysippus.
In Chrysippus’ citation, this understanding of beauty is denoted 
by the word poikilia. Poikilia is not a Stoic term, as it is a promi-
nent aesthetic concept in Greek literary texts. It is often associated 
with material culture, but this adjective can be applied to a wide 
variety of objects, including the natural world and even Odysseus’ 
metis.72 In the context of material culture, poikilia is the result 
of craftsmanship and the skill of inlaying varied materials.73 An 
important aspect of the concept of poikilia is the implication of a 
fairly specific process of production of an object that is ποικίλος. 
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As Grand-Clement explains, ‘the process of creation lies in bring-
ing heterogeneous elements together, as a unified whole, while 
they retain their own nature and keep interacting in a dynamic 
fashion’.74 The fact that poikilos can refer to a positive intellec-
tual value is also pertinent here.75 The reference to craftsmanship 
implied in the concept of poikilia arguably explains why this term 
is adopted in philosophical texts, especially in the context of divine 
generation. In Plato’s Timaeus, the term poikilia is employed in 
describing the revolutions of the wondrous heavenly bodies that 
signify time76 as well as the way in which the demiurge intervenes 
in the race of heavenly gods (οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος) throughout all 
of the heavens (περὶ πάντα κύκλῳ τὸν οὐρανόν).77
It might seem that there is a significant overlap between beauty 
as a proportion and beauty as poikilia in the philosophical tradi-
tion. There is, however, a difference that emerges more clearly in 
Cicero’s texts. Arguably, Cicero uses the term varietas to denote 
a certain aesthetic phenomenon that has close ties to the Greek 
poikilia.78 The On Ends contains a definition of varietas that claims 
this notion primarily refers to colours as follows: ‘“Variation” is 
certainly a word in our language, and in its strict sense is applied to 
differences in colour, though it may be used derivatively for many 
kinds of difference.’79 This definition of varietas is followed by the 
examples of other objects to which the term may be applied includ-
ing a poem, a speech, behaviour, fortune and pleasure.
In the Stoic theological texts, variety as an aesthetic phenom-
enon primarily applies to the natural world. In Seneca’s Letter 113 
and Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, it denotes the awe-inspiring 
diversity of natural life, in terms of colours, shapes and sizes. It 
seems that the basis of this aesthetic phenomenon is the sheer range 
of the differences, but arguably, the issue at stake is subtler. The 
world is awe-inspiring not only because there are many different 
kinds of objects and, furthermore, many variations within each 
kind, but also because it manifests all of this variety as a single piece 
of creation. The existence of multiple colours in general does not 
constitute an aesthetic phenomenon. By contrast, the existence of a 
particular artefact, such as a piece of textile, that cleverly combines 
multiple colours does constitute an aesthetic phenomenon.
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To put it briefly, when it comes to judging an object as possess-
ing poikilia/varietas, the issue at stake is combination. It is not, 
however, numerically the expressible combination that one can see 
in the case of the limbs, but a harmonious combination of colours 
or textures and shapes.80 It is, therefore, possible to distinguish two 
accounts of beauty in Balbus’ speech, both of them relying on the 
notion of harmony: the harmony of parts which can be accounted 
for numerically and the harmony of colours and textures, which 
cannot be expressed numerically.81 Although by no means inter-
changeable, both concepts share something in common, as a har-
monious relationship between the elements is the basis for both 
of them. This means that the world, as an object of craftsmanship 
and design, can manifest both poikilia and numerical proportion 
without any contradiction as they refer to different aspects of the 
harmonious structure of the world.82
Perceiving beauty
In regard to the beliefs underlying Chrysippus’ theodicean argu-
ments, the core idea is the rational systematicity of the world which 
renders everything in the world functional and hence ultimately 
good and beneficial. This leaves the question of the purpose of 
beauty, and especially the beauty of particular objects, such as birds. 
It might be tempting to answer this question by taking a Platonic 
route and suggesting that perhaps Chrysippus thought that con-
templating beautiful objects would lead to metaphysical knowl-
edge.83 If Chrysippus had similar ideas, the peacock argument 
would have been an ideal place to expound them, because he could 
have shown that certain beautiful objects lead us to metaphysical 
knowledge, and conventional evils are a small price to pay for the 
existence of such easy access to knowledge. There is, however, no 
evidence to support such an interpretation.84 In fact, such a line 
of reasoning is more in line with the Platonic tradition. Plotinus, 
the founder of the Neoplatonist school and a harsh critic of the 
Stoic conceptualisation of aesthetic properties, theorises aesthetic 
properties in this way.
Plotinus starts his On the Intellectual Beauty (Ennead 5.8) by 
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stating that beauty originates from the Form.85 Later in the trea-
tise, Plotinus compares perfect philosophical wisdom to the non-
discursive86 perception of beauty and even claims that such wisdom 
consists of seeing beauty. When describing god-like contemplation, 
Plotinus states that such a life is ‘wisdom not acquired by reason-
ings, because it was always all present, without any failing which 
would make it need to be searched for; but it is the first, not derived 
from any other wisdom’.87 Plotinus’ statement clearly shows that 
such wisdom is fundamental and not derivative from any other 
concepts. In the same treatise, he suggests that wise men in Egypt 
understood this, because they used images rather than letters and 
words to signify ideas.88 In another section, Plotinus adds that 
Zeus, as well as any person who is his fellow-lover (συνεραστής), 
‘sees’ by participating in intelligible beauty.89
Some contemporary philosophers pick up the idea that the 
Neoplatonists posited an account of the perception of beauty as 
non-conceptual experience that is revelatory of important theologi-
cal or ethical truths as well. James Kirwan, for instance, has sug-
gested that the Neoplatonic account of beauty, broadly construed, 
has marked advantages over other theories of beauty, such as radical 
subjectivism (beauty is in the eye of the beholder) or what Kirwan 
calls synaesthetic theories.90 Kirwan argues that the perception of 
beauty is ‘aconceptual’.91He explains his view as follows: ‘Beauty is 
one thing we do “know” absolutely, its being is to be perceived, and 
thus it guarantees its own reality. The inscrutability of beauty, its 
traditional grounding in the “I-know-not-what”, simply signifies 
that the perception of beauty is so immediate as to leave no room 
for enquiry.’92 Kirwan uses Neoplatonic ideas as an inspiration and 
justification for his claims. According to him, the Neoplatonic texts 
contain some very important insights into aesthetic experience as 
follows:
. . . what distinguishes them from other forms of discourse is that, in 
them, the God that will complete us is not hidden within a love of 
humanity, or life, or justice, or integrity, or even truth; they are explicit 
on the impossibility of conceiving of the in-itself, and, in being so, can 
account for the positive pole of beauty. Indeed everything associated 
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with the experience of beauty, both the sensation itself and the resist-
ance of that sensation to logical definition, points to beauty being a 
yearning not for any individual end or object but rather for that object 
which is the goal of being itself, that perfection of the self towards 
which every action aims and which every pleasure registers.93
There is some ground to suspect that the Stoics very likely held 
the opposite view. Plotinus criticises the Stoic definition of beauty 
as summetria,94 and his attempt to posit non-conceptual perception 
as the best form of philosophical knowledge can be understood as 
the answer to the deflationist views of such thinkers as Chrysippus. 
These two ways of thinking about the perception of beauty are polar 
opposites, because they explore distinct ways in which beauty can 
contribute to the acquisition of knowledge. Whereas in Plotinus’ 
account, the non-conceptual perception of beauty is the key for 
developing an advanced understanding of metaphysics, in the Stoic 
account, the perception of beauty is not marked at all.
Chrysippus’ concept of beauty seems pretty prosaic. So far, 
all the evidence has shown that the Stoics account for beauty in 
terms of formal and in certain cases functional properties. Beauty, 
it follows, is a sign of good composition. Good composition can 
be an important aspect of some objects. The beauty of astronomi-
cal objects and their motion, for instance, shows that they are 
functioning well according to rational principle. The beauty of 
ordinary objects, meanwhile, is much less significant. The beauty 
of a peacock’s tail indicates that it is a well-composed object (and, 
in this case, has a nice colouring), but it does not imply much 
more than that. If my suggested reconstruction of Chrysippus’ 
argument is correct, the beauty of a tail cannot even be read as 
a sign of rational functioning of the world as a whole, because it 
would imply that peacocks without their tails –  and, to a certain 
extent, peahens –  are signs that god fails, that is, the products of its 
creation could have been better and therefore they are not in the 
perfect state. Chrysippus’ point is precisely that we ought not to 
concentrate on the excellences or deficiencies of particular objects, 
but take a holistic view of the world. On the whole, the world is 
good, useful and providential.
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The physical beauty of particular objects, moreover, is not an 
indication of value that ought to be pursued. In one extant fragment, 
Chrysippus warns that people who are overly enthusiastic about pur-
suing beautiful objects were ‘close to painting their privies’.95 This 
is consistent with the doctrine of indifferents presented in Chapter 
2.96 At the same time, such arguments as Posidonius’ sphere and 
Chrysippus’ beautiful house appear to use the presence of beauty 
as a kind of inference that indicates that beauty can be revelatory 
in some sense. Arguably, despite the fact that there is no insight to 
be gained from merely perceiving beauty, beauty can be analysed 
to learn more about its composition and components. The Stoic 
epistemology is an important background. After stating that the 
Stoics apply the term αἴσθησις to pneuma passing from the leading 
part of the soul to the senses, sense-perception and the apparatus of 
sense organs, Diogenes Laertius records the following Stoic claim:
ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν καὶ 
μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων, λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως 
συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους.
It is by sense-perception, they [the Stoics] hold, that we get cognition 
of white and black, rough and smooth, but it is by reason that we get 
cognition of conclusions reached through demonstrations, such as the 
gods’ existence and their providence.97
This passage shows that the Stoics distinguish between the sense 
perception which directly conveys data about the perceived object 
and the perception by inference. It explicitly states, moreover, that 
important theological and metaphysical beliefs are, according to 
the Stoics, established by inferences.98 Diogenes Laertius even 
specifies that these kinds of inference are demonstrations. The dem-
onstrations are specific types of argument that reveal non-evident 
conclusions. These arguments are governed by logic, and they are 
revelatory not in the sense of conveying their conclusions in a non-
conceptual manner, but in the sense of combining the premises in 
a way which leads to the conclusion which is not evident in the 
premises themselves.
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This is not to say, however, that beauty cannot be used for the 
acquisition of knowledge at all. The Stoic belief that only the beau-
tiful is the good (proved by the fact that even irrational animals 
take the beautiful to be choice-worthy) indicates that aesthetic 
properties can be analytical tools in Stoic arguments. If the pres-
ence of beauty in certain actions renders them choice-worthy, then 
choice-worthiness can be explained in terms of beauty, and conse-
quently, beauty has an explanatory role to play. Beauty, therefore, 
can be analysed by means of concepts, and it can be used for 
forming inferences. This is especially evident in the case of theologi-
cal arguments which suggest that the beauty of the world helps to 
establish the conclusion that the world was generated rationally. 
In the second book of Cicero’s The Nature of The Gods, the Stoic 
spokesperson Balbus criticises the Epicurean idea that atoms rather 
than gods are responsible for the physical processes that generate 
and maintain the world. He presents the Stoic arguments support-
ing their belief that the world is generated and maintained by a 
rational god as follows:
Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes et initio 
constitutas esse et omni tempore administrari. Eamque disputationem tris 
in partes nostri fere dividunt . . . secunda est autem quae docet omnes res 
subiectas esse naturae sentienti ab eaque omnia pulcherrume geri; quo 
constituto sequitur ab animantibus principiis eam esse generatam.
I therefore assert that it is by the providence of the gods that the world 
and all its parts were first compounded and have been governed for 
all time. The defence of that thesis is usually divided into three parts 
by our school . . . Second is the part which proves that all things are 
under the control of a sentient nature, and that nature’s works are all 
of the utmost beauty: once this is established, it follows that they are 
generated from animate origins.99
This passage illustrates how the Stoics use the concept of beauty 
in an argument to establish a very important metaphysical conclu-
sion.100 The passage describes an inference which can be made on 
the basis of the presence of beauty, and this indicates that beauty is 
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conceptually analysable, that is, it is a property which can be broken 
down and explained by using underlying concepts. The Stoics use 
the term ‘sign’ (σημεῖον) to denote phenomena which are indica-
tory of non-evident information. The theorisation of signs helps to 
explain what kind of explanatory role aesthetic properties can have.
The signs
It is important to note that signs played a prominent role in 
Hellenistic philosophy in general. There was a continuous debate 
between the Epicureans, the Sceptics and the Stoics regarding the 
existence and the classification of signs,101 therefore it is unsurpris-
ing to find the notion of a sign featuring fairly prominently in 
Stoic epistemology and logic. The ability to make inferences by 
means of signs distinguishes human beings from irrational animals. 
Although animals also receive simple impressions, they are unable 
to use them as signs, that is, to infer what follows from them.102 
The main evidence for the Stoic definition of a sign comes from 
Sextus Empiricus’ The Outlines of Pyrrhonism. While attempting to 
prove that the dogmatic philosophers’ notion of a sign is untenable, 
he records the Stoic definition of a sign as follows:
αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἀκριβῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ διειληφέναι δοκοῦντες, οἱ 
Στωικοί, βουλόμενοι παραστῆσαι τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ σημείου, φασὶ 
σημεῖον εἶναι ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον, 
ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος . . . προκαθηγούμενον δὲ λέγουσι τὸ 
ἐν συνημμένῳ ἀρχομένῳ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγοντι ἐπὶ ἀληθὲς 
ἡγούμενον. ἐκκαλυπτικὸν δέ ἐστι τοῦ λήγοντος, ἐπεὶ τὸ ‘γάλα ἔχει 
αὕτη’ τοῦ ‘κεκύηκεν αὕτη’ δηλωτικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ 
συνημμένῳ ‘εἰ γάλα ἔχει αὕτη, κεκύηκεν αὕτη.’
For example, those who are thought to have made accurate distinctions 
about the sign, the Stoics, when they wish to establish the conception 
of the sign, say that a sign is a leading proposition in a sound condi-
tional, revelatory of the consequent . . . By ‘leading’ proposition they 
mean the antecedent in a conditional with true antecedent and true 
consequent. It is ‘revelatory’ of the consequent, since in the conditional 
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‘If this woman has milk, this woman has conceived’, ‘This woman has 
milk’ seems to be indicative of ‘This woman has conceived.’103
Certain objects or properties can be revelatory according to the 
Stoics in the sense that they disclose a piece of information that can 
be conceptually constructed into an inference about non-evident 
facts. The example recorded by Sextus –  a woman’s having milk is a 
sign that she has conceived –  shows this very clearly. The argument 
that the beauty of the kosmos is evidence of the rational generation 
of the world could plausibly illustrate the Stoic notion of a sign, 
even though the text does not contain the term ‘sign’. The way in 
which the beauty terms are used in those passages resonates with 
the definition of a sign cited by Sextus Empiricus.
It is noteworthy, however, that a phenomenon is a sign not by 
virtue of some special characteristic, but by virtue of having a role 
to play in a specific inference. The passage of Diogenes Laertius 
quoted above recording the Stoic distinction between sense impres-
sions and impressions reached by inference calls the latter kind of 
impression a demonstration (ἀπόδειξις). Diogenes Laertius pre-
sented no more information about what a demonstration entails, 
but Sextus Empiricus’ refutation of dogmatic epistemology in The 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism contains a more detailed description of the 
Stoic notion of a demonstration. According to Sextus, the Stoics 
distinguished demonstrations from progressive arguments that lead 
to a conclusion by means of trust and memory104 as follows:
οἱ δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐφοδευτικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς 
ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος ‘εἰ ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας 
ἱδρῶτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα·’ 
τὸ γὰρ ῥεῖν τοὺς ἱδρῶτας ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ πόρους εἶναι, διὰ τὸ 
προειλῆφθαι ὅτι διὰ ναστοῦ σώματος ὑγρὸν οὐ δύναται φέρεσθαι. ἡ 
οὖν ἀπόδειξις καὶ λόγος εἶναι ὀφείλει καὶ συνακτικὸς καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ 
ἄδηλον ἔχων συμπέρασμα [καὶ] ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως 
τῶν λημμάτων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι λέγεται ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι’ 
ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων 
ἄδηλον.
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Those which lead us to the conclusion in a not only progressive but 
also revelatory way are ones like this: ‘If sweat flows through the 
surface, there are ducts discoverable by thought. But the first, therefore 
the second. For the proposition that sweat flows is revelatory of the 
proposition that there are ducts, thanks to our preconception that 
liquid cannot penetrate a solid body. Thus a demonstration must be 
an argument, and deductive, and true, and with a conclusion which is 
non-evident and revealed by the force of the premises. That is why a 
demonstration is said to be an argument which through agreed prem-
ises by means of deduction reveals a non-evident conclusion.105
This passage elaborates on what demonstrations are. It is note-
worthy that although demonstrations can be described accurately 
as ‘revelatory’, they are not channels of non-conceptual knowledge. 
‘Revelation’ in this case denotes a disclosure of non-evident facts 
by means of an inference. Demonstrations can be described as 
reasoning about entailment, as the example of sweat ducts indi-
cates. The presence of sweat on skin entails the existence of sweat 
ducts, because liquid cannot permeate a solid body. This mundane 
example illustrates the same epistemological mechanism that can 
be applied to discovering loftier propositions. The beauty of the 
world, for instance, is revelatory of its rational generation by the 
same thought process that discovers the existence of sweat ducts 
on the basis of the presence of sweat on skin. The theological argu-
ment stating that beauty is indicative of the rational generation of 
the world preserved by Cicero, for instance, implies roughly the 
following line of thought: if the world is beautiful, then it has a 
certain formal structure; this structure is a product of rationality, 
which does not come into existence by means of arbitrary motion. 
The beauty of the world, therefore, indicates the rational nature of 
its generation.
The Stoic account of the perception of beauty is best described 
as deflationist. In the Stoic fragments, the property of being beauti-
ful is no different for the process of knowing than the property 
of being sweaty or lactating. As the object of a sense impression, 
beauty is not special. An impression of beauty by itself does not 
have any additional information attached to it. As a ‘sign’, it can 
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have an interesting role to play in certain arguments, but no more 
so than any other property. There is, therefore, no specific Stoic 
theory of beauty that differs from the Stoic account of perception 
in general. The fact that beauty can be a sign, however, shows us 
that it is the kind of phenomenon that can be unpacked logically. 
The unpacking of beauty reveals that certain formal and functional 
properties underlie aesthetic phenomena. This finding is consistent 
with the conclusions about how the Stoics theorised in the previous 
chapters.
Concluding remarks
The conclusion above has some bearing on how we understand the 
role that beauty plays in the context of Stoic theological arguments. 
Overall, it does not have an especially significant role to play; it is 
unlikely that the Stoics considered ordinary objects indicative of 
anything very important theologically. At the same time, they drew 
the conclusion about the manner in which the world is generated 
based on the beauty of that world. These two ideas are not at odds 
if we bear in mind that beauty, according to the Stoics, originates 
from functional structures. In the case of an ordinary object, such 
as the tail of a bird, beauty indicates that the underlying parts are 
functionally well arranged and this conclusion, while an interesting 
explanation, does not have many consequences. In the case of the 
world, however, its beauty suggests that the world is generated in 
functionally structural way and, moreover, that there is a prin-
ciple responsible for that structuring. The Epicureans, according 
to the Stoics, could not be right in saying that random atomic 
motion generated the world, because the world, by virtue of being 
beautiful, exhibits a rational, non-random structure. If we want to 
understand what principles govern the generation of the world, 
we ought to start by considering the functional structure that the 
world possesses rather than by considering how atomic movement 
could produce an entire world.
The theological arguments are arguably some of the most impor-
tant tenets of Stoic cosmology and the fact that they contain infer-
ences from beauty suggests that the conceptualisation of beauty was 
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firmly intertwined with more familiar Stoic views. They also reveal 
certain Stoic commitments regarding not only the epistemology 
but also the metaphysics of aesthetic properties. By now, certain 
elements of the Stoic account of beauty are evident as they emerge 
consistently in different arguments that employ aesthetic terms. 
The following section is dedicated to discussing these elements as a 
single and coherent Stoic theory of beauty.
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6
The Stoic Definition of Beauty 
as Summetria
‘Moreover, the perfection of mathematical beauty is such (as Colin 
Maclaurin learned of the bee), that whatsoever is most beautiful and 
regular is also found to be most useful and excellent.’
D’Arcy Thompson, On Growth and Form1
The Stoics employ aesthetic terms in a fairly sizeable number of their 
arguments that can be found in a variety of contexts. Two concep-
tualisations or two ways of theorising aesthetic properties underly all 
of these cases: the formal and the functional. This chapter is focused 
on the question of how these ways of theorising beauty are unified 
and made coherent in the Stoic definition of beauty as summetria, 
the most theory-laden aesthetic notion in the extant evidence.
Before focusing on the Stoic use of the term summetria, it is 
worth noting that it does not mean ‘symmetry’ in the sense of 
bilateral symmetry. As Giora Hon and Bernard Goldstein show 
in their monograph From Summetria to Symmetry: the Making of a 
Revolutionary Scientific Concept, the contemporary understanding 
of symmetry as either bilateralism or, in mathematics and logic, a 
certain stability in mathematical properties that undergo changes2 
originated in the work of the eighteenth-century French mathema-
tician Adrien-Marie Legendre. In antiquity, summetria referred to, 
broadly speaking, a property of being well proportioned.3 This is 
quite evident in, for example, Galen’s anatomical account of the 
human body in his treatise On the Utility of Parts. When describ-
 The Stoic Definition of Beauty as Summetria 145
ing the bilateral relationship between the left and the right sides 
of the human body, he uses the word ἴσος, ‘equal’.4 Summetria, 
meanwhile, is more commonly found in texts that discuss beauty 
and art; in other words, in texts that address aesthetic issues. It 
is worth noting from the outset that these are diverse, and this 
tradition as a whole is discussed in the following chapter. In order 
to determine the role that the Stoic theory of summetria plays in 
the ancient tradition, it is first necessary to look closely at how the 
extant fragments conceptualise this term.
The evidence
The definition of beauty as summetria of parts with each other and 
with the whole is, arguably, the most fundamental piece of evidence 
for analysing the Stoic conceptualisation of beauty.5 This defini-
tion, typically attributed simply to ‘the Stoics’, can be found in a 
number of texts. It is recorded by Arius Didymus, Plotinus, Galen 
and Cicero.6 Galen’s On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 
however, is especially informative, as Galen attributes this defi-
nition to Chrysippus. Galen notes that Chrysippus distinguishes 
between the health and the beauty of the body by stating that health 
depends on the proportion of elements, while beauty depends on 
the proportion of parts. Then Galen states the following:
τὸ δὲ κάλλος οὐκ ἐν τῇ τῶν στοιχείων ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τῶν μορίων 
συμμετρίᾳ συνίστασθαι νομίζει, δακτύλου πρὸς δάκτυλον δηλονότι 
καὶ συμπάντων αὐτῶν πρός τε μετακάρπιον καὶ καρπὸν καὶ τούτων 
πρὸς πῆχυν καὶ πήχεως πρὸς βραχίονα καὶ πάντων πρὸς πάντα . . .
He believes that beauty does not lie in the proportionality of the ele-
ments but in the proportionality of the parts: of finger, that is, to finger 
and of all the fingers to palm and wrist, of these to forearm, of forearm 
to shoulder, and of all to all . . .7
Galen’s record of Chrysippus’8 definition appears to refer to 
visual beauty alone, as is evident from the fact that he uses the term 
τὸ κάλλος for beauty as well as from the fact that he illustrates this 
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with the example of the proportionality of limbs. Other sources, 
however, emphasise that summetria explains both visual and intel-
lectual or moral beauty. Since ethical questions play an important 
role in the Stoic corpus overall, it is likely that the definition was 
supposed to account for both the beauty of the body and the beauty 
of the soul. The extended versions of the definition that include 
the beauty of the body and the soul, moreover, are not only more 
prevalent, but also more uniform.
One of the main sources for the elaborated version of the defini-
tion stating that the same phenomenon –  summetria –  accounts for 
the beauty of both the body and the soul is Arius Didymus.9 This 
fragment is found in Stobaeus’ Eclogae, amongst the excerpts from 
Arius Didymus’ Epitome of Stoic Ethics. It is cited as follows:
ὥσπερ τε τὸ κάλλος τοῦ σώματός ἐστι συμμετρία τῶν μελῶν 
καθιστάντων αὐτὸ πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ 
τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος ἐστὶ συμμετρία τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ 
πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τε αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.
Just as the beauty of a body is the proportionality of limbs when they 
relate to each other and to the whole, so the beauty of the soul is the 
proportionality of logos and its parts when they relate to the whole of 
the soul and to each other.10
Similarly, Cicero, when discussing notions of health and disease 
in his Tusculan Disputations,11 states that, according to the Stoics, 
good proportion is responsible for both the beauty of the body 
and the beauty of the soul. It has been shown that Cicero’s source 
for the Tusculan Disputations was very likely Chrysippus himself. 
More importantly, Cicero is using the On Emotions. The very same 
treatise is used by Galen in the On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and 
Plato.12 This is possibly a significant fact to take into considera-
tion, because Cicero’s formulation of the definition includes some 
additional conditions not mentioned by Galen as follows:
et ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam 
suavitate eaque dicitur pulchritudo, sic in animo opinionum iudicio-
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rumque aequabilitas et constantia cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate 
virtutem subsequens aut virtutis vim ipsam continens pulchritudo vocatur.
When used of the body, the word ‘beauty’ refers to a nice configuration 
of the limbs together with a pleasant coloring, and similarly ‘beauty’ of 
mind means an evenness and consistency in the opinions and judge-
ments, together with a certain toughness and stability, either following 
upon virtue or identical with it.13
Here, colour, as well as summetria of limbs, is said to constitute 
the bodily beauty of human beings. The beauty of the soul consists 
not only of the consistency of beliefs, but also of their stability. The 
requirement of steadiness or stability for the beauty of the soul, 
unlike the requirement of colour for bodily beauty, is found only in 
Cicero. It refers to a tranquil state of mind unperturbed by strong 
emotions and wrong beliefs. One possible reason why the condi-
tion is found here would be the context in which Cicero records 
the Stoic definition, namely, the Stoic treatment of emotions and 
mental health.14 It is quite likely that Cicero put an emphasis on 
the stability of opinions and judgements for this reason.
It is hard to determine when the conditions of colour and stabil-
ity were added to the Stoic definition and what role they were 
intended to play. It has already been mentioned above that Cicero 
and Galen very probably used the same treatise by Chrysippus as 
their source. It might be the case that the conditions present in 
Cicero but not Galen are due to Cicero’s interpretation. It is worth 
noting, however, that colour is mentioned by Plotinus as well. 
This passage, which can be found at the beginning of Plotinus’ On 
Beauty, contains the following statement:
λέγεται μὲν δὴ παρὰ πάντων, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συμμετρία τῶν μερῶν 
πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τό τε τῆς εὐχροίας προστεθὲν τὸ πρὸς 
τὴν ὄψιν κάλλος ποιεῖ καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅλως τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τὸ 
καλοῖς εἶναι τὸ συμμέτροις καὶ μεμετρημένοις ὑπάρχειν . . .
More or less everyone says that summetria of parts with one another and 
with the whole, with the addition of fine colour, produces visual beauty 
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and that both for the objects of sight and, generally, for everything else 
being beautiful is a matter of being summetros and measured . . .15
Despite the fact that Plotinus claims he is criticising a view held 
by ‘almost everyone’, it is generally agreed that the target of this 
critique is the Stoic definition of beauty.16 Galen’s testimony shows 
that it was adopted by the Stoics as early as Chrysippus. The idea 
criticised is also not easily mistaken for the views held by any other 
ancient philosophical school.17 Plotinus makes it clear that he is 
attacking the theory positing summetria as the sole explanation 
for the presence of beauty; in his view, summetria can be a part 
of beauty, but it cannot fully account for it. The aim of his attack 
is the account that suggests that summetria fully accounts for the 
existence of beauty as the only relevant factor, because according to 
Plotinus, beauty cannot be explained by the presence of summetria 
alone.18
Plotinus’ record of this definition also corroborates the evidence 
in Cicero that the definition included the requirement of colour. 
Unless Plotinus used Cicero as his source, for which we do not 
have evidence,19 it is unlikely that the addition of colour is simply 
Cicero’s interpretation. It is more likely that it was added by the 
Stoics themselves. It is also possible that the colour requirement in 
visual objects might have been included in response to a criticism. 
In his Ennead 1.6, Plotinus criticises the advocates of summetria 
by arguing that this theory of beauty does not explain how colour 
can be beautiful.20 This criticism is very pertinent as it is indeed 
difficult, if not impossible, to account for the beauty of colour by 
means of summetria, which typically refers to a certain proportion-
ality or ratio. It is quite possible that Plotinus was not the first to 
point out this shortcoming, and therefore, the requirement for the 
‘charm’ of colour was added by one of the Stoics (possibly even 
Chrysippus himself) as a response. In addition to this, it is worth 
remembering that the notion of poikilia, which can refer to the 
property of being multi-coloured, features fairly prominently in 
Stoic theological texts. These texts describe the world designed by 
god as both proportional and poikilos, and both of these properties 
are sources of beauty. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that 
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Cicero and Plotinus include colour in their records of the Stoic 
definition of beauty as summetria.
In all the cited passages, the central part of the Stoic definition 
is the simple statement that beauty is summetria or the propor-
tionality of parts with each other and with the whole. The most 
straightforward and obvious interpretation of the Stoic notion 
of summetria is that it conceptualises beauty as proportionality. 
According to such a reading, summetria of parts with each other 
and with the whole means that all the parts have harmonious ratios 
with each other, such as exemplified by Polycleitus’ Doryphoros or 
described in Vitruvius’ On Architecture.21 The harmony of beliefs 
and cognitive functions required for the beauty of the soul could be 
interpreted in a similar way.22
Plotinus’ critique
In Plotinus’ Ennead 1.6, Stoic ideas mostly serve as a foil for present-
ing Plotinus’ own account, yet his critique raises some significant – 
 and possibly enlightening –  questions about the Stoic definition of 
beauty. Plotinus starts Ennead 1.6, traditionally labelled On Beauty, 
by raising some general questions of whether the nature of beauty 
is the same in different kinds of objects and what attracts the eye to 
beautiful things. Then he proposes that there is a principle which 
bestows beauty on objects and states that it is the Form of Beauty.23 
Before any further exposition of his own ideas, Plotinus presents 
the following critique of the alternative account:
τό τε ὅλον ἔσται καλὸν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ μέρη ἕκαστα οὐχ ἕξει παρ’ 
ἑαυτῶν τὸ καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὅλον συντελοῦντα, ἵνα καλὸν ᾖ· 
καίτοι δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅλον, καὶ τὰ μέρη καλὰ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐξ αἰσχρῶν, 
ἀλλὰ πάντα κατειληφέναι τὸ κάλλος . . . εἰ δὲ δὴ μεταβαίνοντες καὶ 
ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς καλοὺς τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ 
ἐπ’ αὐτῶν αἰτιῷντο, τίς ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασι συμμετρία καλοῖς 
ἢ νόμοις ἢ μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐπιστήμαις; θεωρήματα γὰρ σύμμετρα 
πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἂν εἴη; εἰ δ’ ὅτι σύμφωνά ἐστι, καὶ κακῶν ἔσται 
ὁμολογία τε καὶ συμφωνία. τῷ γὰρ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἠλιθιότητα 
εἶναι τὸ τὴν δικαιοσύνην γενναίαν εἶναι εὐήθειαν σύμφωνον καὶ 
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συνῳδὸν καὶ ὁμολογεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα. κάλλος μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ 
πᾶσα καὶ κάλλος ἀληθινώτερον ἢ τὰ πρόσθεν· ἀλλὰ πῶς σύμμετρα; 
οὔτε γὰρ ὡς μεγέθη οὔτε ὡς ἀριθμὸς σύμμετρα·
The whole will be beautiful, in their view, while the individual parts 
will not have the quality of being beautiful in themselves but will 
contribute to making the whole beautiful. But if the whole is beautiful, 
the parts must be beautiful too; it could not be composed of ugly 
parts –  all the parts must have beauty . . . If they move on to practices 
and beautiful expressions of thought and claim that here too the sum-
metros is responsible for beauty, what could be meant by summetria in 
beautiful practices, or laws, or types of learning and knowledge? How 
could theories be summetros with one another? If the point is that they 
are in harmony, bad ideas can be consistent and in harmony with one 
another: the claims that ‘self-control is folly’ and that ‘justice is noble 
silliness’ are harmonious and in tune and consistent with each other. 
All virtue is beauty of soul, a truer beauty than the one mentioned 
earlier. How is virtue summetros? It is not summetros in the same way as 
magnitudes and numbers.24
Plotinus’ critique consists of a series of cases that exemplify 
objects or phenomena which, according to him, the Stoic defini-
tion of beauty could not account for. One of the most significant 
of these objections is that nothing beautiful can be made of parts 
which have no beauty themselves.25 This criticism raises the ques-
tion of the metaphysics of the Stoic concept of aesthetic properties. 
It is an important issue that ought to be addressed in order to 
understand the implications of the Stoic definition of beauty.
In addition to this, Plotinus asks how summetria can account for 
the beauty of such phenomena as laws, customs, virtue and even 
intellect itself. He writes that his opponents cannot mean that 
these phenomena are beautiful by virtue of being ‘in harmony’, 
because vices and wrong beliefs can be in harmony with each 
other as well and therefore they ought to be beautiful too. This is 
a powerful critique, possibly designed to showcase the strengths 
of Plotinus’ own theory. In Ennead 6.7, Plotinus states that an 
ugly living man is more beautiful than a statue of a beautiful man, 
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because ‘the living is more desirable; and this is because it has soul; 
and this is because it has more the form of good; and this means 
that it is somehow coloured by the light of the Good, and being 
so coloured wakes and rises up and lifts up that which belongs 
to it, as far as it can makes it good and wakes it’.26 According to 
Plotinus’ theory, the form helps to establish an exclusive relation-
ship between beauty and the good. Plotinus employs the notion 
of Forms in order account for the phenomena that, according to 
him, summetria cannot account for.
The Stoics are indeed committed to the view that there is a con-
nection between the good and aesthetic properties, while the vices 
are not able to form such a connection. Chapter 3 was dedicated 
to the evidence showing that Chrysippus and other Stoics employ 
syllogisms to prove that only the beautiful is the good.27 These 
arguments show that the Stoics establish important connections 
between beauty and morality. There is another pertinent piece of 
evidence in Plutarch’s Against the Stoic on Common Conceptions. 
When criticising the Stoic theodicean argument that even appar-
ently bad things are not truly bad, Plutarch argues that the Stoics 
are contradicting themselves, because they also state that evils are 
not good or useful for human beings as follows:
πρὸς δὲ κάλλος ἡμῖν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχὺν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία γέγονεν; οὔ 
φασιν.
Has vice proved to be useful to us for beauty or for strength? They 
deny it.28
The fact that the Stoics deny the assignment of beauty to vice 
raises the question of whether they could have defended themselves 
against Plotinus’ accusation that their definition of beauty does not 
rule out the possibility of vices, as well as virtues, being beautiful. 
As Plotinus rightly notes, mere good composition and the fitting 
together of parts do not sufficiently explain why abstract and espe-
cially moral objects are beautiful,29 and if the Stoic theory had no 
answer to this problem, it would constitute a serious shortcoming. 
Thus Plotinus raises two problematic questions: how is it possible 
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that the whole is beautiful when the parts lack beauty, and how 
could the Stoics say that virtues –  but not vices –  possess beauty?
Supervenience
Plotinus argues that the Stoic conception of beauty implies that 
aesthetic properties depend on bases that are unrelated to these 
properties. If Plotinus’ critique depicts the Stoic claims accurately 
and they account for beauty in this way, then they subscribe to the 
view that aesthetic properties supervene on non-aesthetic proper-
ties. Such a claim is not necessarily a drawback, despite the fact 
that it is presented as such by Plotinus. Conceptualising aesthetic 
properties in this way would have been not only an original stance, 
but also a substantial theoretical contribution to ancient aesthetics.
The verb ἐπιγίγνεσθαι, found in several sources on the Stoic 
views on virtue, shows how the Stoics employ the notion of super-
venience.30 Diogenes Laertius, for instance, records that one of the 
Stoic definitions of the good is ‘the natural perfection of a rational 
being qua rational’,31 adding that such a thing is virtue, virtuous 
acts and men. Then it is added that joy and gladness supervene on 
virtue. Similarly, despair and moroseness supervene on everything 
that partakes in vice. Joy and gladness, then, are novel proper-
ties that are dependent on virtue. An even more revealing passage 
comes from Cicero’s On Ends. Here, the Stoics are reported as 
claiming that the property of being ‘artistic’ is unlike the property 
of being ‘wise’, because the former is applicable only subsequently 
to the activity, whereas the latter is applicable from the outset. This 
is due to the fact that the wise act is an end in itself. Some actions 
are said to be bad given their consequences, while others are said 
to be bad in themselves, and virtuous actions can be judged right 
from their inception.32 As virtuous actions are done for the sake of 
themselves, the virtue of such actions depends on the agent; virtue, 
in these cases, follows from virtue.
This is not the case with the properties that are subsequent to 
the action, such as the property of being ‘artistic’. The fact that the 
example employed here is ‘artistic’ shows that this principle cer-
tainly (although not exclusively) applies to art objects. These prop-
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erties must follow from different properties. A dance, for example, 
is artistic because the movements of the dancer are swift, precise 
and so on. Swift motion in itself is not artistic, as one can see from 
the case of running. The aesthetic value of the dance, therefore, 
merely supervenes on the swift motion. Whereas virtue produces 
virtue, being artistic needs to be produced by different, subvening 
properties. There is, in addition to this, an explicit statement in 
Stobaeus that beauty supervenes as follows:
ταύταϛ . . . ἀρετὰϛ τελείας εἶναι λέγοuσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ 
συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων· ἄλλας δὲ ἐπιγίνεσθαι ταύταις, 
οὐκ ἔτι τέχνας οὔσας, ἀλλα δυνάμεις τιυάς, ἐκ τῆς ἀσκήσεως 
περιγιγνομένας, οἷον τὴν ὑγίειαν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν ἀρτιότητα καί 
τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ κάλλος. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν 
εὐκρασίαν εἶυαι τῶν ἐν τῶ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν 
καὶ ὑγρῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγίειαν εὐκρασίαν εἶναι τῶν ἐν 
τῇ ψυχῇ δογμάτων.
These . . . virtues, they [sc. the Stoics] say, are complete in the sphere of 
life and consist of theorems; but others supervene on these because they 
are no longer forms of expertise but certain powers that are acquired 
through training, for instance the soul’s health and soundness as well as 
its strength and beauty. For just as bodily health is a good blend of the 
hot, cold, dry and wet elements in the body, so too psychic health is a 
good mixture of the doctrines in the soul.33
Although this passage is not attributed to any specific Stoic, 
Teun Tieleman convincingly argues that it is quite likely based on 
Chrysippus’ On Virtues, with a minor variation.34 The central argu-
ment here is the juxtaposition of power (δύναμις) and expertise 
(τέχνη). It is best understood as the claim that ‘certain qualities of 
the soul cannot be directly influenced by reason, i.e. through acts 
of assent. Strength of character and inner harmony lend an addi-
tional quality to mental life; hence they are said to supervene on 
the theoretical virtues’.35 Beauty, health and strength are ‘powers’ 
that depend on training. The passage precedes the definition of 
beauty as summetria by Arius Didymus cited above, which states 
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that summetria of limbs and summetria of beliefs are responsible 
for the beauty of the body and the soul respectively. In both cases, 
beauty supervenes on the composition of the parts. In the case of 
bodily beauty, the composition or structure of the limbs renders a 
body beautiful. In the case of the soul, it is the structure, arguably 
a coherent structure, of beliefs that renders it as having a certain 
aesthetic property as well. If beauty is conceptualised as a kind 
of property that supervenes, then it can depend on non-aesthetic 
properties, and the Stoics could be defended against the charge of 
Plotinus.
The second criticism issued by Plotinus, however, presents 
another challenge. Summetria, as was shown above, is typically 
understood in terms of the proportionality of parts. If this is the 
case, Plotinus’ critique suggests, then vice can be beautiful as well, 
since nothing prevents a vicious mind from being harmoniously 
vicious. I would argue, however, that the Stoic definition could 
be defended even against this criticism, if it is read as stating that 
beauty supervenes not on just any kind of proportionality of parts 
but on the proportionality which enables an object to perform its 
function well.
Functional composition
The functional theory of beauty maintains that beauty depends 
not only on the structural properties of an object, such as the ratio 
amongst its parts, but also on how those structural properties allow 
the object to fulfil its role as the kind of object it is.36 Different 
ratios and proportions are generally considered to be beautiful in 
a family house and a gothic church. The properties of these two 
buildings differ based on their respective functions, and beauty 
in each case depends on not merely being well proportioned, but 
well proportioned in regards to what is appropriate to that kind of 
building. Whereas a high ceiling and good acoustics typically con-
tribute to the beauty of gothic churches, very different properties 
are typically found in family houses that might be called beautiful. 
Beauty is functional in the sense that it depends not only on the 
internal structural properties of an object, but also on how well 
 The Stoic Definition of Beauty as Summetria 155
those properties enable their owner to function as an object of its 
kind.
It is not uncommon to discuss functionality as one of the aspects 
of beauty in ancient Greek philosophy. Plato’s Hippias Major con-
tains a discussion of functional beauty, although ultimately, this 
account is rejected.37 A similar attempt to theorise beauty can be 
found in Xenophon’s Memorabilia.38 Such an understanding of 
beauty can also be found in the theoretical underpinnings of the 
aesthetic vocabulary. Aristotle, for instance, uses the term τὸ καλόν 
when describing the teleological functionality of animals.39 This 
notion plays an important role in the Stoic conceptualisation of 
beauty as well.
The notion of functional beauty can be read as a teleological 
claim, but arguably, in these cases, it is more appropriate to adopt 
the language of excellence. The concepts of τέλος and excellence 
are, of course, related, but excellence is a particularly useful notion 
for discussing aesthetic properties.40 When writing about Aristotle’s 
use of τὸ καλόν, Kelly Rogers notes that one of its references is 
‘functional excellence’. She illustrates this meaning of τὸ καλόν by 
citing a passage from Xenophon’s Memorabilia in which Socrates 
describes the shield as beautiful because it does not impede the use 
of hands while protecting the vulnerable parts.41 While all shields 
have the same end, their excellences may vary. Both a hoplite’s 
shield and a primitive woven shield protect their bearers, so both of 
them achieve their end, yet the hoplite’s shield has certain advan-
tages which make it excel at its function. Beauty, therefore, can 
be understood as resulting not just from achieving a certain end, 
but also from achieving that end particularly well, that is, having a 
certain excellence.
The notion of aesthetic functionality is captured by the Stoic 
notion of τὸ πρέπον (decorum in Latin), attributed to Panaetius. 
Possibly the best source for Panaetius’ views, including this one, 
is Cicero’s On Duties. It is clear that τὸ πρέπον has aesthetic, and 
functional, meaning in the following passage which describes τὸ 
πρέπον as analogous to bodily beauty:
. . . natura doceat non neglegere, quem admodum nos adversus homines 
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geramus, efficitur, ut et illud, quod ad omnem honestatem pertinet, 
decorum quam late fusum sit appareat et hoc, quod spectatur in uno 
quoque genere virtutis. Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione 
membrorum movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes 
cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, 
movet adprobationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et constantia et 
moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.
. . . nature teaches us to be mindful of the way we behave towards other 
men, it becomes apparent how widespread is not only that seemliness 
(decorum) which extends over all that is honourable, but also that 
which is seen in one part of virtue. For just as the eye is aroused by the 
beauty of a body, because of the appropriate arrangement of the limbs, 
and is delighted just because all its parts are in graceful harmony, so this 
seemliness (decorum), shining out in one’s life, arouses the approval of 
one’s fellows, because of the order and constancy and moderation of 
every word and action.42
The analogy with visual beauty indicates that τὸ πρέπον is an 
equivalent of bodily proportionality (‘appropriate arrangement of 
limbs’, to be precise), but it belongs to the sphere of action. Human 
beings delight in τὸ πρέπον of actions in the same way as they 
delight in the arrangement of limbs. It is not very easy to pinpoint 
what exactly τὸ πρέπον is. A useful definition is offered by Andrew 
Dyck, who suggests that it ‘is a concept without a content of its 
own; it merely sets up a proportional relationship between two 
terms’.43 In addition to this, I would argue that this relationship 
can be described as functionality, in the sense that an act which 
exhibits τὸ πρέπον is in accordance with the agent’s nature or 
function. The passage cited above as well as a number of other 
remarks in the On Duties indicate that the notion of τὸ πρέπον is 
tied to what is natural or in accordance with the nature of human 
beings. The source of τὸ πρέπον –  regardless of whether the issue is 
a human body or mind –  are nature’s laws.44
The functional aspect of τὸ πρέπον is also evident in the com-
parison of the appropriate character in poetry and real life. The 
poets are said to observe seemliness ‘when what is said and done 
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is worthy of the role’.45 When some immoral phrase or speech fits 
the character of the immoral person in a play, it is applauded and 
admired because of τὸ πρέπον (yet this would not be the case if the 
same was uttered by a noble character). This claim is immediately 
succeeded by a further clarification stating that in poetry, unlike in 
real life, τὸ πρέπον can apply to various characters, including the 
bad ones. In real life, τὸ πρέπον applies only to virtues, because 
‘our parts have been given to us by nature: since they are the ones 
of constancy, of moderation, of restraint, of a sense of shame’.46 
The beauty of the soul, when denoted by τὸ πρέπον, derives from 
achieving our τέλος –  or fulfilling our ‘function’ –  of living in 
accordance with our nature as rational virtuous agents.47
One might raise the question of whether it is permissible to use 
this notion to interpret the definition of beauty, typically denoted 
by another term (summetria). These two concepts are treated as 
separate by some scholars. Giovanni Lombardo in his L’Estetica 
Antica, for instance, reserves functional connotations to the term 
τὸ πρέπον and suggests that summetria refers to internal structural 
properties alone.48 In addition to this, the fact that τὸ πρέπον is 
often associated with Panaetius, whereas summetria can be attrib-
uted to the earlier Stoics, especially Chrysippus, might constitute 
an obstacle to such an interpretation. Yet the connection between 
the two concepts is discussed in Cicero’s On Duties, or to be more 
precise, the text contains a comparison between τὸ πρέπον and 
honestum.49
It is necessary to consider the relation between honestum and τὸ 
πρέπον in order to determine whether the functional connotations 
of the latter also apply to the former. In the On Duties, honestum and 
τὸ πρέπον are described as distinct,50 but the difference between 
τὸ πρέπον and honestum is hard to outline clearly. The difference 
between them is said to be more easily grasped than explained.51 
There is also a strong connection between them, because what is τὸ 
πρέπον is honestum and what is honestum is τὸ πρέπον. Moreover, 
everything just is πρέπον, but what is unjust is lacking in hon-
estum and unseemly.52 According to Andrew Dyck, ‘Panaetius 
evidently regards to prepon as an infallible sign of the presence of 
the kalon. . . . Moreover, unseemly behaviour would, according to 
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94, appear to be a sure sign of the absence of the kalon.’53 It follows 
that honestum is a necessary and sufficient condition for τὸ πρέπον 
and it is not reasonable to read these two notions as different. We 
can distinguish them conceptually (just as the On Duties indicates), 
but they necessarily coincide.
Although it has been argued that τὸ πρέπον was introduced by 
Panaetius specifically, there is no need to treat this notion as strictly 
existing outside the conceptual framework advocated by the early 
Stoics. The functional interpretation of beauty may very well have 
predated Panaetius within the Stoic tradition, and τὸ πρέπον can 
be said to be Panaetius’ notion in the sense that he put a special 
emphasis on it. If summetria is a feature of honestum, and hones-
tum necessarily coincides with τὸ πρέπον, a notion with a strong 
functional aspect, then summetria can be related to the functional 
theory of beauty. This is not, however, the only evidence for the 
theory of functional aesthetics in Stoicism.
It is noteworthy that beauty and utility are often cited in close 
proximity in Balbus’ account of the Stoic theology in Cicero’s 
On the Nature of the Gods, discussed in the previous Chapter 5. 
Providence, according to Balbus, has three objectives: ‘to ensure 
first, that the universe is most suitably ordered for survival; sec-
ondly, that it is deficient in no respect; and above all, that its beauty 
is outstanding in its universal adornment’.54 He also claims that 
the world could not have been better in regard to either utility or 
beauty as its parts exhibit exceptional coherence.55 Although these 
statements do not reduce beauty to functionality (that is, Balbus 
does not say explicitly that the world is beautiful because of its 
utility), the proximity of the claims about the beauty of the world 
to the claims about the utility of the world is notable. Even if the 
relationship between the two properties is not spelled out in great 
technical detail, it is quite clear that the beauty and the utility of the 
world go hand in hand.
The functionality of the world can be described more precisely 
in metaphysical terms. Plutarch reports that, in his On Motion, 
Chrysippus argued that ‘the world is a complete body, but the 
parts of the world are not complete because they are in certain 
ways relative to the whole and are not per se’.56 The category of 
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being relatively disposed, the fourth category in the Stoic theory 
of genera,57 explains the relationship between the world as a whole 
and its constituent parts. Being relatively disposed refers to a kind 
of property that can appear and cease to exist without qualitative 
alteration, but in reference to something external.58 Usually this 
category is explained by a simple example, such as ‘a man on the 
left’. But Plutarch’s passage shows that it can have a much more 
complex use. If the parts of the world are relatively disposed, they 
ought to be understood in reference to the cosmos as a whole. They 
have a nature, or function, in respect to the nature of the cosmos.
Similarly, in the Stoic definition of beauty as summetria, an 
object is said to be beautiful if its parts are summetros not only with 
each other but also with the whole. If being relatively disposed on a 
cosmic level has a certain functional meaning, then being disposed 
‘to the whole’ on a smaller scale also quite plausibly has a func-
tional meaning. There was, of course, a controversy within the Stoa 
regarding the category of ‘relatively disposed’ and its connection to 
virtue. On the one hand, Aristo argued that virtue is essentially only 
a single thing, and different kinds of virtues, such as courage and 
prudence, are relative dispositions. On the other hand, Chrysippus 
argued that every virtue constitutes its own quality as it is ‘qualified’ 
(τὸ ποιόν).59 In the Chrysippean conceptual framework, beauty of 
the soul would arguably be a matter of a further differentiation of 
an already qualified thing in regard to an external factor, that is, 
the role assigned to human beings by the rational cosmic principle.
The proper functions
The category of relative disposition can be used to explain proper 
functions as well.60 The proper functions (τὰ καθήκοντα) are 
actions in agreement with nature and can be interpreted as a func-
tional notion. The most common definition of a proper function 
states that it is an act in accordance with nature.61 The most broad 
and general understanding of this concept does not have aesthetic 
underpinnings. Animals and plants have proper functions62 and 
certain simple actions performed by humans are proper functions 
as well,63 yet none of these exhibit any kind of beauty. The proper 
160 The Stoic Theory of Beauty
functions do acquire certain aesthetic aspects, however, when the 
acting agent is the perfectly rational wise man.
In Cicero’s On Ends, the Stoic spokesperson Cato explains that 
the first proper function is to preserve one’s constitution, while the 
second is to pursue things that are in accordance with nature and to 
avoid those that are not. Once a person is able to perform this in a way 
which is fully consistent with his nature, he observes the regularity 
and harmony of such conduct (viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, 
ut ita dicam, concordiam) and gains the understanding of the highest 
human good, which is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake. 
This is the actual human good and honestum itself.64 The harmony of 
behaviour described here seems to be similar to the beauty of the soul 
described in the Stoic definition of beauty as summetria. At the very 
least a person who is acting for the sake of honestum can be meaning-
fully described as having beauty of the soul. If this is the case, here the 
phenomenon of beauty has clear functional connotations.
This claim is also supported by a passage from Stobaeus that 
contains the Stoic definition of a right action as a proper func-
tion that possesses all the measures or numbers (τοὺς ἀριθμούς).65 
The importance of the phrase ‘all the measures’ is highlighted by 
Anthony Long in his article ‘The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue’. The 
‘proper functions’ are especially often described as having ‘all the 
numbers’ of virtue,66 and Long argues that this phrase refers to a 
musical theory as follows:
As he plays, the musician is moving with the notes of one tetrachord, or 
ascending or descending to a higher or lower tetrachord. So, by analogy, 
the Stoic sage at one time is exercising this or that subordinate virtue 
in the domain of justice, and at another time displaying a subordinate 
virtue in the domain of courage. . . . Just as the musician will fail if any 
of the notes in his mode is out of tune, so too virtue requires complete 
concordance between all its parts or ‘numbers’ . . . the conception 
of virtue as a harmony provides an illuminating analogy for the wise 
man’s relationship with external nature as well as with himself. He may 
be pictured as someone whose character and actions are completely in 
tune with the causal system employed by cosmic nature.67
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The wise man, thus, is directly comparable to the musician by 
virtue of the harmony of his actions, as his actions are organised in 
such a way as to be perfectly attuned with nature. The reading of 
this perfect attunement as resulting in beauty follows quite naturally, 
especially given the reference to music which Long rightly emphasises. 
The proper functions can, therefore, be a part of the phenomenon of 
beauty –  and it seems fairly clear that the phenomenon described here 
is beauty –  when the agent in question is wise. Even more impor-
tantly, the beauty described here consists of functionality, in the sense 
that it consists in living and acting in a way which is not only well 
structured, but also in accordance with nature, both individual and 
cosmic. It could be argued that the definition of beauty as summetria 
of parts with each other and with the whole already implies that 
aesthetic properties supervene on functionality. Although the defini-
tion clearly refers to the structure of a beautiful object, there is a 
condition of being summetros with the whole. As was argued above, 
the ‘whole’ referred to here might very well have the same meaning 
as in Chrysippus’ claim that the parts of the world are relatively dis-
posed to the whole, and thus it can be interpreted as a claim about 
functionality.68 That is to say, this part of the definition implies that 
beauty is also functional, and that in order to be beautiful, an object 
has to perform adequately the role which this kind of object ought to 
fulfil. The proportionality of structure and functionality are not two 
distinct conditions for beauty, but two aspects of compositionality. 
The parts of a beautiful object are well composed not just in any 
respect, but by virtue of enabling the object to function as that kind 
of object. A composition, therefore, is only properly summetros if 
it has a functional structure.69 While ‘the summetria of parts with 
one another’ refers to an internal relationship between parts within 
an object, ‘the summetria of parts with the whole’ concerns the role 
that an object has from the functional perspective as well as how the 
composition of its parts contributes to its playing of that role.
Beautiful vices?
If this reading is accepted, then it also helps to clarify the Stoic 
position regarding the problem of attributing aesthetic properties 
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to virtues but not vices. As mentioned above, if it is assumed that 
beauty is produced when the parts simply ‘fit together’ and ‘comple-
ment each other’, then Plotinus is right in pointing out that the 
Stoics have trouble explaining why virtue, but not vice, is beautiful, 
as nothing seems to prevent vices from fitting together harmoni-
ously. This problem could be tackled by denying that vices have the 
capacity to co-exist in a harmonious way. There is some evidence 
showing that this might have been the approach the Stoics took. 
In the Tusculan Disputations, for instance, viciousness (vitiositas) is 
described as a character that is ‘inconsistent in the whole of life and 
out of harmony with itself ’ (a se ipsa dissentiens).70 A similar claim 
is recorded by Stobaeus. Here, ignorance is said to be vice, which is 
contrary to moderation and which makes impulses unstable and flut-
tering (ἀκαταστάτους καὶ πτοιώδεις).71 An unstable and fluttering 
impulse is defined as a passion (πάθος) by the Stoics.72 Vices such as 
ignorance can be shown to be innately inharmonious by appealing 
to the description of passions. Galen, citing Chrysippus’ On Passions, 
Book 1, records an elaborate explanation of the definition of passion 
as the excess of impulse that includes the following vivid illustration:
οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι καθ’ ὁρμὴν οὐ πλεονάζει ἡ τῶν σκελῶν 
κίνησις ἀλλὰ συναπαρτίζει τι τῇ ὁρμῇ ὥστε καὶ στῆναι, ὅταν 
ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μεταβάλλειν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ’ ὁρμὴν οὐκέτι 
τοιοῦτον γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἡ τῶν σκελῶν 
κίνησις ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς οὕτως εὐθὺς 
ἐναρξαμένων.
When someone walks in accordance with his impulse, the movement 
of his legs is not excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that 
he can stop or change whenever he wants to. But when people run in 
accordance with their impulse, this sort of thing no longer happens. 
The movement of their legs exceeds their impulse so that they are 
carried away and unable to change obediently, as soon as they have 
started to do so.73
The very nature of vice, then, is chaotic, and one could quite 
plausibly argue that, for the Stoics, the notion of harmonious vices 
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is an oxymoron. Consequently, if vices cannot co-exist in a way that 
can be called harmonious, then they cannot be beautiful either.
There is another, somewhat related, way of denying that vices 
can harmoniously fit together and form beauty. In fact, if the Stoic 
conception of beauty is read as referring to the functional struc-
ture of a beautiful object, then their definition allows restricting 
the supervenience of aesthetic properties to those structures that 
properly fulfil the function of an object.74 The Stoics maintain that 
the best in human beings is their rationality and it is in their nature 
to be rational.75 Vice, meanwhile, is the cause of an unnatural and 
unhappy life.76 Acting in a rational manner, therefore, constitutes 
acting in accordance with human nature and, therefore, fulfilling 
human functions. Subsequently, if it is accepted that beauty super-
venes not just on any harmonious structure, but on a functional 
structure, it follows that vices cannot contribute to beauty, because 
they do not contribute to the human τέλος. The Stoics could deny 
that it is possible to act in a harmoniously vicious way, because vice 
is not functional by virtue of being not in accordance with human 
nature. Fitting vices together in a harmonious fashion for the Stoics 
is a bit like performing a dance at a singing competition. It might 
be a very good dance, but it cannot win, because that is not what 
the competition is for.
The two components of the Stoic definition of beauty render 
it a very flexible concept. This definition takes into account more 
than the internal coherence of parts within an object. Beauty has 
a functional aspect, since in order to be beautiful, an object must 
have appropriate properties for that kind of object. This stance has 
important philosophical implications. Chrysippus proposes what 
in contemporary terms is called broad aesthetic supervenience. This 
kind of supervenience differs from narrow aesthetic supervenience 
in respect to its scope of relevant factors. In contemporary aesthet-
ics, broad supervenience is used to explain why an original master-
piece is more aesthetically valuable than its copy, even if the copy is 
very good. By virtue of having identical structural properties, both 
pieces ought to have identical supervening aesthetic properties. 
In order to support an intuition that the original piece of art has 
different aesthetic properties than its copy, broad supervenience is 
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necessary, because this notion of supervenience takes into account 
the contextual and relational properties as well as the intrinsic 
properties of an object.77
Concluding remarks
All the explanations and arguments containing aesthetic terms 
discussed in the previous chapters are not only consistent but are 
also supported by the Stoic way of theorising summetria. The Stoic 
definition of beauty as summetria helpfully spells out the technical 
implications about the Stoic understanding of the aesthetic proper-
ties, although it is a notable piece of Stoic philosophy in its own 
right. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of their definition 
of beauty is providing a reference point from which a composition 
can be judged to be ‘good’. Functionality is a reference point for 
composition, thus aesthetic properties in any given object depend 
on the composition of the parts attuned to the purpose of that object 
as a whole. Such a conceptualisation of aesthetic properties allows 
the Stoics to present a flexible and multi-layered theory that can 
account for the presence of beauty in simple physical objects, such 
as human bodies, complex physical objects, such as the world and 
even abstract objects, such as virtue. It becomes clear that the Stoic 
definition of beauty represents an interesting and significant devel-
opment in ancient aesthetics once it is placed within the ancient 
aesthetic tradition. This will be shown in the following chapter.
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76. Plutarch Mor. 1044A=SVF 3.55=LS 63H.
77. Zangwill (2001: 43–4).
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Aesthetics in Stoicism and 
Stoicism in Aesthetics 
‘The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable 
objects; but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a 
Venus or an Helen . . . Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to 
beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment.’
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding1
Having analysed the ways in which the Stoics used aesthetic terms 
and determined what theoretical implications this use underpins, 
one important question remains: that is, the question of the role 
that Stoic ideas played in the ancient debates on issues pertinent 
to aesthetics. Some of the debates that the Stoics engaged in have 
already been discussed. Plotinus’ critique of the Stoic definition 
of beauty as summetria, for example, was discussed in the previ-
ous chapter in order to determine the implications of that defini-
tion. This chapter, meanwhile, is dedicated to painting the general 
picture of the place of Stoic views within the ancient tradition of 
aesthetics, with a special emphasis on the debates and the develop-
ment of the ideas resulting from them. Given that the focus of this 
study is Stoicism, this account of ancient aesthetics will inevitably 
be limited to those debates that are pertinent to the topic, and thus 
it is not an exhaustive account. At the same time, it is worth stating 
from the outset that the Stoics engaged in the debates that were 
central and their influence was far more enduring than one might 
suspect.
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The summetriai, the artistic theory
In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that the most important 
piece of evidence for the Stoic definition of beauty comes from 
Galen’s treatise On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. In this 
passage, Galen claims that the Stoic theory is the same as the 
one proposed by Polycleitus. It is shown below that Galen is not 
quite right and the Stoic theory differed in several respects from 
Polycleitus’ Canon, yet Galen’s remark shows that Stoic thought 
is well integrated into the ancient Greek tradition. The Stoics were 
among the many philosophers influenced by the artistic theory 
typically attributed to Polycleitus. For this reason, the artistic 
theories are, arguably, the starting point of the enquiry into ancient 
Greek aesthetics.
Although far from being detailed, Galen’s passage suggests that 
Polycleitus’ theory referred mostly to ratios or the composition 
of an object.2 Galen adds that Polycleitus was the first to give τὰς 
συμμετρίας of the body as well as making a statue in accordance 
with his theory.3 Since Polycleitus is cited as talking about sum-
metria in the plural, it does seem that in his work this term refers 
to specific ratios that govern the internal structural properties of 
a beautiful statue.4 It is worth noting, however, that Polycleitus 
might not have been the inventor of the theory giving summe-
triai. Diogenes Laertius, while naming various people named 
Pythagoras active in the middle of the sixth century bc, also men-
tions Pythagoras the sculptor from Rhegium, who was the first to 
pay attention to rhythm and summetria.5 It seems that Polycleitus’ 
theory, however, was considered to be the theory of summetria par 
excellence. When listing the sculptors, Pliny the Elder describes 
Myron as being ‘the first sculptor who appears to have enlarged the 
scope of realism, being more prolific in his art than Polycleitus and 
being more careful in his proportions (symmetria)’.6 A little later he 
observes that Latin has no equivalent to the Greek term summetria, 
which Lysippus, another noted sculptor, followed attentively ‘by 
the new and hitherto untried method of modifying the squareness 
of the figure of the old sculptors’.7
Although summetria is often associated with sculpture, it is 
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also sometimes mentioned in relation to painting.8 It also plays 
a significant role in the theories of architecture, as Vitruvius’ On 
Architecture shows. According to Vitruvius, all buildings ought to 
possess strength, utility and beauty (venustas). He then explains 
what constitutes these properties. Strength comes from the solid 
foundation and the right choice of materials. Utility comes from 
the distribution of the parts which correspond to their purpose. 
Beauty, meanwhile, is produced by the pleasant appearance of 
the whole and the proportionality of its parts.9 Later, in Book 3, 
Vitruvius explains that the design of temples comes from the sum-
metria which depends on proportion (called ἀναλογία by Greeks). 
Then he defines proportion, in a way that is reminiscent of the 
Stoic definition of beauty, as follows: ‘Proportion is the co-relation 
(commodulatio) of the fixed parts in the elements of the build-
ing and in the whole [building], [and] from this ratio symmetria 
is produced.’10 As well as sharing some similarities, Vitruvius’ 
description of summetria in On Architecture differs from the Stoic 
in one significant respect: it does not incorporate any references to 
functionality. Instead, proportionality consists of only a series of 
numbers representing ratios. This becomes clear when Vitruvius 
compares temples with a well-formed human body,11 and then 
provides a rather in-depth description of the ideal proportions of 
a human body. From the chin to the top of the head is one tenth 
of the whole height, from chin to the crown of the head is one 
eighth, and so on.12 This makes it clear that, in the context of the 
arts, summetria refers to a very specific and rather technical series of 
ratios that allows the depiction of, for example, human anatomy, 
although it could be used for other kinds of objects too. Numbers 
and mathematical calculations, therefore, constitute the theory of 
summetriai used by the artists.
The Pythagoreans
Numbers also play prominent explanatory roles in the accounts of 
beauty presented by the philosophers. Arguably, the Pythagoreans 
are the most famous advocates of the theory that explains everything 
in terms of numbers. It has been suggested that the Pythagoreans 
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were the authors of the idea that beauty originates from the 
harmony of parts, which appears to be a conceptually similar (if not 
identical) stance to the one advocated by the Stoics.13 Discussing 
the Pythagorean stance in general terms is, however, very difficult, 
as the history and even the identity of the Pythagorean school is 
non-monolithic. Pythagoreanism is divided into the mathematical 
and the acousmatic traditions.14 The scope of this study does not 
allow discussing the Pythagorean stance in general, but it is pos-
sible to look at some representative evidence. Philolaus of Croton, 
for example, was one of the more noted Pythagoreans of the fifth 
century bc, and the extant fragments of his works are a valuable 
source for determining the views that can be reasonably associated 
with the Pythagorean school.
The similarity between the broadly Polycleitean summetria theory 
and the Pythagorean views is due to the role that mathematical 
explanation plays in both theories. Interestingly, the Pythagorean 
fragments rarely contain the term summetria. When they do, it is 
clear it is not a reductive explanation of aesthetic properties, as no 
surviving Pythagorean fragment identifies beauty with summetria 
in a reductive way. The Philolaus fragment that associates these two 
properties most explicitly can be found in Stobaeus, but it only 
states that summetria is beautiful as follows: ‘Order and proportion 
are beautiful and useful, while disorder and lack of proportion are 
ugly and useless.’15 Although this fragment attributes beauty to 
order and summetria, it does not explicitly state that there is a causal 
link between summetria and beauty, or that they share an identity 
in some sense.
Philolaus attributes a greater causal role to another often-
employed term, harmonia, which at first sight appears to be very 
similar to summetria. Harmonia, however, is portrayed as a fun-
damental power which binds together the so-called limiters and 
unlimiteds into the world-order.16 Harmonia, thus, tells us more 
about cosmology than aesthetics. Whereas the Pythagorean har-
monia is a universal power which reconciles conflicting parts into 
unity, the theories of summetria merely explain that the summetros 
arrangement of parts produces a property of beauty in various 
objects. The Pythagorean view as represented by Philolaus, then, is 
 Aesthetics in Stoicism and Stoicism in Aesthetics 175
rather different from both the artistic theory and the Stoic theory 
of summetria.
Both the Pythagorean view and the artistic theory of summetria, 
nevertheless, share an insight which becomes extremely significant 
to the later philosophers, namely, that beauty can be explained in 
terms of numbers. If one says that Dion has a beautiful body, then 
it means that Dion’s body is proportioned in a certain way and that 
proportion can be rendered in a series of very specific ratios. This 
idea is fairly fundamental to ancient Greek aesthetics, as it keeps on 
re-emerging in various forms and is used to posit various problems 
by later philosophers.
Plato
Of all ancient Greek philosophers who theorised beauty, Plato’s 
views are probably the most studied. Ultimately, the Platonic 
account is distinctly original, but it is worth noting that Plato 
often uses the term summetria as a tool for theorising beauty. He 
often uses the term to denote good proportion,17 measurements 
or ratio18 and even appropriateness.19 While these phenomena can 
be pertinent to the discussions of beauty, none of these passages 
explicitly describe beauty as nothing over and above summetria. 
The most pertinent passage for the discussion of how summetria is 
related to beauty is found in the Philebus. In the relevant section of 
this dialogue, Protarchus and Socrates discuss what the good is in a 
life that is devoted to pursuing a mixture of wisdom and pleasure.20 
After agreeing on the components of this mixture, Socrates states 
that the cause which renders any mixture valuable or valueless is 
obvious and known to everyone. Since Protarchus is perplexed 
by this claim, Socrates explains that this cause is τὸ μέτρον and ἡ 
συμμετρία.21 After Protarchus agrees with this, Socrates states the 
following:
{ΣΩ.} Νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ 
καλοῦ φύσιν· μετριότης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ 
πανταχοῦ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.
{ΠΡΩ.} Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
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{ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γε ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμεῖχθαι.
{ΠΡΩ.} Πάνυ γε.
{ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σὺν 
τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὡς 
τοῦτο οἷον ἓν ὀρθότατ’ ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθ’ ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμείξει, καὶ 
διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.
Soc: But now we notice that the force of the good has taken refuge in 
an alliance with the nature of the beautiful. For measure and propor-
tion manifest themselves in all areas as beauty and virtue.
Pro: Undeniably.
Soc: But we did say that truth is also included along with them in our 
mixture?
Pro: Indeed.
Soc: Well, then, if we cannot capture the good in one form, we will 
have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three: beauty, proportion, 
and truth. Let us affirm that these should by right be treated as a unity 
and be held responsible for what is in the mixture, for its goodness is 
what makes the mixture itself a good one.22
In this passage, Socrates states that there is a connection between 
beauty and summetria. Socrates claims that beauty, proportion and 
truth are unified in the good, and this claim shows that the members 
of this triad are separate entities that have a special relation amongst 
themselves.23 There are two notable points about the Platonic treat-
ment of summetria here. First, this notion is generalised here, it is 
clear that the issue at stake is more than just ratios.24 The second 
and somewhat related point to note here is that, for Plato, beauty 
is not reducible to summetria; that is, this notion does not explain 
fully why some object is beautiful. In order to obtain a full explana-
tion, it is necessary to refer to the Platonic Form.
In Plato’s philosophy, Forms play a major causal role. Objects 
gain properties such as beauty by partaking in the Form of 
Beauty.25 Interestingly, the motivation for positing the Form as the 
cause in general can be found in the texts discussing beauty.26 The 
Hippias Major is an especially useful text for this purpose, although 
its authorship has been doubted.27 Regardless of the question of 
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whether Plato wrote this dialogue, it is an illuminating text. The 
dialogue contains the arguments that implicitly criticise the artistic 
theory of summetria and imply the need for the kind of explanation 
that can only be provided by positing Forms.
The dialogue starts with and then revolves around the question 
of what the beautiful is.28 Hippias answers with confidence that a 
beautiful maiden is the beautiful.29 The most important issue here 
is that Hippias provides an example instead of a definition.30 The 
subsequent questioning by Socrates reveals this and some other 
interesting points. He suggests31 that Hippias’ answer does not 
explain what the beautiful is, by asking how a beautiful Elean mare, 
a beautiful lyre and a beautiful pot would compare to the maiden. 
Hippias is incensed by the example of the pot, but Socrates points 
out that a smooth, round and well-fired pot would have to be 
called beautiful.32 The description of the pot is important not only 
because it mocks Hippias, but also because it shows that the target 
here is the theories that account for aesthetic properties in terms 
of formal properties, such as the shape, proportion or smoothness 
of a pot. Socrates here is pointing out that they describe certain 
features of beautiful objects but do not properly explain why they 
are beautiful. The pot is beautiful by virtue of one set of properties, 
while the maiden is beautiful by virtue of a different set of proper-
ties. Yet, crucially, these sets of properties are entirely different and 
the formal properties of the pot cannot explain the beauty of the 
maiden. Thus, we learn nothing about what beauty (or, to be more 
precise, the beautiful) actually is. The dialogue proceeds to discuss 
other definitions of beauty, some put forth by Hippias, some by 
Socrates, and it ends in aporia.
This claim is in line with what is said about summetria and beauty 
in the passage from the Philebus cited above. In Platonic metaphys-
ics, saying that beautiful objects are summetroi would amount to 
naming one of the properties that beautiful objects have, rather 
than explaining why they are beautiful. Summetria might be a 
necessary condition for being beautiful (although it is impossible to 
assert this with certainty), but it is not a sufficient one. In Platonic 
thought, an account of beauty that includes no references to the 
Form of Beauty cannot adequately explain the origin of beauty.
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Aristotle
Aristotle’s contribution to aesthetics is very substantial. His brief 
discussion of catharsis alone has fuelled and informed debates until 
this day.33 Although much of Aristotle’s work on the philosophy of 
art survives, few texts in which he discusses the nature of aesthetic 
theories are extant. There is good reason to assume that these texts 
did exist, because Aristotle refers to them in the Metaphysics. This 
passage can be found in the context of refuting those who deny34 
that mathematics are of any use for moral philosophy and for 
understanding the beautiful. Aristotle makes his point as follows:
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕτερον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐν πράξει, 
τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις), οἱ φάσκοντες οὐδὲν λέγειν τὰς 
μαθηματικὰς ἐπιστήμας περὶ καλοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ ψεύδονται. λέγουσι 
γὰρ καὶ δεικνύουσι μάλιστα: οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ὀνομάζουσι τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα 
καὶ τοὺς λόγους δεικνύουσιν, οὐ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν. τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ 
μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον, ἃ μάλιστα 
δεικνύουσιν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. καὶ ἐπεί γε πολλῶν αἴτια 
φαίνεται ταῦτα (λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ἡ τάξις καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον), δῆλον ὅτι 
λέγοιεν ἂν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν τὴν ὡς τὸ καλὸν αἴτιον τρόπον 
τινά. μᾶλλον δὲ γνωρίμως ἐν ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν.
Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former 
always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also 
in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences 
say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences 
say and prove a great deal about them; if they do not expressly mention 
them, but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions, it 
is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms 
of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness, which the math-
ematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e.g. 
order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently 
these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also (i.e. the 
beautiful) as in some sense a cause. But we shall speak more plainly 
elsewhere about these matters.35
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It is not clear what other works Aristotle has in mind here, but 
the passage offers a glimpse of Aristotle’s more extensive views. 
Aristotle’s argument is fairly straightforward. Those who deny the 
usefulness of mathematics for the understanding of the good and 
the beautiful are wrong, because summetria and order are forms of 
beauty and these are demonstrated mathematically. This shows that 
Aristotle’s understanding of aesthetic phenomena is also greatly 
influenced by the artistic tradition which defines beauty in terms 
of formal properties. Aristotle is a notorious critic of Platonic 
metaphysics and one might wonder if, in this case, the problems he 
raises about the Forms might have motivated him to subscribe to 
a reductive theory of beauty as summetria. Aristotle also, however, 
does not equate beauty with summetria entirely, just like his teacher 
Plato. At the same time, summetria features in the passages where 
Aristotle does some work to define beauty. In the passage above, 
as well as in the Topics, Aristotle groups summetria together with 
order (ἡ τάξις) and definiteness (τὸ ὡρισμένον) as the main forms 
of beauty.36 He does not, however, distinguish summetria as the 
necessary and sufficient condition of beauty.
More importantly, there are additional passages which indicate 
even more clearly that summetria is not a sufficient condition for 
beauty. According to Aristotle, the existence of beauty requires the 
presence of both good proportion (ἡ συμμετρία) and magnitude (τὸ 
μέγεθος). Without the latter, an object cannot be called beautiful. 
This is made very clear in the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle 
claims that in order to be beautiful, a body must possess magni-
tude. Short people, as a consequence, can be well proportioned, 
but not beautiful.37 The definition of beauty as a combination of 
summetria and magnitude can be found in the Poetics38 and in the 
Politics39 as well, in the context of discussing the importance of size 
for the best government of the polis. According to these passages, 
summetria can exist independently of beauty. While it can account 
for some aspects of a beautiful phenomenon, beauty cannot be 
explained by the presence of summetria alone. Although Aristotle’s 
views contain traces of the Polycleitean notion of  summetria, it is, 
in fact, a distinct theory.
It seems that the problematic point about summetria  according 
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to Aristotle is entirely different from the one pointed out in the 
Platonic texts. The problem is not that summetria does not explain 
the beautiful itself, but that by defining beauty by means of sum-
metria, one risks committing to absurd consequences. For example, 
if a summetros vase was so tiny that it is barely perceptible to 
human sight, a Polycleitean theorist would have to say it is beauti-
ful, despite the fact that this beauty is not visible. Beauty, thus, 
is an object of sense perception, and an object cannot be called 
beautiful if it fails to produce a proper sensory impression. It would 
be possible to argue that beauty depends on a certain kind of func-
tionality, although a different kind from the typically mechanical 
functionality discussed in, for example, Xenophon’s Memorabilia 
or Plato’s Hippias Major.
The Stoics
To sum up the points made above, the Stoic definition of beauty as 
summetria differs from the ways in which Plato and Aristotle used 
the term.40 In certain respects, the Stoics agree with Aristotle, but 
their formulation is also notably different due to the explanatory 
primacy they assign to summetria. According to the Stoics, beauty 
is fully explained by the presence of summetria. This reductive 
understanding of beauty also constitutes the central difference 
between the Stoics and Plato.41 The apt proportion of parts is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for beauty, and no additional 
explanation is required. This way, there is no need to posit complex 
theoretical devices, such as the theory of Forms. It is worth bearing 
in mind that the Stoic criticism of Plato’s theory of Forms as unable 
to account for how immaterial Forms are able to have an impact on 
corporeal objects42 is at the very least a relevant background and at 
most the central motivation here.
The Stoics defined beauty in a way that is closer to the Polycleitean 
account of summetriai than the philosophers preceding them, in 
the sense that, in their theory, beauty is explained, and explained 
fully, by summetria. At the same time, there is much more to 
the Stoic theorisation of summetria than the series of Polycleitean 
ratios. Arguably, the Stoic summetria is distinct because it is con-
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ceptualised as functional proportionality, that is, proportionality 
in reference to the function of an object. By theorising summetria 
in this way, the Stoics were able to avoid the drawbacks that Plato 
and Aristotle may have found in the simple artistic account of 
summetriai, while keeping the elegant reductivity of the theory. The 
notion of functional composition allowed them to explain how a 
single principle could unify diverse manifestations of beauty.
It is also quite noteworthy that the Stoic account allows the 
explanation of complex kinds of beauty, such as the beauty of 
abstract objects or unusually small objects. The odd consequence 
of Aristotle’s view is that a well-proportioned, normally sized vase 
would be beautiful, while its exact but minute copy would not be. 
One might also wonder how the Aristotelian account would deal 
with objects whose aesthetic value is grounded in their minuteness, 
for example, an intricately engraved signet ring or a miniature 
painting. According to the Stoic view of summetria, one does not 
need to deny any explanatory power to the formal properties at all, 
but only to adjust the explanation to the nature of the aesthetic 
object. In a busy museum, for example, a person might get no 
chance to study an intricately carved signet ring in detail and miss 
seeing some of its properties, yet at the same time appreciate its 
aesthetic value arising precisely from its small size.
The influences of the Stoic theory
The return to a reductive way of accounting for aesthetic prop-
erties introduced by the Stoics was challenged by the resurgent 
Platonist tradition. An especially vivid example of the engagement 
between the broadly Platonist and the Stoic traditions is Plotinus’ 
critique of the definition of beauty as summetria, discussed in the 
previous chapter. Plotinus’ remarks can be read as representative 
not only of his own kind of Neoplatonism, but also of the posi-
tion of any philosopher committed to advocating the existence of 
Forms. Plotinus, for instance, agrees that summetria plays a role 
in the account of aesthetic properties and the understanding of 
the arts, but this role is instrumental, overshadowed by the sig-
nificance of the Forms.43 Platonism and Neoplatonism dominated 
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 post-Hellenistic philosophy and thus, seemingly, the Stoic theory 
had hardly any successors. There is evidence to suggest, however, 
that the Stoic influence was, in fact, strongly present in certain 
scientific and rhetorical traditions.
Hermogenes of Tarsus, the second-century ad rhetorician, refers 
to something very much like the Stoic definition of beauty in his 
major treatise on style titled On Types of Style. To be precise, he 
compares the beauty originating from a composition in words to 
human beauty as follows:
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καθόλου τὸ κάλλος ἐστὶ συμμετρία μελῶν καὶ μερῶν μετ’ 
εὐχροίας, δι’ ὧν δὴ λόγος τις γίνεται, εἴτε ἰδεῶν ὅλων μιγνυμένων 
εἰς ταὐτὸν εἴτε καὶ τῶν συμπληρούντων ἑκάστην ἰδέαν-ταῦτα γὰρ 
οἷον μέλη καὶ μέρη ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ . . .
Beauty generally consists of symmetry and harmony and proportion 
in the various parts and limbs of the body, combined with a fresh and 
healthy complexion. That is also how the style is produced, whether 
you mix all the types together or concentrate on each one individually 
–  for these are, as it were, the ‘parts and limbs of the body’.44
The definition of beauty is not doing much work here; 
Hermogenes is simply using it to support his discussion of style. 
The elements of this definition are recognisably Stoic, and espe-
cially close to Cicero’s record of the Stoic definition of beauty in 
the Tusculan Disputations,45 in which colour is mentioned as one of 
the conditions. This shows that by the second century ad, the ideas 
that Cicero treated as distinctly Stoic had become part of the more 
general vocabulary. An even more striking case is found in another 
author working during the period of the Second Sophistic, Galen. 
After citing Chrysippus’ definition of beauty as summetria in the On 
the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, Galen adds that this notion 
of beauty is adopted by ‘all physicians’.46 This is a peculiar remark, 
but several passages from Galen’s other treatise, On the Utility of 
Parts, not only illuminate the meaning of this claim but also show 
that Galen himself might have been one of these physicians.
The treatise On the Utility of Parts is a grand work dedicated to 
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showing the brilliance of the teleological design of human anatomy. 
Although Galen claims the treatise is not polemical but rather 
focused on the exposition of this brilliance, some of his remarks 
show that the work is written as a counter-position to those who 
posit non-teleological explanations of various phenomena in 
human bodies.47 The end of the treatise contains the ‘Epode’, a 
hymn to the designing powers of nature, which includes a rather 
personal description of awe and wonder arising from seeing an 
elephant for the first time. It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising 
that beauty plays no small role in Galen’s teleological account of 
human anatomy, as the impression of beauty invariably follows the 
discovery of functional design. Amongst the bodily parts that are 
described as beautiful or beautifully constructed are the coronas of 
the ulna,48 the sponge-like bones lying in front of the meninges49 
and the placement of the kidneys.50 These remarks are numerous, 
and it is clear that the terms used here are aesthetic, because Galen 
compares Nature to the craftsmen showing foresight for analo-
gias.51 Elsewhere in the treatise, when describing the proper sizing 
of the thorax, he states that all the body parts are in due proportion 
(analogian) to one another.52 He also says that one cannot help but 
admire the tunic of the left side of the heart53 due to the summetria 
found in its thickness and strength.
In this treatise, Galen shows himself not only to be interested 
in beauty but also to be versed in aesthetic theories. In book three 
of the same treatise, Galen argues that the beautiful arrangement 
of the heavenly bodies displays great wisdom and foresight. Then 
he addresses the problem of theodicy, and notes that due to the 
material from which humans are made, they cannot be as deathless 
and beautiful as heavenly bodies. Galen is presumably influenced 
by Plato’s Timaeus here.54 Subsequently, however, he adds that one 
might admire Pheidias’ Zeus at Olympia for its ivory, gold and the 
size of the statue and turn away from the same statue made from 
clay. This is the sign of an uncultivated man, however. An artist, 
Galen argues, would recognise the art and appreciate the statue no 
matter what it is made of.55 The idea that an architect appreciates 
the design itself rather than the appearance of an object can be 
found in Vitruvius’ On Architecture. Vitruvius does not deny that 
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the laymen can make proper aesthetic judgements in quite the same 
way as Galen does here, but he does note that the judgements of a 
layman and an architect are different because the latter can perceive 
beauty by thinking of the design, whereas the former has to see the 
object.56
Given his erudition and interest, it is unsurprising to find pas-
sages in On the Utility of Parts in which Galen’s views about the 
nature of aesthetic properties are discussed in a fairly detailed way. 
It is surprising, however, to find recognisably Stoic themes in this 
discussion. Relatively early in the treatise, in book one, Galen cites 
Hippocrates on the shape of the hands and then comments as 
follows:
καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ῥινῶν εὐφυΐαν ζητῶν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις 
συνάπτων αὐτῶν τὴν κατασκευὴν ἐξευρήσεις· αὕτη γάρ σοι κανὼν 
καὶ μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον εὐφυΐας τε καὶ κάλλους ἀληθινοῦ. οὐδὲ 
γὰρ ἄλλο τι τὸ ἀληθινὸν κάλλος ἐστὶ πλὴν τῆς ἀρίστης κατασκευῆς, 
ἣν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις κρινεῖς Ἱπποκράτει πειθόμενος, οὐ λευκότησιν ἢ 
μαλακότησιν ἤ τισιν ἑτέροις τοιούτοις, δι’ ὧν τὸ κομμωτικόν τε καὶ 
νόθον, οὐ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐπιδείκνυται κάλλος.
And so, if you are seeking to discover the proper form for the eye or 
nose, you will find it by correlating structure and action. In fact, this is 
your standard, measure, and criterion of proper form and true beauty, 
since true beauty is nothing but excellence of construction, and in obe-
dience to Hippocrates you will judge that excellence from actions, not 
from whiteness, softness, or other such qualities, which are indications 
of a beauty meretricious and false, not natural and true.57
Galen uses language that can be traced to the Polycleitean tradi-
tion, that is, the canon and the criterion of beauty. Although Galen 
does not use the word summetria here, he does claim that the canon 
refers to the correlation between κατασκευή, structure, and action. 
Human bodily parts, thus, are beautiful if they are structured in a 
way which enables them to perform their acts, or in other words, to 
function appropriately. This is a strikingly Stoic way of conceptual-
ising aesthetic properties.
 Aesthetics in Stoicism and Stoicism in Aesthetics 185
Galen nowhere mentions Chrysippus. Instead, he ascribes 
this view to Hippocrates, despite the fact that the Hippocratic 
sayings he cites concerning anatomy do not imply anything as 
complex as the theorisation of aesthetic properties he provides. This 
is not, however, an empty attribution. Galen makes the connec-
tion between Hippocrates and the Stoics in a different treatise,58 
and it has been demonstrated that the key to understanding these 
claims is Galen’s interaction with his contemporary Stoics and 
Stoicising doctors. To be precise, the significant influences here are 
figures such as Aeficianus, a Stoicising Hippocratic exegete. This 
Stoicising reading of Hippocrates led Galen to the appreciation and 
adoption of Stoic metaphysics, while maintaining his well-known 
rejection of the Chrysippean psychology and such views as the 
location of the hegemonikon in the heart.59 It is quite likely that the 
Stoic conceptualisation of beauty was made convincing for Galen 
once it was incorporated into a medical context and reinterpreted 
within the Hippocratic exegetical tradition. In that case Galen 
would naturally attribute the idea to Hippocrates, whom he treats 
as the greatest authority in medicine.60
More generally speaking, Galen’s passage shows a fascinating 
confluence of interests in aesthetics. After citing Chrysippus’ defi-
nition of beauty and saying it is like that offered by Polycleitus, 
he says it is the definition adopted by all physicians in the On 
the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. In the On the Utility of 
Parts, Galen himself uses a vocabulary that is strongly tied to the 
Polycleitean tradition (namely, the Canon). He references the argu-
ment about aesthetic agency that is also associated with the artistic 
tradition and can be cross-referenced to Vitruvius. In addition to 
this, close to this passage, Galen refers to the passage in Xenophon’s 
Symposium, in which the functional theory of beauty is discussed. 
Socrates is said to be more handsome than any youth, because, 
for example, his bulging eyes make him see better, like a crab.61 
Galen’s knowledge of these discourses on the arts and beauty could 
be due to the fact that Galen was extremely well educated.62 Yet his 
claim that other physicians subscribe to a certain theory of beauty 
indicates that it was not unusual for those studying medicine to 
engage in discussions about the nature of beauty. This, moreover, 
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shows that Stoic ideas travelled far and wide, and survived the rise 
of Platonism in fields that, although connected, are not entirely 
philosophical.
The case of Stoic ideas illuminates the ways in which the nature of 
aesthetic properties was discussed in antiquity and how the debates 
on this topic spread. These debates are not only scarcely confined 
within disciplinary bounds, but also the people participating in 
them adopt and adapt these views liberally. In this way, Stoic views 
on beauty suffered a rather peculiar fate. On the one hand, their 
account of beauty proved much more popular than rival accounts 
outside philosophy. By the third century ad, it was ubiquitous 
amongst doctors and rhetoricians. On the other hand, this meant 
that Stoic views were misattributed or treated as common, and the 
Stoics got less credit than they deserved for their elegant yet potent 
way of accounting for beauty.
Concluding remarks
One may wonder if the Stoics themselves might have been sur-
prised by their legacy in aesthetics or, to put it differently, if the 
Stoics thought they had a theory of beauty. Despite the fact that 
the lack of evidence on early Stoicism inevitably leaves room for 
such scepticism, there are strong reasons to believe that the Stoic 
engagement with this topic was not an accident. It may very well 
be that all the extant remarks, arguments and conceptualisations of 
aesthetic properties in the Stoic corpus are not a clearly demarcated 
theory of the beautiful. These ideas permeate various metaphysi-
cal, epistemological and ethical arguments. There is no definite 
evidence that Chrysippus ever isolated his ideas on the beautiful 
and discussed them for their own sake, because his works survive 
only in fragments, yet there might have been a treatise or treatises 
on aesthetic questions that are not extant. It is impossible, there-
fore, to answer the question of whether the early Stoics considered 
themselves to have a theory of beauty with reference to the works 
they wrote or did not write.
It is possible, however, to argue on the grounds of the con-
tents of the Stoic claims pertinent to beauty. They share a striking 
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degree of consistency. The definition of beauty as summetria, for 
instance, states explicitly what other arguments imply in the use of 
the aesthetic terms τὸ καλόν and τὸ κάλλος. The evidence for every 
topic discussed in this book shares certain common theoretical 
grounds and assumptions with the evidence for all the other topics. 
There are, therefore, strong connections between the ways in which 
beauty is conceptualised not only within Chrysippus’ fragments 
but also the Stoic corpus more generally. Even if Chrysippus and 
other Stoics never put all of their ideas on beauty into a single work 
but theorised the beautiful as a part of their other enquiries, their 
insights and arguments on the beautiful are substantial enough 
in their content to be treated as a theory of the beautiful.63 The 
evidence of the extensive legacy of the Stoic ideas discussed in this 
chapter corroborates such a reading.
As a result, the significance of Stoic aesthetics is twofold. First, 
Stoic ideas played a fairly prominent role in the ancient debates 
on aesthetics and these ideas are much more influential than one 
might suspect, often reaching far beyond philosophical audiences 
and their polemics. Stoicism, thus, has a place within ancient 
aesthetics and the history of aesthetics more generally. Second, 
aesthetic issues permeate Stoicism thoroughly and, consequently, 
paying attention to Stoic views on matters relating to aesthetics 
means obtaining a fuller understanding of their system. Aesthetics, 
thus, has a place within the study of Stoicism, just as Stoicism has 
a place in aesthetics.
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